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When can a noncitizen bring her claims directly before a federal district court?
The answer is complicated, due in large part to a provision of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). That provision states that if a
noncitizen’s claims “arise from” her removal proceedings, they cannot be heard by a
federal district court. Instead, those claims would be subject to more limited judicial
review in a federal court of appeals only after the noncitizen’s immigration removal
proceedings have concluded. If, however, a noncitizen’s claims do not “arise from”
removal proceedings, § 1252(b)(9) poses no obstacle to district court jurisdiction. In
these instances, noncitizens may have a more immediate opportunity to obtain judicial
review and hold the government accountable for its potentially unlawful action. This
Comment argues that § 1252(b)(9) should be read narrowly in light of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Jennings v. Rodriguez. To effectuate that interpretation, this
Comment offers and evaluates several factors and frameworks that district courts can
employ when confronted with claims that may implicate § 1252(b)(9).
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INTRODUCTION
Efrain and his six-year-old daughter Mia feared being returned to Mexico,
for they knew what awaited them there.1 Just months earlier, in April 2019, the
father and daughter fled the violence of their hometown in Guatemala and

1 Brief for Plaintiffs at 2, Hernandez Culajay v. McAleenan, 396 F. Supp. 3d 477 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (No.
19-03204). This fact pattern is based on E.O.H.C. v. Sec’y of United States Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 950 F.3d
177 (3d Cir. 2020), which reversed in part the district court’s decision in Hernandez Culajay v. McAleenan,
396 F. Supp. 3d 477 (E.D. Pa. 2019). This Comment uses the pseudonym Efrain for the father.
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crossed the southern border of the United States.2 But instead of finding the
refuge they sought, Efrain and Mia were hauled back across the border and
dropped off in Tijuana, Mexico, without food, shelter, or a guarantee of
survival.3 They, like nearly 60,000 other migrants, were subject to the Migrant
Protection Protocols (MPP), a Trump administration policy that forced asylum
seekers to wait for months in increasingly dangerous and crowded Mexican
border towns until their appearance in immigration court.4 In Tijuana, Efrain
and Mia were initially homeless and lived in constant fear for their safety,
avoiding harm only because they were taken in by a willing stranger.5
In June, they returned to the United States for their immigration court
hearing.6 Despite having a viable asylum claim,7 Efrain told the immigration
judge, on the ﬂawed advice of a Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) agent,
that he had no fear of returning to Guatemala and was merely seeking a better
life for his daughter in the United States.8 Because these are insuﬃcient
grounds for a grant of asylum, the immigration judge ordered Efrain’s
removal.9 Rather than appeal his removal, Efrain waived his opportunity to
do so, fearing that he and his daughter would be sent back to Mexico as they
awaited another hearing.10
To prepare for their deportation to Guatemala, the government
transferred Efrain and Mia across the country, from southern California to
the Berks County Residential Center—an immigration detention center—in
Leesport, Pennsylvania.11 There, an attorney took up their case and appealed
it to the Board of Immigration Appeals, arguing that Efrain’s waiver of appeal
2 Brief for Plaintiﬀs, supra note 1, at 1; see also E.O.H.C., 950 F.3d at 181 (“[Petitioners] are from
Mixco, Guatemala, a city plagued by violent crime.”).
3 Brief for Plaintiﬀs, supra note 1, at 2; E.O.H.C., 950 F.3d at 181.
4 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., MIGRANT PROTECTION PROTOCOLS (Jan. 24, 2019),
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2019/01/24/migrant-protection-protocols
[https://perma.cc/WG4VKTDA]; see also Miriam Jordan, Appeals Court Allows ‘Remain in Mexico’ Policy to Continue Blocking
Migrants at the Border, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/
03/04/us/migrants-border-remain-in-mexico-mpp-court.html
[https://perma.cc/8KRN-VXH5]
(“Since the ‘Remain in Mexico’ policy [MPP] was rolled out in January 2019, many of the estimated
60,000 migrants required to wait in Mexican border towns for their immigration hearings have been
victimized by sexual assault, kidnap and torture.”).
5 Brief for Plaintiﬀs, supra note 1, at 3.
6 Id.
7 Telephone Interview with Mike DePrince, Pro Bono Counsel for Plaintiﬀs (May 14, 2020)
(explaining that Efrain and Mia had a viable claim for asylum).
8 Brief for Plaintiﬀs, supra note 1, at 1, 3-4.
9 Id. at 3-4. To win a grant of asylum, Efrain would have to demonstrate that he was unwilling
to return to Guatemala because of “persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
[his] race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42)(A); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13 (2020) (describing the eligibility and burden of proof for
asylum applicants). Merely desiring a better life is an insufficient ground for asylum or similar relief.
10 Brief for Plaintiﬀs, supra note 1, at 4.
11 Id. at 3-4.
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was invalid because he made the decision under duress.12 Filing the appeal
triggered an automatic stay of removal, but it was unclear whether this stay
prevented their intermediate return to Mexico or their ultimate removal to
Guatemala.13 Given this ambiguity, the government took Efrain and Mia
from the Berks County facility and put them on a plane to California, with
the intent to return them to Mexico for the pendency of their appeal to the
Board of Immigration Appeals.14
In a matter of hours, their pro bono counsel scrambled to draft and file an
emergency mandamus petition for a preliminary injunction in federal district
court.15 In their petition, Efrain and Mia alleged, among other things, that
returning them to Mexico would violate their constitutional and statutory rights
to counsel, and that they were ineligible to be placed in MPP in the first place.16
Simply put, they asked the district court to prohibit their return to Mexico.
The district court declined to do so.17 Instead, it found that it lacked
jurisdiction to adjudicate Efrain and Mia’s claims under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(9),18 which provides in relevant part:
Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and
application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action
taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under
this subchapter shall be available only in judicial review of a ﬁnal order under
this section.19

12 Id. at 4 (“Now represented, Plaintiﬀs initiated an appeal to the Board of Immigration
Appeals arguing that the abandonment of their asylum claims was made under duress, and thus not
knowing, intelligent, or voluntary.”).
13 Id.; E.O.H.C. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 950 F.3d 177, 181 (3d Cir. 2020).
14 Brief for Plaintiﬀs, supra note 1, at 4.
15 Id. at 4-5; see also Telephone Interview with Mike DePrince, supra note 7 (describing the
events leading up to the ﬁling of the petition).
16 E.O.H.C., 950 F.3d at 181-82. Efrain and Mia also argued that their return to Mexico would
violate the Flores Agreement and the government’s non-refoulement obligations. Id. at 182. While central
to the case, these claims did not implicate 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9), which is the topic of this Comment.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9); E.O.H.C., 950 F.3d at 182. Although it has since been codiﬁed,
§ 1252(b)(9) was originally enacted as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996 (1996 Act), Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 306, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 607-12 (1996) (codiﬁed as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). It was later amended by the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub.
L. No. 109-13, § 106, 119 Stat. 231, 302-311. The only change that the REAL ID made to the provision
was to add the following language explicitly prohibiting habeas review:

Except as otherwise provided in this section, no court shall have jurisdiction, by habeas
corpus under section 2241 of Title 28, United States Code, or any other habeas corpus
provision, by section 1361 or 1651 of such title, or by any other provision of law
(statutory or nonstatutory), to review such an order of such questions of law or fact.
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The district court reasoned that the father and daughter’s claims “arose
from” an “action taken or proceeding brought to remove [them]” from the
United States, and therefore § 1252(b)(9) precluded district court
jurisdiction.20 If Efrain and Mia wanted relief, they would have to ﬁrst bring
their claims before the immigration judge, then to the Board of Immigration
Appeals, and ﬁnally in a petition for review before a court of appeals.21 In
other words, they would have to return to Mexico and wait to bring their
claims to a federal court only after trudging through the entire administrative
appeals process—one that could take months, if not years.22
Although the district court’s jurisdictional analysis was later overturned
by the Third Circuit—an outcome that ultimately prevented the government
from returning Efrain and Mia to Mexico—its initial decision represents a
larger, and troubling pattern. In dozens of cases like this one, noncitizens
bring urgent claims to district court, only to face the potentially
insurmountable hurdle of § 1252(b)(9).23 And when the doors to district court
are slammed shut, so too are the doors to justice, as noncitizens have no other
avenues to immediate relief.24 Thus, as Efrain and Mia’s case illustrates,
whether noncitizen plaintiﬀs can access federal district court may be the
diﬀerence between relief and removal, freedom and detention, life and death.
In the years following § 1252(b)(9)’s enactment, several scholars published
seminal articles addressing the provision and the newly installed judicial

Id. at § 106(a)(2), 119 Stat. at 311, amending 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). The Act did not, however, make
any substantive changes to the provision. In examining the amended provision, the Ninth Circuit
concluded “[t]he statute now contains an additional sentence on habeas jurisdiction, but the
operative jurisdiction-channeling language has not changed from 1996.” J.E. F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d
1026, 1034 n.6 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Chehazeh v. Att’y Gen., 666 F.3d 118, 132 (3d Cir. 2012)
(explaining that the REAL ID Act did not modify the scope of § 1252(b)(9)).
20 Hernandez Culajay v. McAleenan, 396 F. Supp. 3d 477, 486 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (“[T]his Court
lacks jurisdiction under Section 1252(b)(9) [over the right-to-counsel claims]”); id. at 487 (“The
Court does not have jurisdiction to hear [the Migrant Protection Protocol] claim because Section
1252(b)(9) takes away any such jurisdiction.”).
21 Id. at 488-89; see also 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(1), (b)(9), (d)(1) (requiring noncitizens to exhaust
all administrative remedies before bringing claims that “arise from” removal proceedings to federal
court through a petition for review). A petition for review is “the document ﬁled by, or on behalf
of, an individual seeking review of an agency decision in a circuit court of appeals.” Practice Advisory:
How to File A Petition for Review, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Nov. 2015),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/ﬁles/practice_advisory/how_to_ﬁle_a_p
etition_for_review_2015_update.pdf [https://perma.cc/9YAP-DN7L].
22 See Immigration Court Backlog Jumps While Case Processing Slows, TRAC IMMIGR. (June 8,
2018), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/516 [https://perma.cc/S658-RCH7] (ﬁnding that
noncitizens may wait many months, if not years, for their hearing before an immigration judge).
23 See infra Section I.E (discussing the types of claims that § 1252(b)(9) implicates).
24 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) (explaining that the petition for review process is the only means
of judicial review for anything swept within the reach of § 1252(b)(9)).
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review system more broadly, including Professors Lenni B. Benson;25 Gerald
L. Neuman;26 and Hiroshi Motomura.27 Since 2000, only one other article,
another student Comment, has addressed the provision, which focused
speciﬁcally on § 1252(b)(9)’s applicability in Bivens actions.28
This Comment not only aims to address the provision more
comprehensively, but it also seeks to update the literature in light of Jennings
v. Rodriguez, in which the Supreme Court squarely addressed the scope of
§ 1252(b)(9) for the ﬁrst time in nearly two decades.29 Speciﬁcally, this
25 Lenni B. Benson, Back to the Future: Congress Attacks the Right to Judicial Review of Immigration
Proceedings, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1411 (1997). In her article, Professor Benson argued that the severe
restrictions on judicial review under IIRIRA “ha[d] revived the default vehicle for judicial review,
the writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 1416. She contended that noncitizens are “likely to ﬁnd a variety of
ways to try to evade the strictures of [§ 1252(b)(9)].” Id. at 1458. As this Comment will reveal, her
prediction was correct. However, rather than rely on the phraseology of “evade the strictures,” this
Comment will demonstrate that many noncitizens have brought and continue to bring claims that
legitimately fall outside the reach of § 1252(b)(9). Id.
26 Gerald Neuman, Jurisdiction and the Rule of Law After the 1996 Immigration Act, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 1963 (2000). Professor Neuman’s piece evaluated the contemporaneous “state of the debate” in
the immigration jurisdiction context and oﬀered important observations about the judicial review
system ushered in by IIRIRA. Id. at 1964, 1989-97.
27 Hiroshi Motomura, Judicial Review in Immigration Cases After AADC: Lessons from Civil
Procedure, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 385 (2000). Professor Motomura most squarely addressed
§ 1252(b)(9), noting that the provision “warrants sustained discussion . . . . [because it] has
widespread practical implications, [and] because it will shape access to federal courts in immigration
cases.” Id. at 451. In addition to oﬀering a comprehensive analysis of § 1252(b)(9), he contended,
among other points, that jurisdictional statutes like § 1252(b)(9) “play an underappreciated role in
shaping our view of the merits of a court challenge.” Id. This Comment leans heavily on Professor
Motomura’s work but has the beneﬁt of analyzing twenty years of case law.
28 See Sripriya Narasimhan, Comment, Does “Keep Out!” Mean “Stay Out!”?: The Immigration
and Nationality Act’s Eﬀect on Access to Federal Courts for Constitutional Actions, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
1443 (2010) (evaluating whether § 1252(b)(9) limits federal district court jurisdiction speciﬁcally in
the context of Bivens claims).
29 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 840-41 (2018) (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion). Since 2018,
when Jennings was decided, the Supreme Court has discussed the provision on multiple occasions, to
varying extents. In 2019, the Court decided Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954, 962 (2019), in which it
essentially reiterated the same positions offered in Jennings. The following year, in 2020, the Court
discussed the provision in three cases. See Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062, 1070-71 (2020);
Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1689-90 (2020); Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1901 (2020). Although these cases, especially Regents, have an impact on the scope
of § 1252(b)(9), Jennings remains—by far—the most important recent case to address the provision.
In Guerrero-Lasprilla, the Court analyzed specific language of § 1252(b)(9) to construe the phrase
“questions of law” used elsewhere in § 1252. See 140 S. Ct. at 1070-71 (analyzing the “zipper clause” of
§1252(b)(9) and concluding that it must encompass mixed questions of law and fact, including the
application of law to facts). It did not discuss, much less alter, the scope of § 1252(b)(9). In Nasrallah
v. Barr, the Court held that a court of appeals should deferentially review factual challenges to denials
of Convention Against Torture relief. 140 S. Ct. at 1688. In reaching that decision, the Court merely
summarized the function of § 1252(b)(9) without interpreting or modifying the scope of the provision.
Id. at 1689-90. Of the three Supreme Court cases that discussed § 1252(b)(9) in the 2020 term, Regents
had the greatest impact on the provision’s scope. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1907. There, the Court held
that the government’s rescission of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) was unlawful.
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Comment contributes to the literature in two related ways: ﬁrst, it presents
an argument that Jennings substantively narrowed earlier interpretations of
§ 1252(b)(9). Second, it compiles, outlines, and evaluates the various
frameworks and factors that lower courts have used since Jennings to
determine whether § 1252(b)(9) prohibits review of the claims before them.
Part I provides a brief history of judicial review in the immigration context.
It then describes the purpose and framework of § 1252(b)(9), explains the
administrative process for immigrants appealing removal decisions, highlights
the types of claims that may implicate the provision, and introduces the textual
issues courts grapple with when interpreting § 1252(b)(9).
Part II provides a summary and analysis of the Supreme Court’s opinion
in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. St. Cyr, where the Court directly
addressed § 1252(b)(9) for the ﬁrst time.30 It then traces the evolution of how
lower courts interpreted and applied § 1252(b)(9) after St. Cyr, with a
particular focus on the extremely broad reading of § 1252(b)(9) advanced by
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and later adopted by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Finally, it summarizes the Supreme
Court’s decision in Jennings.
Part III provides a substantive analysis of Jennings, arguing that it directed
a narrower interpretation of § 1252(b)(9) than had previously been embraced
by the First and Ninth Circuits. In turn, it outlines and analyzes the various
factors lower courts have employed since Jennings, many of which have been
used to properly eﬀectuate the Court’s narrower interpretation of
§ 1252(b)(9). Finally, the Appendix provides a comprehensive chart
summarizing the main district and circuit court cases that have addressed
§ 1252(b)(9) since Jennings.31
I. THE HISTORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN IMMIGRATION CASES AND
THE INTRODUCTION OF § 1252(b)(9)
The story of judicial review in the immigration context has been
analogized to Sir Isaac Newton’s Third Law of Motion: for every action there
is an equal, and opposite, reaction.32 It may be better characterized, however,
Id. at 1901. The Court made two important observations about the scope of § 1252(b)(9). First, that
the provision is not implicated in this sort of case, where “the parties are not challenging any removal
proceedings.” Id. at 1907 (emphasis added). Second, the scope of § 1252(b)(9), like that of its
neighboring provision § 1252(g), is “narrow.” Id. While both observations are helpful, Jennings remains
the most influential case on the provision.
30 533 U.S. 289, 292 (2001).
31 The chart is recent as of November 17, 2020. Although it is widely inclusive, it is not entirely
exhaustive. It includes only post-Jennings cases in which § 1252(b)(9) was treated in some depth. It
does not include every case since Jennings that has merely cited the provision in passing.
32 Benson, supra note 25, at 1419.
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as a perpetual game of “Whac-a-Mole” in which Congress seeks to smack
down nearly all avenues of judicial review that surface—particularly those
that lead to review in federal district court.33 Congress’s intent to curb judicial
review of immigration decisions was most evident in two laws enacted in
1996, which categorically eliminated judicial review for certain noncitizens
and for particular claims. Moreover, all judicial review of ﬁnal orders of
removal, as well as any related claims, was to take place solely in a court of
appeals presented through the petition for review process, leaving few, if any,
paths for immediate review in federal district court.34
This Part ﬁrst traces the history of judicial review prior to these 1996 laws.
It then outlines how the 1996 legislation reshaped judicial review in a general
sense before focusing speciﬁcally on § 1252(b)(9): Congress’s intent in
enacting this provision; the potential consequences of its applicability; the
types of claims that may implicate it; and, ﬁnally, its text.
A. Judicial Review in Immigration Proceedings Before 1996
Prior to 1955, federal courts reviewed the legality of exclusion and
deportation of noncitizens exclusively through habeas corpus petitions filed in
a federal district court.35 Judicial review was expanded in 1955, however, when
the Supreme Court held that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)36
offered an additional avenue for judicial review of deportation orders.37 In
1956, the Court further extended the opportunity for judicial review under the
33 See id. (“[The 1996] changes are part of the continuing eﬀorts of Congress to control the
timing, scope, and nature of judicial review of immigration proceedings.”). As this Part
demonstrates, there has been a seemingly endless cycle of congressional attempts to foreclose
avenues of judicial review only for the judicial branch to pry them back open.
34 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(5), (b)(9) (requiring all claims “arising from” removal proceedings
to be consolidated into a petition for review with a court of appeals).
35 Motomura, supra note 27, at 395; see also Neuman, supra note 26, at 1966-67 (“Even before the
federal government took on the task of regulating immigration, federal courts employed the writ of
habeas corpus to inquire into the lawfulness of ” noncitizens’ presence in the United States). Prior to
the passage of IIRIRA in 1996, discussed infra Sections I.B-C, there were two types of immigration
proceedings: deportation proceedings and exclusion proceedings. See IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR.
INADMISSIBILITY & DEPORTABILITY § 1.4 (2019) (explaining pre-1997 immigration proceedings and
comparing those proceedings to those mandated under current law). In deportation proceedings, the
government had to prove the person was deportable, and in exclusion proceedings, the individual had
to prove that she was admissible. See id. (“Generally, the [Immigration and Naturalization Service]
had the burden of proving someone was deportable [in deportation hearings] while the non-citizen
had to prove they were not excludable in exclusion proceedings.”).
36 Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codiﬁed as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
37 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163; see Shaughnessy
v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51-52 (1955) (holding that “there is a right to judicial review of deportation
orders other than by habeas corpus,” and that the remedy sought in this case, judicial review under
the Administrative Procedure Act, “is an appropriate one”).
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APA, this time to orders of exclusion.38 After these decisions, noncitizens
could challenge their deportation or exclusion order directly in federal district
court under the APA, as well as through a habeas petition.39
This expansion of judicial review “led to many novel and creative challenges
and, in some notorious cases, lengthy delay in the execution of deportation or
exclusion orders.”40 Shortly thereafter came the first round of judicial review
“Whac-a-Mole,” when Congress amended the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA) in 1961, providing the first statutory provision governing—and
restricting—judicial review of exclusion and deportation orders.41
For exclusion cases, section 106(b) of the amended INA provided that
noncitizens could seek review of their ﬁnal exclusion orders exclusively in
habeas corpus proceedings in district court—the APA would no longer
provide a separate avenue for judicial review of such orders.42
For deportation cases, section 106(a) of the INA set forth the “sole and
exclusive” procedure for judicial review of ﬁnal orders of deportation.43
Under this procedure, noncitizens facing deportation had to ﬁrst exhaust
administrative remedies in the immigration system and then seek judicial
review of their ﬁnal orders only by ﬁling a petition for review in a court of
appeals pursuant to the Hobbs Act.44 With one exception provided in section
106(a)(9), there were no statutorily authorized avenues for litigants to bring
challenges to deportation orders to a district court.45

38 See Brownell v. Shung, 352 U.S. 180, 181 (1956) (determining that a noncitizen may
appropriately pursue either remedy—habeas corpus or a declaratory judgment under the
Administrative Procedure Act—when challenging an exclusion order).
39 See David M. McConnell, Judicial Review Under the Immigration and Nationality Act: Habeas
Corpus and the Coming of REAL ID (1996-2005), 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 75, 80 (2006-2007)
(discussing how noncitizens facing deportation could now challenge their orders under the
Administrative Procedure Act and through habeas corpus proceedings).
40 Benson, supra note 25, at 1431.
41 See Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, § 5, 75 Stat. 650 (amending the statute to
include “judicial review of orders of deportation and exclusion”); see also Motomura, supra note 27,
at 395 (“The enactment of § 106 in 1961 was an attempt by Congress to limit opportunities for
judicial review that the Administrative Procedure Act had opened.”).
42 See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 106(b) (codiﬁed at 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(b))
(“Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, any alien against whom a ﬁnal order of exclusion
has been made heretofore or hereafter under the provisions of section 1226 of this title or comparable
provisions of any prior Act may obtain judicial review of such order by habeas corpus proceedings
and not otherwise.”) (repealed 1996).
43 § 106(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (repealed 1996).
44 Id. The Hobbs Act, which governs review for various administrative agencies, eliminates district
court jurisdiction and places judicial review solely in the courts of appeals. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341–2351.
45 “[A]ny alien held in custody pursuant to an order of deportation may obtain judicial review
thereof by habeas corpus proceedings.” INA § 106(a)(9), 75 Stat. 650, 652 (repealed 1996).
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But despite Congress’s attempt to curtail judicial review in federal district
court, section 106 left open several significant avenues to such review.46 For one,
section 106 only applied to review of a “final order” of exclusion or deportation.
Thus, if a noncitizen challenged a matter outside the ambit of a “final order of
deportation,” she could bring her claims directly to federal district court.47
In Cheng Fan Kwok v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, for example,
a noncitizen challenged an immigration oﬃcial’s decision to deny a temporary
stay of deportation while he applied for asylum.48 The Supreme Court found
that because the denial of the stay was not a determination “made during a
[deportation] proceeding,” it fell outside the scope of a “ﬁnal order” and thus
was not precluded by section 106.49 In other words, because the decision to
deny a stay was collateral to his ﬁnal order of deportation, the noncitizen
could bring his claims challenging the immigration oﬃcial’s denial directly to
federal district court.50
Future litigants relied on Cheng to bring their claims to district court,
characterizing them as collateral to their “ﬁnal order” and thus not subject to
the requirement of section 106 that review of such orders takes place solely in
a court of appeals through a petition for review.51
Likewise, the Supreme Court’s decision in McNary v. Haitian Refugee
Center provided a path around section 106 for noncitizens alleging “pattern
and practice” violations.52 At issue in McNary was section 210 of the INA, the
special agricultural worker legalization program (SAW), which was part of
the Immigration Control and Reform Act of 1986.53 Under section 210, the

46 See Benson, supra note 25, at 1432 (“[L]itigation soon arose about the type of actions, orders and
decisions of the agency that were within the term ‘final order.’”). Benson highlights the various types of
challenges that would fall outside section 106 and thus get into federal district court. Id. at 1433.
47 See Motomura, supra note 27, at 415 (“If a matter was not included in a ‘ﬁnal order,’ then
review was in the district court under the general federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and
former INA § 279.”).
48 392 U.S. 206, 207-08 (1968).
49 Id. at 216.
50 Id. Motomura explains that subsequent lower court decisions extended this principle from
Cheng, where a final removal order had already been issued, to cases where a final removal had not yet
been issued. Motomura, supra note 27, at 416. For example, Professor Motomura recounts Kavasji v.
Immigration and Naturalization Service, 675 F.2d 236, 237-39 (7th Cir. 1982), where the government
ordered a student deported after denying his requests to extend his status and be transferred to another
school. Id. As Motomura explains, the Seventh Circuit found that such claims fell outside the scope of
a “final order” and could thus be brought directly to federal district court. Id.
51 See Benson, supra note 25, at 1457 (describing how litigants relied on Cheng to characterize
their claims as “outside the scope of a removal order” and thus not limited by the procedures
prescribed in section 106).
52 McNary v. Haitan Refugee Ctr., 498 U.S. 479, 497 (1991).
53 Id. at 483 (describing statutory requirements for adjusting special agricultural workers’
statuses); Immigration Reform and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359, 3417 (1986).
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only means of judicial review for a denied SAW application was with a court
of appeals through the petition for review process set forth in section 106.54
Despite the statute’s claims-channeling provision, the McNary plaintiffs
brought their claims directly to district court alleging a “pattern and practice”
of procedural due process violations by the government in its administration of
the SAW program.55 The plaintiffs argued that they should be permitted to
access federal district court because the administrative procedures did not allow
SAW applicants the opportunity to challenge adverse evidence, to present
witnesses, or to communicate effectively as competent interpreters were not
provided.56 In spite of the claims-channeling provision in the statute—
mandating that all challenges to application denials go to a court of appeals
through a petition for review—the Supreme Court held that the district court
retained jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ “pattern and practice” claims.57
Two factors underpinned the Court’s holding. First, requiring noncitizens
to individually exhaust administrative remedies per section 106 would be less
eﬃcient than permitting them to compile and bring claims directly to the
district court.58 Second, and perhaps more importantly, the Court was
concerned that precluding district court jurisdiction would deprive the
plaintiﬀs of “meaningful judicial review.”59 Since the administrative process
at issue failed to develop an adequate record for any subsequent appellate
court review of the “pattern and practice” claims, the Court reasoned that the
plaintiﬀs must be permitted to develop an adequate record in district court.60
Relying on McNary, litigants were able to find their way into district court
despite the limitations set forth in section 106 by challenging INS enforcement
practices and arguing that only a district court could properly develop an adequate
record for review of such claims.61
These cases—Cheng and McNary—revealed that what seemed like an ironclad
judicial review system was, in practice, subject to workarounds. Noncitizens were
still finding avenues into federal district court. These perceived loopholes led to
54 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 210(e)(3)(A) (codiﬁed at 8 U.S.C. § 1160(e)(3)(A))
(“There shall be judicial review of such a denial only in the judicial review of an order of exclusion
or deportation under section 1105a of this title.”). If a noncitizen’s SAW application were denied and
resulted in a deportation order, her only means of judicial review would be to exhaust administrative
remedies in the immigration system and ﬁle a petition for review with a court of appeals.
Immigration and Nationality Act § 106(a) (codiﬁed at 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)) (repealed 1996).
55 McNary, 498 U.S. at 483.
56 Id. at 487-88.
57 Id. at 484.
58 Id. at 490.
59 Id. at 484.
60 Id.
61 See Benson, supra note 25, at 1457 n.213 (discussing cases in which noncitizens were successful,
and unsuccessful, in convincing district courts that jurisdiction over their claims was proper because
they would otherwise be deprived of “meaningful judicial review”).
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“increasing congressional and administration frustration.”62 Despite various
responsive attempts to close off these avenues of judicial review, the next bona
fide round of judicial review “Whac-a-Mole” would not take place until 1996
when Congress overhauled the system once more.63
B. Judicial Review in Immigration Proceedings After 1996
In 1996, Congress passed two statutes that fundamentally altered—and
further limited—judicial review of administrative immigration decisions.64
The ﬁrst piece of legislation was the Antiterrorism and Eﬀective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which speciﬁcally eliminated judicial review
for noncitizens convicted of certain criminal oﬀenses.65 This substantial
restriction of judicial review reﬂected “congressional dissatisfaction with the
pace of criminal alien removals under existing laws.”66 A similar sentiment
was evident in the second piece of legislation, the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), which added
§ 1252(b)(9), among other provisions.67
IIRIRA “restructured judicial review in fundamental ways.”68 Most
signiﬁcantly, IIRIRA repealed the entirety of section 106, which had been in
place since 1961, and replaced it with section 242 of the INA, now codiﬁed at
8 U.S.C. § 1252.69 The new law consolidated what were once separate
exclusion and deportation proceedings into a singular “removal proceeding”
and accordingly created a singular order of removal.70
Under section 242, judicial review of these orders was subject to the Hobbs
Act, which had previously applied only to deportation orders under section
106.71 The Hobbs Act prohibits district court review of administrative
decisions and instead funnels judicial review into the court of appeals through
Id. at 1433.
See id. at 1433-38 (tracing the history of judicial review between 1961 and 1996, noting that
no major changes had taken place until 1996).
64 See Motomura, supra note 27, at 396 (“[T]wo separate pieces of legislation signiﬁcantly
changed judicial review of immigration decisions.”).
65 Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 440(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1276-77 (1996).
66 See McConnell, supra note 39, at 83 n.2 (citing S. Rep. No. 104-249, at 2, (1996)) (explaining
that a purpose of the bill was to “expedit[e] the removal of excludable and deportable aliens, especially
criminal aliens”) (emphasis added).
67 Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codiﬁed at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1231, 1252)
(repealing INA § 106 in IIRIRA § 306(b) and creating the new INA § 242).
68 Motomura, supra note 27, at 397.
69 Immigration and Nationality Act § 242 (codiﬁed at 8 U.S.C. § 1252). See also Benson, supra
note 25, at 1442-43 (“[IIRIRA] also completely repealed the former statutory section governing
judicial review of deportation and exclusion proceedings . . . .”).
70 Motomura, supra note 27, at 397.
71 Section 242(a)(1) (codiﬁed at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1)) provides: “Judicial review of a ﬁnal order
of removal . . . is governed only by [the Hobbs Act] . . . .”
62
63
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a petition for review process.72 Therefore, under the new judicial review
regime, which is still in place today, noncitizens are prohibited from
challenging their removal orders in district court. Instead, under § 1252(a)(1),
judicial review of final orders of removal can be obtained only through the
filing of a petition for review with the appropriate court of appeals.73 With
this change, Congress eliminated the few remaining statutorily authorized
avenues to judicial review in district court.74
C. Consolidation of Claims: The Addition and Intent of § 1252(b)(9)
IIRIRA did not only deprive district courts of jurisdiction over challenges
to ﬁnal removal orders. With the addition of § 1252(b)(9), IIRIRA also
removed district court jurisdiction over many claims that even relate to
removal and the removal process. Subsection 1252(b)(9) provides:
Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation of
constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or
proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States . . . shall be
available only in judicial review of a ﬁnal order under this section.75

At bottom, the provision is meant to consolidate for review—or “zip”76—all
precedent claims “arising from” removal proceedings into a subsequent petition
for review with a court of appeals, alongside a noncitizen’s challenge to her final
removal order.77 With the addition of § 1252(b)(9), as one court put it, Congress
sought to prevent “piecemeal litigation” by limiting all noncitizens “to one bite
of the apple with regard to challenging an order of removal.”78
28 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2351.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). Congress later clariﬁed in the REAL ID Act of 2005, which added
section 242(a)(5) to the Immigration and Nationality Act (codiﬁed at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5)), that
the petition for review process is “exclusive and not subject to circumvention.” See O.A. v. Trump,
404 F. Supp. 3d 109, 128 (D.D.C. 2019) (noting that “a petition for review ﬁled with an appropriate
court of appeals” is “the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of an order of removal”).
74 As noted supra, under section 106(b), noncitizens could challenge ﬁnal orders of exclusion in
district court through a petition for habeas, and under section 106(a)(9), noncitizens could challenge
custody pursuant to ﬁnal orders of deportation in district court through a petition for habeas. See
supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
75 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9); see also supra note 19 (discussing the REAL ID Act’s amendment
to § 1252(b)(9)).
76 See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. (AADC), 525 U.S. 471, 483 (1999)
(describing § 1252(b)(9) as an “unmistakable zipper clause”) (internal quotations omitted).
77 See Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062, 1070 (2020) (“Congress intended the zipper clause
to ‘consolidate judicial review of immigration proceedings into one action in the court of appeals.’”).
78 Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 446 (3d Cir. 2005). Though the Court was explaining
the intent of the REAL ID Act, the logic applies with equal force to the original intent of
§ 1252(b)(9). See E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 950 F.3d 1242, 1269 (9th Cir. 2020) (“The
purpose of these claim-channeling provisions is to limit all [noncitizens] to one bite of the apple
with regard to challenging an order of removal.”) (internal quotations omitted) (citation omitted).
72
73
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The legislative history of the REAL ID Act of 2005—which amended
§ 1252(b)(9) by adding a clause to explicitly state that the provision applied
to habeas claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2241—similarly noted that § 1252(b)(9)
“made clear that review of a ﬁnal removal order [through a petition for review
with a court of appeals] is the only mechanism for reviewing any issue raised
in a removal proceeding.”79 In sum, § 1252(b)(9) aims to funnel any claims
stemming from removal proceedings away from federal district court and into
an eventual petition for review with a court of appeals.
In an article critical of IIRIRA’s judicial review scheme, Professor Benson
observes that § 1252(b)(9) was apparently intended to overturn Supreme
Court decisions like Cheng and McNary, which allowed litigants to ﬁnd their
way into district court despite the “sole and exclusive” review procedures of
the now-repealed section 106.80 Relative to section 106, which consolidated
only challenges to “ﬁnal orders,” § 1252(b)(9) appears to have a broader scope.
On its face, § 1252(b)(9) aims to “gather all [] permissible claims and channel
them into review of the ﬁnal order of [removal]” with a court of appeals.81
Ostensibly, even claims that were previously collateral to “ﬁnal orders” under
section 106—like those at issue in Cheng—might be consolidated under a
broad reading of § 1252(b)(9).82
D. The Consequence of Consolidation: The Administrative Process
Importantly, § 1252(b)(9) does not eliminate access to judicial review
altogether.83 Where applicable, the provision only requires noncitizens to
consolidate their claims for eventual judicial review in a petition for review with

79 H.R. Rep. No. 109-72, at 173 (2005). The House Report further explained that the
combination of § 1252(a)(1)—the provision implementing the Hobbs Act—and § 1252(b)(9) were
“intended to preclude all district court review of any issue raised in a removal proceeding.” Id.; see
also supra note 19 (explaining the REAL ID Act’s eﬀect on § 1252(b)(9)).
80 Benson, supra note 25, at 1456-57.
81 Id. at 1456 (emphasis added). Notably, some, including the three dissenting justices in
Jennings, have construed § 1252(b)(9) in a similar way courts did section 106: that it applies only to
challenges to “ﬁnal orders.” For a more detailed discussion on this point, see infra note 198.
82 See Motomura, supra note 27, at 417 (“[T]he government decision at issue in Cheng—denial
of a stay of deportation after a deportation order—may be within the new timing consolidation
provision in § 1252(b)(9).”).
83 See id. at 416-17 (explaining that § 1252(b)(9) consolidated the claims that must be brought
in a petition for review in front of a court of appeals); see also Aguilar v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs
Enf ’t, 510 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2007) (stating that § 1252(b)(9) “is a judicial channeling provision, not
a claim-barring one”).
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a court of appeals.84 Therefore, when claims implicate § 1252(b)(9), the question
is not if they can be reviewed by a federal court but where, when, and how.85
If the claims fall within § 1252(b)(9)’s scope, they must be consolidated into a
petition for review before a court of appeals only after exhausting administrative
remedies, which in the immigration context is called “removal proceedings.” If,
on the other hand, claims fall outside the ambit of § 1252(b)(9), they can be
reviewed directly and more immediately by a federal district court.86 Although
judicial review exists in either scenario, having claims consolidated into a petition
for review has several critical drawbacks for noncitizens.
First, noncitizens may be forced to wait for a staggering period of time—
months or years, often while in detention87—before their removal proceedings
conclude and they can file a petition for review with a court of appeals.88
Removal proceedings unfold in two stages.89 In the ﬁrst, an immigration
judge determines whether to sustain the charges contained in the
government’s oﬃcial charging documents that present the provisions of the

84 See Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 313 (2001) (concluding that the
purpose of § 1252(b)(9) is to “consolidate ‘judicial review’ of immigration proceedings into one
action in the court of appeals,” and therefore it is not meant to completely eliminate or bar claims).
85 See Narasimhan, supra note 28, at 1449 (“[§ 1252(b)(9)] consolidate[s] questions for judicial
review both as a matter of time and forum.”); see also J. E. F.M. ex rel. Ekblad v. Whitaker, 908 F.3d
1157, 1158 (9th Cir. 2018), reh’g denied (Berzon, J., dissenting) (noting with respect to § 1252(b)(9)
that “[t]he issue is only how and where [the claims] may be raised”).
86 See, e.g., S. Poverty L. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 18-760, 2020 WL 3265533,
at *16-18 (D.D.C. June 17, 2020) (ﬁnding that claims challenging conditions of conﬁnement in
immigration detention fell outside the scope of § 1252(b)(9), thereby permitting review in district
court). To be clear, there are other jurisdiction-limiting provisions in the INA, mainly in § 1252.
Even if a claim overcomes § 1252(b)(9), there may be other barriers to district court jurisdiction.
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (restricting district court jurisdiction over challenges to an agency’s
discretionary actions or decisions); Benson, supra note 25, at 1445-55 (describing the disfavored
litigants and disfavored claims under § 1252).
87 See TRAC IMMIGR., supra note 22 (ﬁnding that the average wait for an immigration hearing
is well over a year, though noting that it can be shorter for detained noncitizens).
88 The INA provides for two diﬀerent administrative processes. One is the “expedited
removal” process, which, as its name suggests, focuses on rapidly removing noncitizens near the
border. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (explaining the conditions in which a noncitizen arrives and is subject to
expedited removal proceedings); see also 84 Fed. Reg. 35410 (July 23, 2019) (explaining that the
Department of Homeland Security “may remove, without a hearing before an immigration judge,
certain aliens arriving in the United States . . . who are inadmissible under [certain subsections of
the INA]”). The other are “regular removal proceedings.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (requiring that “[a]n
immigration judge shall conduct proceedings for deciding the inadmissibility or deportability of an
alien” and explaining requirements for such proceedings). Since the INA eliminates all avenues of
judicial review for those in expedited removal, this Comment only discusses regular removal
proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A) (eliminating judicial review in expedited removal
proceedings). These paragraphs oﬀer a highly abbreviated summary of removal proceedings. For a
more in-depth explanation of the removal process, see Ingrid V. Eagly, Remote Adjudication in
Immigration, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 933, 957-58 (2015).
89 Eagly, supra note 88, at 957-58 (explaining the two stages).
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INA the noncitizen allegedly violated.90 If the immigration judge sustains the
charges, that judge will issue a removal order, unless the noncitizen applies
for relief, such as asylum or voluntary departure, in which case she moves to
the second stage of removal proceedings.91 In the second stage, the
immigration judge adjudicates the application for relief.92 If the judge rejects
either or both applications, the noncitizen is issued a removal order.93
Regardless of when a removal order is issued—the ﬁrst stage or the second
stage—it does not automatically become “ﬁnal.” A removal order becomes
ﬁnal after the Board of Immigration Appeals aﬃrms the order on appeal or
upon the expiration of the period during which the noncitizen is permitted
to seek review of the order with the Board of Immigration Appeals.94 Only
then, after the removal order becomes ﬁnal, can a noncitizen ﬁnally ﬁle a
petition for review before a court of appeals.95
To underscore how painstakingly long this process can be, consider the
following example of a group of noncitizen asylum-seekers detained in an
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) facility in the San Francisco
area.96 Although the noncitizens had retained counsel to represent them in
removal proceedings, a rarity for detained immigrants,97 ICE transferred
them to faraway facilities outside California, making it nearly impossible for

90 See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.13, 1003.14 (2020) (deﬁning “[c]harging document” as “the written
instrument which initiates a proceeding before an Immigration Judge” and explaining that
“proceedings before an Immigration Judge commence, when a charging document is ﬂed with the
Immigration Court by the Service”).
91 Eagly, supra note 88, at 957-58. Voluntary departure is an immigration beneﬁt that allows a
noncitizen to avoid the harsh penalties associated with receiving a formal removal order. 8 C.F.R.
§ 1240.26 (2020). Professor Eagly notes that voluntary departure might be better categorized as an
immigration “beneﬁt” rather than as an actual form of “relief ” because it still results in departure
from the United States. Eagly, supra note 88, at 938 n.23.
92 Eagly, supra note 88, at 957-58.
93 Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(1)(A) (“At the conclusion of the proceeding the immigration
judge shall decide whether an alien is removable from the United States.”).
94 Id. In addition to this statutory provision, federal regulations permit an order of removal
issued by an immigration judge to become ﬁnal in several other circumstances. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R.
§ 1241.1(a) (2020) (explaining that a removal order shall become ﬁnal upon dismissal of an appeal by
the Board of Immigration Appeals); § 1241.1(b) (upon waiver of appeal by noncitizen); § 1241.1(d)
(upon the date of a decision ordering removal if case is certiﬁed to the Attorney General or Board
of Immigration Appeals); § 1241.1(e) (explaining removal in abstentia, in which a removal order
becomes ﬁnal immediately if “an immigration judge orders an alien removed in the alien’s absence”).
95 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) (requiring removal order to be ﬁnal before noncitizen can seek
judicial review through a petition for review with a court of appeals).
96 The following facts are based on Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1044-45 (N.D.
Cal. 2018). It is unclear from the facts provided whether the noncitizens were indeed seeking asylum,
but the court noted that many of them already had their ﬁrst immigration hearing, suggesting they
were seeking some form of relief from removal. Id. at 1044.
97 See Ingrid Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration Court, 164 U.
PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2015) (finding that only fourteen percent of detained immigrants secure representation).
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their lawyers to continue representing them eﬀectively.98 In response, the
noncitizens brought due process claims under the Fifth Amendment to a
federal district court, arguing that their relocation violated their
constitutional right to counsel.99 The court, however, held that the claims fell
within the scope of § 1252(b)(9)—if the noncitizens wanted to bring these
constitutional claims, they would have to do so in a petition for review with
a court of appeals only after completing removal proceedings without the
beneﬁt of counsel.100
Once a district court denies review under § 1252(b)(9), the outlook is
grim. It could be years before removal proceedings conclude and the petition
for review process becomes available noncitizens seeking judicial review. At
the time of writing, the average wait for any hearing before an immigration
judge is over 800 days.101 If a noncitizen wants to seek asylum or other relief
in the second stage of removal proceedings, like the detained noncitizens
described above, the wait will be even longer.102 Although detained
immigrants generally face shorter delays, the wait in detention is still a matter
of months, not days.103
Assuming an immigration judge denies relief,104 the noncitizens can
appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals—but that will add another
several months, if not years, to their path to judicial review. In a 2012 report,
the U.S. Department of Justice found that the Board of Immigration Appeals
took about three months to complete appeals involving detained noncitizens
and completed those involving non-detained noncitizens in around sixteen
months, “with some cases taking more than ﬁve years to complete.”105
98 Alvarez, 388 F. Supp. 3d at 1045.
99 Id.
100 This was the holding of Alvarez,

which read § 1252(b)(9) broadly to encompass the right-tocounsel claims. 338 F. Supp. 3d at 1049. See generally KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RSCH. SERV. R43613
ALIENS’ RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS: IN BRIEF 6,
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43613.pdf [https://perma.cc/2MRG-NJMA] (explaining that
although noncitizens do not have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel at the government’s expense,
they generally have a Fifth Amendment right to counsel at their own expense in removal proceedings).
101 See
Immigration Court Backlog Tool, TRAC IMMIGR. (June 8, 2018),
https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog [https://perma.cc/S658-RCH7]; see also TRAC
IMMIGR., supra note 22 (explaining that sixty-one percent of cases in the backlog are waiting for their
first hearing before an immigration judge, which represents the “first stage” of removal proceedings).
102 See TRAC IMMIGR., supra note 22 (explaining that the delay to schedule “individual merits
hearing[s],” the second stage of removal proceedings, will be “a great deal longer” than the average wait times).
103 See Immigration Court Backlog Tool, supra note 101 (noting that wait times for detained
immigrants can be as little as a month or two).
104 This is a safe assumption because detained noncitizens who are not represented are exceedingly
unlikely to obtain relief. See Eagly & Shafer, supra note 97, at 50 (finding that only two percent of
unrepresented, detained noncitizens obtained relief in removal proceedings between 2007-2012).
105 OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. EVALUATION AND INSPECTIONS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST., I-2013-001, MANAGEMENT OF IMMIGRATION CASES & APPEALS BY THE EXECUTIVE
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Although the data are now outdated, the backlog at the Board of Immigration
Appeals has only gotten worse. In 2012, when the report was released, there
were around 25,000 appeals pending.106 In 2020, there were nearly 91,000
appeals pending before the Board.107 Therefore, if § 1252(b)(9) applies to a
noncitizen’s claims, it will likely be months or years before the noncitizens
can administratively exhaust their claims and bring them through a petition
for review with a court of appeals. In the interim, noncitizens may be
languishing in detention,108 stranded in dangerous border towns in Mexico,109
or closely monitored by ICE.110
The second drawback of having claims consolidated by § 1252(b)(9) is that
the record for review is limited. When a case reaches the court of appeals
through the petition for review process, the court “shall decide the petition
only on the administrative record on which the removal order is based.”111 But
the record developed during the administrative process—the multiple phases
of removal proceedings described above—may not adequately address the
claims that a noncitizen seeks to raise.112
Consider, for example, the case of unrepresented noncitizen minors who
brought claims into federal district court arguing that they have a
constitutional due process right to government-appointed counsel.113 The
district court held—and the circuit court aﬃrmed on appeal—that
§ 1252(b)(9) applied to the minors’ claims, thus forcing them to raise their
OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW iii (2012), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2012/e1301.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2ANK-BTRE].
106 EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ADJUDICATION STATISTICS
(2020), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/ﬁle/1248506/download [https://perma.cc/R228-BFSC].
107 Id.
108 See AM. C.L. UNION, HUM. RTS. WATCH & NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR., JUSTICEFREE ZONES: U.S. IMMIGRATION DETENTION UNDER THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION 5 (2020)
(outlining growth of immigration detention during the Trump administration)
109 See Jordan, supra note 4 (explaining squalid conditions on the U.S.-Mexican border for
those migrants subject to MPP).
110 See Fact Sheet: Electronic Monitoring Devices as Alternatives to Detention, NAT’L IMMIGR.
FORUM (Feb. 22, 2019) https://immigrationforum.org/article/fact-sheet-electronic-monitoringdevices-as-alternatives-to-detention [https://perma.cc/URC3-CLCL] (highlighting the various
invasive means ICE uses to monitor non-detained noncitizens during removal proceedings).
111 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A).
112 See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. (AADC), 525 U.S. 471, 476 (1999)
(“Since neither the Immigration Judge nor the Board of Immigration Appeals has authority to hear
such claims . . . a challenge to a ﬁnal order of deportation based upon such a claim would arrive in
the court of appeals without the factual development necessary for decision.”). This concern was
also articulated by the ﬁve Ninth Circuit judges that dissented to the decision to deny rehearing and
rehearing en banc of J.E. F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026, 1034 n.6 (9th Cir. 2016). See J. E. F.M. ex rel.
Ekblad v. Whitaker, 908 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2018) (Berzon, J., dissenting) (noting that
immigration judges have little reason to develop an adequate record to address a potential future
right-to-counsel claim).
113 These facts are based oﬀ J.E. F.M., 837 F.3d at 1029-31.
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claims individually in a court of appeals through a petition for review after
their removal proceedings concluded.114
If the minors eventually came before a court of appeals through a petition
for review, the record to bolster their constitutional claims would be sparse at
best. That is because throughout removal proceedings, immigration judges and
the Board of Immigration Appeals are uniquely concerned with the merits of an
individual’s case—whether she is eligible for asylum or another form of relief.115
Not only do these administrative adjudicators have “no reason to develop an
adequate record” related to a noncitizen’s constitutional right-to-counsel claims—
or any other similar claim—but doing so may also exceed their authority.116 The
record that develops throughout removal proceedings, therefore, is unlikely to
cover the types of claims that are susceptible to the reach of § 1252(b)(9).117 In
these circumstances, a reviewing court of appeals is thus restricted to using an
inadequate record to adjudicate often significant constitutional issues.
The third disadvantage of having claims swallowed by § 1252(b)(9)
concerns representation. Permitting noncitizens to access district courts
allows them to bring class action suits, which, in turn, allows public interest
organizations to provide representation to a greater number of people than
they would be able to assist on an individual basis through removal
proceedings.118 If claims fall outside the scope of § 1252(b)(9) and can proceed
in district court, the noncitizen may be able sue on behalf of a class,
permitting the court to review issues that arise for many other noncitizens
during administrative adjudication.119 This is not true of removal proceedings,
which can only address claims of individual noncitizens, not classes.120 Class
actions are a crucial tool, not only because any relief granted will be widely
Id. at 1031-35.
See J. E. F.M. 908 F.3d at 1163 (Berzon, J., dissenting) (explaining that immigration judges and
the Board of Immigration Appeals are focused solely on the merits of an individual immigration case).
116 Id.
117 That was precisely the Supreme Court’s concern in McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, where
an inadequate record in the administrative process was central to ﬁnding that precluding district
court jurisdiction would deprive noncitizens of “meaningful judicial review.” 498 U.S. at 496.
118 See J. E. F.M., 908 F.3d at 1158 (Berzon, J., dissenting) (explaining that permitting district
court review would allow for the “representation of the class . . . by public interest organizations that
lack the capacity to represent each class member individually”).
119 See 8 CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN, STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR & RONALD Y.
WADA, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 112.02 (Matthew Bender, rev. ed.) (discussing
necessary steps for bringing class action lawsuit in the immigration context). It is worth noting that
8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) may limit certain class actions in the immigration context. See Jill E. Family,
Another Limit on Federal Court Jurisdiction? Immigrant Access to Class-Wide Injunctive Relief, 53 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 11, 13 (2005) (observing that 8 U.S.C § 1252(f)(1) may limit the ability of federal courts
to grant class-wide injunctive relief in immigration cases).
120 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(3) (explaining that individual removal proceedings are the “sole and
exclusive procedure” for determining admissibility); id. § 1229a(a)(1) (“An immigration judge shall
conduct proceedings for deciding the inadmissibility or deportation of an alien.”) (emphasis added).
114
115
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enjoyed, but also because public interest organizations may lack the capacity
to represent each class member individually. Therefore, if claims can be heard
in district court, these organizations can consolidate their eﬀorts into class
actions and distribute their representation more broadly.
Whether a noncitizen can access district court has signiﬁcant, if not grave,
consequences. Had the Third Circuit upheld the district court’s decision to
dismiss Efrain and Mia’s case, they would have been sent back to Mexico—
with no guarantee of safety or survival. But their case is just one of a number
of situations in which § 1252(b)(9) may be implicated.
E. The Contexts Where § 1252(b)(9) May Arise
Claims that implicate § 1252(b)(9) are most often brought to federal
district court before and during removal proceedings and challenge a wide
range of allegedly unlawful action. As the following scenarios illustrate,
determining whether claims raise a question “arising from any action taken
or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States” is anything
but straightforward.121
Noncitizens often seek to bring claims to district court that arise even
before the initiation of removal proceedings. For example, they have sought to
challenge the way in which ICE stopped, searched, and detained them, which
includes claims challenging large, indiscriminate ICE raids and sweeps.122
Likewise, noncitizens (and organizational plaintiffs) have sought to challenge
immigration policies such the rescission of Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals (DACA)123 and severe restrictions placed on access to asylum.124
Although not clearly brought “before” removal proceedings, these are claims
brought by noncitizens who were never in removal proceedings or are seeking
to apply for asylum, which requires the initiation of removal proceedings.125
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9).
See Tun-Cos v. Perrotte, No. 17-943, 2018 WL 3616863, at *1 (E.D. Va. Apr. 5, 2018)
(challenging allegedly illegal ICE stops and searches), rev’d on other grounds by Tun-Cos v. Perrotte,
922 F.3d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 2019); Nava v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 435 F. Supp. 3d 880, 885 (N.D.
Ill. 2020) (challenging ICE’s allegedly race-based traﬃc stops and large-scale, indiscriminate
sweeps); Nak Kim Chhoeun v. Marin, No. 17-01898, 2018 WL 1941756, at *1 (C.D. Cal. 2018)
(challenging ICE’s decision to round up and detain approximately 100 Cambodian nationals).
123 Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1901 (2020).
124 See E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 950 F.3d 1242, 1259 (9th Cir. 2020) (challenging
the November 2018 rule and proclamation that, together, “strip[] asylum eligibility from every migrant
who crosses into the United States between designated ports of entry”); O.A. v. Trump, 404 F. Supp.
3d 109, 117 (D.D.C. 2019) (presenting a similar challenge to the one brought in E. Bay Sanctuary
Covenant); Al Otro Lado, Inc. v. McAleenan, 423 F. Supp. 3d 848, 857 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (challenging
the “asylum ban,” which required most non-Mexican nationals to seek asylum in Mexico).
125 This is only true of defensive asylum applications. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS.,
OBTAINING ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES (Sept. 22, 2020), https://www.uscis.gov/
121
122
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Likewise, noncitizens often seek to bring claims implicating § 1252(b)(9)
to federal district court during removal proceedings. For example, noncitizens
have sought to challenge their transfer to faraway detention facilities (or
foreign countries) in the midst of their removal proceedings because it would
violate their right to counsel;126 they have brought challenges to the use of
videoconference technology during their removal proceedings;127 and they
have attempted to challenge their prolonged detention pending completion
of removal proceedings.128
Less often, claims squarely implicating § 1252(b)(9) are brought after
removal proceedings have concluded and a removal order has already become
ﬁnal. At that point, noncitizens may be able to bring any precedent claims to
a court of appeals in a petition for review, alongside their challenge to a ﬁnal
removal order, because that process has become available to them.129 But it
may also be the case that a neighboring provision, § 1252(a)(5), serves an
identical channeling function for claims brought to district court after a

humanitarian/refugees-and-asylum/asylum/obtaining-asylum-in-the-united-states [https://perma.cc/4Z2SLJ6U] (explaining the differences between affirmative and defensive asylum).
126 See Arroyo v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 19-815, 2019 WL 2912848, at *3-4 (C.D.
Cal. June 20, 2019) (discussing a right-to-counsel claim noncitizen plaintiﬀ brought after being
transferred to detention facilitates outside a particular ICE ﬁeld oﬃce’s “Area of Responsibility”);
Avilez v. Barr, No. 19-08296, 2020 WL 570987, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2020) (discussing a right-tocounsel claim noncitizen plaintiﬀ brought after being transferred from a detention facility in
California to one in Texas); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1044 (N.D. Cal. 2018)
(discussing a right-to-counsel claim noncitizen plaintiﬀ brought after being transferred from
detention facility in California to others in Washington and Colorado). Similar claims have also
been brought by plaintiﬀs who have been or will be removed from the country. See, e.g., Anaya
Murcia v. Godfrey, No. 19-587, 2019 WL 5597883, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 10, 2019) (discussing the
right-to-counsel claim noncitizen plaintiﬀ brought after ICE removed him to El Salvador before his
case was remanded to an immigration court for further proceedings), appeal docketed, No. 19-35-35913
(9th Cir. Oct. 31, 2019); Hernandez Culajay v. McAleenan, 396 F. Supp. 3d 477, 481-82 (E.D. Pa.
2019) (discussing right-to-counsel claim that noncitizen plaintiﬀ raised in anticipation of their return
to Mexico during the pendency of their removal proceedings).
127 See P.L. v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf ’t, No. 19-01336, 2019 WL 2568648, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
June 21, 2019) (discussing a noncitizen plaintiﬀ ’s claim that ICE’s policy regarding video
teleconferencing violates plaintiﬀ ’s due process rights); Flores Valle v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs
Enf ’t, No. 19-2254, 2019 WL 7756069, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 2019) (discussing a noncitizen
plaintiﬀ ’s claim that exclusive use of video teleconference technology in immigration removal
proceedings violates plaintiﬀ ’s constitutional and statutory rights).
128 See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 838 (2018) (addressing challenge to prolonged
detention during removal proceedings).
129 See 28 U.S.C. § 2344 (“Any party aggrieved by the ﬁnal order may, within 60 days after its
entry, ﬁle a petition to review the order in the court of appeals wherein venue lies.”).
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removal order has become ﬁnal.130 Indeed, many courts have stated as much131
and have deployed § 1252(a)(5) without § 1252(b)(9) in such cases.132
Some courts have contended, however, that the two provisions necessarily
work in tandem to channel claims into a single petition for review.133 In fact,
many courts examining claims brought after a removal order has become final
have simultaneously used § 1252(a)(5) and § 1252(b)(9) to evaluate a noncitizen’s
claims. This includes challenges to agency decisions to dismiss adjustment of
status applications for lack of jurisdiction,134 challenges to deficient Notices To
Appear (NTAs), which resulted in removal in abstentia,135 and cases in which
130

Added by the REAL ID Act of 2005, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including [28
U.S.C. § 2241], or any other habeas corpus provision . . . a petition for review ﬁled
with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section shall be the sole
and exclusive means for judicial review of an order of removal entered or issued under
any provision of this chapter . . . .

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5), amended by REAL ID Act of 2005, § 106(a)(1)(B). Through this provision,
Congress made clear that the petition for review process outlined in § 1252(a)(1) is the “sole and
exclusive means for judicial review of an order of removal.” Id. (emphasis added).
131 See Rivas Rosales v. Barr, No. 20-008888, 2020 WL 1505682, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2020)
(“[B]ecause there had not been an order of removal in the [present case], section 1252(a)(5), which
pertains to review of removal orders, does not govern the analysis here.”), appeal filed No. 20-15813
(9th Cir. Mar. 30, 2020); E.O.H.C. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 950 F.3d 177, 184 (3d Cir.
2020) (explaining that § 1252(a)(5) speciﬁcally bars challenges to removal orders); J.E. F.M. ex rel.
Ekblad v. Whitaker, 908 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2018) (Berzon, J., dissenting) (“§ 1252(a)(5) . . .
applies only when there is an order of removal, not when none has been entered.”).
132 See, e.g., Martinez v. Napolitano, 704 F.3d 620, 623 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that if a
noncitizen “challenges the procedure and substance of an agency determination that is ‘inextricably
linked’ to the order of removal, it is prohibited by section 1252(a)(5)”) (emphasis added); Delgado v.
Quarantillo, 643 F.3d 52, 55 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that “the substance of the relief ” the noncitizen
is seeking will determine if claims challenge an order of removal and are channeled by § 1252(a)(5)).
133 According to one court, “§ 1252(a)(5) is central to Section 1252(b)(9)’s scope.” CancinoCastellar v. Nielsen, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1107, 1111 (S.D. Cal. 2018). Another explained that § 1252(a)(5)
“prescribes the vehicle for judicial review” and § 1252(b)(9) establishes the types claims that should
be placed into that vehicle. J.E. F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2016).
134 See, e.g., Patel v. Wolf, 427 F. Supp. 3d 161, 164-65 (D. Mass.) (“[P]laintiffs request that the
Court invalidate the Attorney General regulations depriving USCIS of jurisdiction and order
defendants to adjudicate plaintiffs’ applications.”); Santa Maria v. McAleenan, No. 18-3996, 2019 WL
2120725, at *2 (S.D. Tex. May 15, 2019) (“[Plaintiff] sued the heads of the Department of Homeland
Security and of Citizenship and Immigration Services, arguing that the decision to close her application
for lack of jurisdiction was arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to the law.”); Isaula v. Nielson, No. 18-2992,
2019 WL 93307, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 3, 2019) (“[Plaintiff] argues that USCIS’s administrative closure
of his I-485 application [for lack of jurisdiction] was ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with the law[]’ . . . .”); Herbert L.R. v. Tritten, 421 F. Supp. 3d 688, 692
(D. Minn. 2019) (“[Plaintiff] alleges that he qualifies as an ‘arriving alien’ based on his 2008 parole entry
and that, as a result, USCIS retains jurisdiction to adjudicate his application.”).
135 See e.g., Asylum Seeker Advocacy Project v. Barr, 409 F. Supp. 3d 221, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)
(examining an objection to in absentia removal orders issued with allegedly deficient notice to the
noncitizens subject to these orders); Rickey R. v. Sessions, No. 18-15613, 2018 WL 5962479, at *1
(D.N.J. Nov. 13, 2018) (examining an objection to an allegedly deficient notice to appear, and
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noncitizens with existing orders of removal attempt to adjust their status or
reopen their removal proceedings but are arrested, detained, or even removed
in the process.136 But even when used together in these post-final-removal-order
cases, § 1252(a)(5) may be doing more of the work than § 1252(b)(9).
That is to say, the precise division of labor between the two provisions is
imprecise and outlining its contours is beyond the scope of this Comment.
What is clear, though, is that § 1252(b)(9) plays a uniquely important role in
cases brought prior to a removal order becoming ﬁnal, which is the primary
focus of this Comment. And in those cases, a federal district court must
determine whether its jurisdiction is foreclosed by § 1252(b)(9), an inquiry
that necessarily centers on the provision’s text.
F. Textual Considerations When Interpreting § 1252(b)(9)
Courts have grappled with three major textual issues when applying
§ 1252(b)(9).
First, at issue has been the extent to which the introductory clause of
§ 1252(b) modiﬁes or limits the scope of § 1252(b)(9). Section 1252(b)
provides: “With respect to review of an order of removal under subsection
(a)(1), the following requirements apply.”137 Many courts have interpreted this
clause to impose serious limitations on the range of claims § 1252(b)(9)
encompasses.138 But today, especially in light of Jennings, few courts, if any,
still maintain that view.139
Second, and most fervently contested in today’s § 1252(b)(9)
jurisprudence, is how broadly the phrase “arising from” should be read.
Perhaps the broadest reading proposed is that any legal claim that would not
have arisen “but for” some removal action should fall within the reach of the
ultimately dismissing for lack of jurisdiction); Diaz-Ceja v. McAleenan, No. 19-00824, 2019 WL
2774211, at *1 (D. Col. July 2, 2019) (examining an objection to a removal order issued after the
Department of Homeland security issued a notice to appear without a time or date of the appearance).
136 See, e.g., Mamadjonova v. Barr, No. 19-01317, 2019 WL 6174678, at *5 (D. Conn. Nov. 20,
2019) (no jurisdiction); Ketsoyan v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., No. 19-01198, 2019 WL 4261881, at *3 (C.D.
Cal. July 2, 2019) (no jurisdiction); Sied v. Nielsen, No. 17-06785, 2018 WL 1142202, at *11 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 2, 2018) (jurisdiction); De Jesus Martinez v. Nielsen, 341 F. Supp. 3d 400, 407-08 (D.N.J. 2018)
(jurisdiction); You, Xiu Qing v. Nielsen, 321 F. Supp. 3d 451, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (jurisdiction);
Wanrong Lin v. Nielsen, 377 F. Supp. 3d 556, 562 (D. Md. 2019) (jurisdiction); Chaudhry v. Barr,
No. 19-0682, 2019 WL 3713762, at *5-7 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2019) (jurisdiction); Chhoeun v. Marin,
306 F. Supp. 3d 1147, 1158-59 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (jurisdiction); M’Bagoyi v. Barr, 423 F. Supp. 3d 99,
105-06 (M.D. Pa. 2019) (jurisdiction); Calderon v. Sessions, 330 F. Supp. 3d 944, 955-56 (S.D.N.Y.
2018) (jurisdiction); Jimenez v. Nielsen, 334 F. Supp. 3d 370, 381-85 (D. Mass. 2018) (jurisdiction).
137 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (emphasis added). Subsection 1252(a)(1) sets forth that judicial review of a
final order of removal is exclusively governed by the petition for review process. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).
138 See infra notes 191-201 and accompanying text (analyzing readings that place substantial
weight on the prefatory clause of § 1252(b)).
139 See infra Part II (explaining how this view has fallen out of favor).
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provision and therefore must be consolidated into a petition for review.140
Another broad reading of “arising from” was adopted by the First and Ninth
Circuits prior to Jennings.141 Although the Jennings plurality failed to provide
a clear and comprehensive deﬁnition of the phrase, it explicitly rejected the
“but for” interpretation142 and implicitly, as this Comment contends, rejected
that broad interpretation embraced in the First and Ninth Circuits.143
Third, the contours of an “action taken or proceeding brought to remove
an alien from the United States”144 has been questioned. Overall, this clause
has received less attention than “arising from,” but it has still been construed
in divergent ways. For instance, Justice Thomas argued in Jennings that
detention is an “action taken to remove an alien from the United States,”145
which the plurality met with substantial skepticism.146
As Professor Benson predicted in her 1997 article, “litigants are likely to
find a variety of ways to try to evade the strictures” of § 1252(b)(9).147 Although
it may be better phrased as litigants trying to bring claims that legitimately fall
outside the scope of § 1252(b)(9), her prediction was prescient—noncitizens
have consistently sought to bring removal-related claims directly to federal
district court despite the channeling provision of § 1252(b)(9).148 Part II will

140 See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 854 (2018) (Thomas, J., Concurring) (“Detaining an
alien falls within [‘arising from’]—indeed, this Court has described detention during removal
proceedings as an ‘aspect of the deportation process.’”) (citing Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003).
141 See Aguilar v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf ’t, 510 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2007) (“By its terms,
the provision aims to consolidate ‘all questions of law and fact’ that ‘arise from’ either an ‘action’ or
a ‘proceeding’ brought in connection with the removal of an alien.”); J.E. F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d
1026, 1033 (9th Cir. 2016) (agreeing with the Aguilar decision and holding that a noncitizen’s right
to counsel claim is “‘inextricably intertwined with’” the removal process).
142 See Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 840 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion) (explaining that if “the
applicability of § 1252(b)(9) turns on whether the legal questions that we must decide ‘aris[e] from’
the actions taken to remove these aliens” then “[i]t may be argued that . . . if those actions had never
been taken, the aliens would not be in custody at all. But this expansive interpretation of § 1252(b)(9)
would lead to staggering results”).
143 See infra Part III (arguing that Jennings narrowed interpretations advanced in Aguilar and
J.E. F.M.).
144 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9).
145 Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 855 (Thomas, J., Concurring) (“[D]etention is an ‘action taken . . . to
remove’ an alien.”).
146 Id. at 841 n.3 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion) (explaining that it would be illogical to view
detention as an action taken “to remove an alien”). Several district courts have similarly interpreted
this clause of § 1252(b)(9). See, e.g., O.A. v. Trump, 404 F. Supp. 3d 109, 132 (D.D.C. 2019) (“The
challenged Rule is not an ‘action taken . . . to remove an alien from the United States,’ and was not
promulgated as part of a removal ‘proceeding.’”); Hernandez Culajay v. McAleenan, 396 F. Supp.
3d 477, 487 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (“The immigration oﬃcer’s decision to place Plaintiﬀs in line for regular
proceedings, rather than expedited proceedings . . . is an ‘action taken . . . to remove an alien.’”).
147 Benson, supra note 25, at 1458.
148 See Appendix, infra (highlighting the many cases noncitizens have brought that are removalrelated yet may not fall within the scope of § 1252(b)(9)).
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begin to distinguish situations where § 1252(b)(9) operates to preclude litigants’
claims from district court and those where it does not.
II. THE LONG-ROAD TO JENNINGS: A POST-ST. CYR CIRCUIT SPLIT
“The maze of immigration statutes and amendments is notoriously
complicated and has been described as ‘second only to the Internal Revenue
Code in complexity.’”149 That may help explain why § 1252(b)(9)
jurisprudence has developed in the confusing and piecemeal way it has. The
Supreme Court directly addressed the scope of § 1252(b)(9) for the ﬁrst time
in St. Cyr, where it oﬀered an ambiguous but narrow interpretation of the
provision, emphasizing the prefatory clause contained in § 1252(b).150 In the
ensuing years, lower courts diverged on how to apply § 1252(b)(9) in light of
St. Cyr, but the prevailing interpretation became an extremely broad
construction of the phrase “arising from,” ﬁrst oﬀered by the First Circuit
and later adopted by the Ninth Circuit. Against this backdrop, almost two
decades after St. Cyr, the Supreme Court revisited § 1252(b)(9), resulting in
a sharply divided decision that failed to oﬀer a comprehensive interpretation
of the provision, leaving lower courts to ﬁll in the gaps.151
This Part summarizes the ﬁrst two cases in which the Supreme Court
tackled § 1252(b)(9), focusing primarily on the second case, St. Cyr, where it
did so directly. Then, it turns to the lower courts’ evolving understanding of
the provision, focusing primarily on the First and Ninth Circuits’ broad
interpretation of “arising from.” Finally, it summarizes Jennings and oﬀers
some brief observations, prior to beginning a more comprehensive analysis of
the case in Part III.
A. The First Attempt: Reno v. AADC
In 1999, three years after the passage of IIRIRA, the Supreme Court was
tasked with interpreting the jurisdiction-limiting statute § 1252.152 Reno v.
AADC involved eight noncitizens aﬃliated with the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine who alleged that the government was selectively

Singh v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 969, 980 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).
Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 313 (2001).
See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 839-41 (2018) (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion)
(concluding that § 1252(b)(9) did not bar jurisdiction); id. at 853-59 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(concluding that § 1252(b)(9) barred jurisdiction); id. at 876 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (concluding that
§ 1252(b)(9) did not bar jurisdiction but on diﬀerent grounds than those the plurality advanced).
152 See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. (AADC), 525 U.S. 471, 476 (1999)
(introducing the Court’s discussion of § 1252).
149
150
151
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enforcing immigration laws against them for political activity protected under
the First Amendment.153
At the time the noncitizens in AADC brought their claims to district
court, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) was the only jurisdiction-limiting provision in the
newly enacted IIRIRA that had been phased in.154 Section 1252(g) provides:
“[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf
of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to
commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against
any alien under this chapter.”155
The government argued that § 1252(g) is “a channeling provision,
requiring aliens to bring all deportation-related claims in the context of a
petition for review of a ﬁnal order of deportation ﬁled in the court of
appeals”156 and thus deprived the district court of jurisdiction over the
noncitizens’ selective-enforcement claim.157
The Court agreed with the government that § 1252(g) barred district court
jurisdiction over the selective-enforcement claim, but it read the provision
“much more narrowly.”158 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia explained
that § 1252(g) limited judicial review with respect to only “three discrete
actions that the Attorney General may take: her ‘decision or action’ to
‘commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’”159
153 Id. at 474 (“Respondents amended their complaint to include an allegation that the INS
was selectively enforcing immigration laws against them in violation of their First and Fifth
Amendment rights.”).
154 Id. at 477 (explaining that § 1252(g) was the only provision that applied retroactively under IIRIRA).
155 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). Subsection (g) is frequently implicated in cases where § 1252(b)(9)
presents potential jurisdictional barriers. In Nava v. Department of Homeland Security, for example, the
government argued that § 1252(g) applied because Plaintiffs “challenge[d] aspects of ICE’s decision
to arrest them in order to commence removal proceedings against them.” 435 F. Supp. 3d 880, 895
(N.D. Ill. 2020). That case involved a challenge to ICE’s “indiscriminate, large-scale immigration
sweeps.” Id. at 885. Because it arguably involved both the Attorney General’s decision to “commence
proceedings” as well as a claim “arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an
alien,” both § 1252(g) and § 1252(b)(9) were at issue. Id. at 894-95. The district court held that neither
subsection applied and that it properly retained jurisdiction over the case. Id. at 895. Though a
discussion of § 1252(g) is beyond the scope of this Comment, it has been the subject of recent scholarly
attention. See, e.g., Matthew Miyamoto, Comment, Whether 8 USC § 1252(g) Precludes the Exercise of
Federal Jurisdiction Over Claims Brought by Wrongfully Removed Noncitizens, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 1655,
1655 (2019) (arguing that § 1252(g) should be interpreted narrowly); Kimberly P. Will, Comment, The
Limits of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g): When Do Courts Have Jurisdiction to Entertain An Alien’s Claim for Damages
Against the Government?, 51 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 533, 534 (2018) (contending that §1252(g) only applies
in situations where the government exercises discretionary authority).
156 AADC, 525 U.S. at 478.
157 Id. at 471 (“The Attorney General ﬁled motions in both the District Court and the Ninth
Circuit, arguing that § 1252(g) deprived them of jurisdiction over respondents’ selectiveenforcement claim.”).
158 See Motomura, supra note 27, at 403 (explaining how the Court’s decision in AADC
narrowed the scope of § 1252(g)’s channeling function).
159 AADC, 525 U.S. at 482 (alteration in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)).
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The Court continued, explaining that § 1252(g) “performs the function of
categorically excluding from non-ﬁnal-order judicial review . . . certain
speciﬁed decision and actions of the INS”160—speciﬁcally, matters of
prosecutorial discretion.161 It concluded that the selective-prosecution claim
“falls squarely within” the scope of § 1252(g) and thus was dismissed.162
Given its focus on § 1252(g), the Court did not directly examine the scope
of § 1252(b)(9), but it did characterize the provision as an “unmistakable ‘zipper’
clause.”163 What exactly is “zipped” into the clause, however, did not become
clearer until the Supreme Court squarely addressed the provision in St. Cyr.
B. The Second Attempt: INS v. St. Cyr
Two years later, the Court directly confronted the scope of § 1252(b)(9)
in St. Cyr.164 The respondent in St. Cyr was a lawful permanent resident who
was issued a removal order after having pleaded guilty to a state drug charge,
a removable oﬀense.165 As a result of his criminal charge, the noncitizen
respondent was ineligible for the petition for review process set forth in
§ 1252(a)(1).166 So, because he was prohibited from ﬁling a petition for review
with a court of appeals, the noncitizen instead ﬁled a petition for habeas
corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in federal district court, claiming he was
eligible for a discretionary waiver of deportation, which had been available to
him prior to the passage of AEDPA and IIRIRA.167
Among its various arguments, the government contended that
§ 1252(b)(9) precluded habeas jurisdiction and instead required consolidation
of such claims into a petition for review before a court of appeals—a process
for which the “criminal alien” was ineligible.168 The Court rejected the
government’s argument, holding that § 1252(b)(9) did not contain a
suﬃciently clear statement to repeal habeas jurisdiction under § 2241.169 In so
Id. at 483.
Motomura, supra note 27, at 404.
AADC, 525 U.S. at 487.
Id. at 483. In his analysis of AADC, Professor Neuman explains that the term “zipper clause”
is derived from labor law, where it “refers to a provision in a collective bargaining agreement that
prohibits further collective bargaining during the term of the agreement or, more generally, that
limits the agreement of the parties to the four corners of the contract.” Neuman, supra note 26, at
1984-85 (citing Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps. v. Dep’t of Interior, 526 U.S. 86, 89 (1999)).
164 Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 298 (2001).
165 Id. at 293.
166 See id. at 313 (explaining that there was no other judicial forum where the noncitizen could
have brought his claims). See also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (removing jurisdiction to review any ﬁnal
order of removal against certain “criminal aliens”).
167 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 293.
168 Id. at 313-14.
169 See id. at 314 (concluding that AEDPA and IIRIRA do not repeal habeas jurisdiction, given
“the lack of a clear, unambiguous, and express statement of congressional intent to preclude judicial
160
161
162
163
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ﬁnding, the Court made an important observation about § 1252(b)(9) that
caused deviations across the lower courts.
The Court ﬁrst reprised its characterization of § 1252(b)(9) as a “zipper
clause”170 and stated that the provision’s “purpose is to consolidate judicial
review of immigration proceedings into one action in the court of appeals.”171
The Court also noted, however, that the introductory clause in § 1252(b)
limited the range of claims to which § 1252(b)(9) applies.172 It was largely this
limitation that led the Court to hold that § 1252(b)(9) did not bar the district
court’s jurisdiction over the noncitizen’s habeas petition.173
The introductory clause of § 1252(b) states: “With respect to review of an
order of removal under subsection (a)(1) of this section, the following
requirements apply.”174 Since § 1252(b) modiﬁes its sub-provisions, the Court
reasoned that § 1252(b)(9) “applies only with respect to review of an order of
removal under subsection (a)(1).”175 Put diﬀerently, the Court found that
§ 1252(b)(9)’s channeling function applied only to review of ﬁnal removal
orders eligible for the petition for review process outlined in § 1252(a)(1).
Because the “criminal alien” (and his removal order) was categorically
ineligible for that petition for review process, however, § 1252(b)(9), “by its
own terms,” had no bearing on his claims.176 To clarify, because Congress had
categorically prohibited “criminal aliens” like the noncitizen here from
seeking judicial review under the petition for review process set forth in
§ 1252(a)(1), § 1252(b)(9) did not apply to the claims. Accordingly,
§ 1252(b)(9) did not bar the district court’s habeas jurisdiction.177
On its face, the Supreme Court’s opinion in St. Cyr appears to draw a
categorical distinction: if a noncitizen is eligible for the petition for review
process under § 1252(a)(1), then the restrictions of § 1252(b)(9) would apply.
If, however, the noncitizen is ineligible for that process, § 1252(b)(9) and its
prohibition of district court jurisdiction would not apply.

consideration on habeas”). As a result, Congress, in the REAL ID Act, amended § 1252(b)(9) to
make clear that habeas petitions could not be used to circumvent the provision’s strictures. See supra
note 19 and accompanying text (discussing the REAL ID Act’s eﬀect on § 1252(b)(9)).
170 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 313 (citing Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.
(AADC), 525 U.S. 471, 483 (1999)).
171 Id. (internal quotations marks omitted).
172 Id.
173 See id. (“[§ 1252(b)(9)] does not bar habeas jurisdiction over removal orders not subject to
judicial review under § 1252(a)(1) . . . .” (emphasis added)).
174 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b).
175 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 313 (internal quotation omitted). Subsection 1252(a)(1) states judicial
review of a ﬁnal order of removal is governed only by the petition for review process set forth in the
Hobbs Act. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).
176 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 313.
177 Id. at 313-14.
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But another legitimate interpretation of the Court’s opinion centers on a
temporal limitation of § 1252(b)(9). Subsection 1252(b)(9) “applies only with
respect to review of an order of removal under subsection (a)(1),” and
accordingly, the provision is inoperative unless and until such a removal order
has been issued.178 Therefore, the applicability of § 1252(b)(9) does not turn
on whether an individual may eventually be eligible for the petition for review
process, but rather, whether or not they are eligible for that process at the
specific moment in which they attempt to bring their claims in district court.
Noncitizens whose orders of removal have not yet become ﬁnal remain
ineligible for the petition for review process in § 1252(a)(1). But the issuance
of a ﬁnal removal order triggers a noncitizen’s eligibility for the petition for
review process, which in turn activates the channeling function of
§ 1252(b)(9). In short, the reasoning of this interpretation goes, a noncitizen
cannot possibly seek judicial review of a ﬁnal order of removal under
§ 1252(a)(1) if such an order does not yet exist.
This distinction can be understood as temporal instead of categorical:
§ 1252(b)(9) will not operate to channel claims into the petition for review
process unless and until that process becomes available, when a noncitizen’s
removal order has become ﬁnal. In eﬀect, this distinction seriously narrows
the range of individuals whose claims would be channeled pursuant to
§ 1252(b)(9). A noncitizen is free to bring their claims in federal district court
up until the point at which her order of removal becomes ﬁnal.
Justice Scalia responded to this alternate temporal reading in his dissent.
He argued that the majority, under this reading, put too much weight on the
introductory clause of § 1252(b) and speciﬁcally on the word “apply.”179 In his
view, § 1252(b)(9) would be rendered meaningless if it applied only after a
ﬁnal removal has been issued.180 What role would the provision play if it could
not channel claims prior to the moment an order of removal becomes ﬁnal?181
Justice Scalia acknowledged the prefatory clause of § 1252(b) but read it
diﬀerently. From his perspective, § 1252(b)(9) certainly “applies” to the
review of a ﬁnal order of removal under § 1252(a)(1), but it does so “in the
broad sense.”182 It is not that § 1252(b)(9) applies only within review of a ﬁnal
order of removal under § 1252(a)(1) but that it operates “in connection with”
such review.183 Accordingly, the provision requires that all claims “arising
from” removal proceedings be consolidated and brought together in a petition
Id. at 313 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 332 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. (“These provisions have no eﬀect if they must apply . . . to review of an order of removal
under subsection (a)(1).” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
182 Id.
183 Id.
178
179
180
181
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for review, after the removal order becomes ﬁnal.184 That, in Justice Scalia’s
opinion, is “application” enough.185
Thus, the main inquiry in Justice Scalia’s approach is whether claims are
“arising from” removal proceedings (or another “action taken” to remove a
noncitizen).186 If they are “arising from,” the claims fall within the reach of
§ 1252(b)(9) and must be brought after removal proceedings through a petition
for review, alongside a review of a final order of removal under § 1252(a)(1).
Importantly, and perhaps ironically, Justice Scalia’s interpretation is
wholly compatible with the majority’s actual holding, just not the alternate
reading to which he responded. The majority held that claims that will never
be subject to judicial review under § 1252(a)(1) are also not subject to
§ 1252(b)(9). Because the “criminal alien” in St. Cyr was categorically excluded
from the petition for review process of § 1252(a)(1), there would never be any
such process into which § 1252(b)(9) would require that he consolidate his
claims—he would have no way to fold his claims into an eventual petition for
review. The facts of St. Cyr thus diﬀer from claims of a noncitizen who would
eventually be eligible for the petition for review process under § 1252(a)(1)
once his removal proceedings concluded. In this scenario, both the majority
and dissent would likely agree that, if that noncitizen wants to bring claims
“arising from” her removal proceedings, she must wait to do so through the
petition for review process, once her removal order becomes ﬁnal.
But Justice Scalia did not identify or discuss this middle ground. Perhaps
he was anticipating how lower courts would read the majority’s opinion. If so,
his prediction was prescient. Although Justice Scalia’s reading of the provision
eventually became the clear majority approach, several courts prior to Jennings
adopted the narrow, temporal distinction to which he responded in his dissent.
C. Divergences After St. Cyr, Before Jennings
The Supreme Court did not revisit § 1252(b)(9) until 2018—almost two
decades after St. Cyr was decided. During that period, lower courts that
addressed § 1252(b)(9) diverged on the provision’s scope. A number of courts
embraced the temporal reading from St. Cyr and applied § 1252(b)(9) only
after a removal order had become ﬁnal.187 Far more inﬂuential, however,
became the “arising from” framework Justice Scalia oﬀered in his dissent.188
Indeed, the First Circuit and eventually the Ninth Circuit not only embraced
this framework, but also interpreted the phrase “arising from” extremely
184
185
186
187
188

Id.
Id.
Id. at 328 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See infra subsection II.C.1. (discussing the “temporal approach”).
See supra notes 179-184 and accompanying text (discussing the Justice Scalia’s opinion in St. Cyr).
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broadly.189 Although the “arising from” framework has endured—indeed, it is
the prevailing approach today—this Comment argues that the broad
interpretation within that framework is incorrect in light of Jennings.
The scholarship in this area could beneﬁt from a more thorough, nuanced
analysis of the various strands of § 1252(b)(9) pre-Jennings case law. Such
analysis, however, is outside the scope of this Comment. Instead, this section
aims to outline the evolving understanding of this provision in the years
between St. Cyr and Jennings.
1. The Temporal Approach
The St. Cyr majority emphasized that § 1252(b)(9) “applies only with
respect to review of an order of removal under subsection [1252](a)(1).”190 As
Justice Scalia seemed to have anticipated in his St. Cyr dissent,191 several
courts interpreted that limitation to mean that § 1252(b)(9) does not operate
unless and until a ﬁnal removal order has been issued.192 This reading
substantially narrows the range of claims that fall within the scope of
§ 1252(b)(9), as the provision would pose no barrier to noncitizens bringing
claims to district court prior to the conclusion of removal proceedings. In
other words, under this interpretation, the door to district court would be left
wide open unless and until an order of removal becomes ﬁnal.
The Third Circuit most prominently and expressly embraced this narrow
reading of § 1252(b)(9). In Chehazeh v. Attorney General of the United States,
after citing the majority language from St. Cyr, the Third Circuit held:
§ 1252(b)(9) . . . requires only that, when there is an order of removal under
subsection (a)(1), review of any issues related to that order must be
consolidated into a single petition for review and cannot be brought
piecemeal. One may not, for instance, follow a petition for review with a
habeas petition or a petition for a writ of mandamus.193

The court continued, explaining that “because § 1252(b) refers only to
‘review of an order of removal under subsection (a)(1),’ it, and its subsections,
are inapplicable when there is no such order.”194
See infra subsection II.B.2 (analyzing the “arising from” framework in Aguilar and J.E. F.M.).
533 U.S. at 313 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Id. at 332 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s application makes it so
§ 1252(b)(9) is “given eﬀect only within the review of removal orders that takes place under
subsection (a)(1),” rendering it meaningless.).
192 See infra note 199 (collecting cases where the court applied the temporal limitation).
193 Chehazeh v. Att’y Gen., 666 F.3d 118, 131 (3d Cir. 2012) (emphasis added).
194 Id. at 132 (quoting St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 313). Several district courts, including some outside of
the Third Circuit, expressly followed the Third Circuit’s temporal interpretation. See, e.g., Michalski
v. Decker, 279 F. Supp. 3d 487, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“[The noncitizen] cannot be challenging an order
189
190
191
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In adopting this view, the Third Circuit concluded that it was joining the
Ninth and Eleventh Circuits.195 Although these circuits had similarly
embraced the St. Cyr majority’s language emphasizing the prefatory clause of
§ 1252(b), both courts appeared to read it as imposing more of a substantive
limitation than a temporal limitation.196
Under this related reading adopted at the time by the Ninth and Eleventh
Circuits, § 1252(b)(9) “applies only with respect to review of an order of
removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1),” and therefore the provision applies only
to claims that “seek[] review of a ﬁnal order of removal within the meaning
of § 1252.”197 Thus, the inquiry does not turn on when the claim was brought
to district court—before or after a removal order becomes ﬁnal—but whether
a noncitizen’s claims challenge the substance of “an order of removal.”198

of removal for the common-sense reason that he is not yet subject to one. Consequently, because his
challenge to the lawfulness of pre-removal detention cannot be connected to that which does not exist,
§ 1252[(b)(9)] does not bar his petition.” (emphasis added)); De La Paz v. Coy, 954 F. Supp. 2d 532,
544 (W.D. Tex. 2013) (“Because Plaintiff here is not seeking review of an order of removal—like the
petitioner in Chehazeh, ‘there has been no such order with respect to him’—section 1252(b)(9) does
not preclude judicial review of Plaintiff ’s constitutional claims.”); Doe v. Rodriguez, No. 17-1709, 2018
WL 620898, at *4 (D.N.J. Jan. 29, 2018) (finding jurisdiction over habeas claim because § 1252(a)(5)
and § 1252(b)(9) are “inapplicable where a petitioner is not challenging an order of removal, including
in those cases where a removal order has yet to be entered.”) (emphasis added)).
195 See Chehazeh, 666 F.3d at 133 (“We therefore join with the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits and
hold that § 1252(b)(9) applies only with respect to review of an order of removal under subsection (a)(1).”)
196 See Singh v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 969, 979 (9th Cir. 2007) (concluding that a noncitizen’s
ineﬀective assistance of counsel claims “cannot be construed as seeking judicial review of his ﬁnal
order of removal” because his success on a habeas petition would lead only to “the restarting of the
thirty-day period for” ﬁling a petition for review); Madu v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 470 F.3d 1362, 1367
(11th Cir. 2006) (declining to apply § 1252(b)(9) because “this case does not involve review of an
order of removal”). For a discussion on later Ninth Circuit precedent, which appeared to diverge
signiﬁcantly from Singh, see infra note 218 and accompanying text.
197 Singh, 499 F.3d at 978-79 (emphasis in original). Indeed, the dissenting justices in Jennings
eventually adopted a similar—and perhaps identical—reading of the provision. See Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 882 (2018) (Breyer, J. dissenting) (ﬁnding that § 1252(b)(9) did not aﬀect
jurisdiction because “by its terms” that provision “applies only ‘with respect to review of an order of
removal under [§ 1252(a)(1)]’” (alterations in original) (emphasis added)).
198 Singh, 499 F.3d at 979; Madu, 470 F.3d at 1367. In Singh, the Ninth Circuit was considering
an ineﬀective assistance of counsel (IAC) claim, which the noncitizen brought to district court after
his removal order became ﬁnal. 499 F.3d at 973. Because the noncitizen was not challenging his
“removal order” but merely seeking a “day in court,” § 1252(b)(9) did not apply. Id. at 979. In Madu,
because the noncitizen was contesting the very existence of an order of removal, such a challenge
could not possibly involve review of such an order, and therefore § 1252(b)(9) did not apply. 470
F.3d at 1367. Notably, this is the precise inquiry courts employed when applying § 1252’s predecessor
section 106, as discussed supra Section I.A. In Cheng, discussed above, supra note 48 and
accompanying text, the Supreme Court found that the noncitizen’s claims fell outside the scope of
a “ﬁnal order” and thus were not precluded by section 106 of the INA. Cheng Fan Kwok v. Immigr.
and Naturalization Serv., 392 U.S. 206, 216 (1968). Congress, in turn, aimed to foreclose such
workarounds by adding § 1252(b)(9), which weighs against the adoption of this interpretation of
§ 1252(b)(9). See Benson, supra note 25, at 1455-57 (describing Congress’ creation of “catch-all
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To be sure, the substantive and temporal characterizations of § 1252(b)(9)
are not mutually exclusive. A court that embraces the substantive limitation
could simultaneously adopt the temporal one advanced by the Third Circuit,
but no other circuits have clearly embraced the temporal limitation.199
The temporal reading of § 1252(b)(9) is not without merit. Indeed, it ﬁnds
substantial support in the text and structure of § 1252 and in the legislative
history of the REAL ID Act of 2005, which added a provision to § 1252 and
modiﬁed others, including § 1252(b)(9).200
But there are also compelling reasons that weigh against the adoption of this
reading. Most obviously, as Justice Scalia argued in his St. Cyr dissent,
interpreting § 1252(b)(9) as unable to channel claims brought prior to the
issuance of a final removal order seems to render the provision “meaningless.”201
If § 1252(b)(9) cannot prohibit noncitizens from bringing claims to district court
prior to the conclusion of removal proceedings, what work is it doing?202 Perhaps
partly as a result of that question, the temporal interpretation of § 1252(b)(9)
has been relegated to a minority approach,203 giving way to the “arising from”
framework, which is the majority approach today.
barriers” intending to supersede the Supreme Court’s decisions in Cheng and McNary, which created
loopholes in § 1252(b)(9)’s bar against jurisdiction over review of ﬁnal orders).
199 However, the ﬁve Ninth Circuit judges dissenting from the court’s denial of a rehearing en
banc argued that Singh stood for—or at least was consistent with—the proposition that the Ninth
Circuit had adopted the Third Circuit’s temporal interpretation. See J. E. F.M. ex rel. Ekblad v.
Whitaker, 908 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2018) (Berzon, J., dissenting) (“In sum, our precedents,
guided by the Supreme Court’s understanding in St. Cyr, have repeatedly held that § 1252(b)(9)
strips district courts of habeas jurisdiction only in cases where a ﬁnal order of removal has been
entered and the claim seeks relief from that order.”).
200 The ﬁve Ninth Circuit judges described above, supra note 199, advanced a persuasive
argument that the text and structure of § 1252, as well as prior circuit case law, supported this
temporal reading of § 1252(b)(9). J. E. F.M., 908 F.3d at 1162 (Berzon, J., dissenting). There is also
an argument that legislative intent bolsters this reading. The House Report on the REAL ID Act of
2005 states, “[The Act] would not preclude habeas review over challenges to detention that are
independent of challenges to removal orders. Instead, the bill would eliminate habeas review only over
challenges to removal orders.” H.R. Rep. No. 109-72, at 175 (2005) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. 240, 299 (emphasis added). Thus, if a noncitizen’s claims are “independent of
challenges to removal orders,” § 1252(b)(9) poses no obstacle. Id. Claims brought to district court
prior to the issuance of a ﬁnal order of removal, the reasoning goes, are necessarily “independent”
from challenges to removal orders for the simple reason that no such order exists.
201 See Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 332 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]o insist that subsection (b)(9) be given eﬀect only within the review of removal
orders that takes place under subsection (a)(1), is to render it meaningless.”).
202 Justice Scalia also advanced a persuasive structural argument in his St. Cyr dissent. See id.
(noting that other numbered subsections such as §§ 1252(b)(7) and (b)(8) would “have no eﬀect if
they must apply . . . ‘to review of an order of removal under subsection (a)(1)’”).
203 See, e.g., O.A. v. Trump, 404 F. Supp. 3d 109, 130 (D.D.C. 2019) (explicitly rejecting the
temporal interpretation of § 1252(b)(9)); Nava v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 435 F. Supp. 3d 880, 88895 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (implicitly rejecting the temporal interpretation because claims were brought
prior to the issuance of a ﬁnal removal order, yet the court did not end its analysis).
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2. The “Arising From” Framework
The “arising from” framework stems directly from the express language
of § 1252(b)(9) which states, “Judicial review of all questions of law and fact
. . . arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien
from the United States . . . shall be available only in judicial review of a ﬁnal
order . . . .”204 In contrast to the temporal interpretation of St. Cyr, the
“arising from” framework interprets § 1252(b)(9) as consolidating any
removal-related claims into a petition for review after a removal order has
become ﬁnal.205 Under this reading, the provision can be distilled as follows:
if a noncitizen wants to bring claims that “arise from” a proceeding brought
to remove her, she may do so only by later seeking “judicial review of a ﬁnal
order [of removal]” through the petition for review process, once it becomes
available.206 The inquiry in this framework, as the name suggests, turns on
the phrase “arising from.” The challenge, as will become clear, is that the
“words ‘arising from’ do not lend themselves to precise application.”207
After St. Cyr, the First Circuit in Aguilar was the ﬁrst court of appeals to
expressly embrace the “arising from” framework.208 In so doing, the court
construed the phrase quite broadly, describing § 1252(b)(9) as “breathtaking”
in scope and “vise-like” in grip.209 Under this reading of “arising from,”
§ 1252(b)(9) applies to almost all claims even remotely related to removal
proceedings—including those that arise prior to a removal proceeding’s

204 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). As Justice Scalia argued in his St. Cyr dissent, the plain text of the
provision supports this reading. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 328 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(9) directly to connect the arising from framework to the text of the statute). This approach
also ﬁnds support in Congress’s intent in enacting § 1252(b)(9). With the passage of IIRIRA, which
added § 1252(b)(9), Congress intended to make clear three things: (1) “only courts of appeals—and
not district courts—could review a ﬁnal removal order;” (2) “review of a ﬁnal removal order is the
only mechanism for reviewing any issue raised in a removal proceeding;” and (3) the statute was
“intended to preclude all district court review of any issue raised in a removal proceeding.” H.R.
Rep. No. 109-72, at 173 (2005) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A. 240, 299.
205 As explained in supra Section II.B, this framework is still consistent with the St. Cyr
majority opinion, which can be read as holding that even if § 1252(b)(9) does not apply when a
noncitizen will never be able to access a petition for review, it still applies when a noncitizen will
eventually be able to bring a petition for review. Thus, under this framework, claims “arising from”
removal proceedings should eventually be brought to a court of appeals via a petition for review.
206 See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 327-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In other words, if judicial review is
available, it consists only of [the petition for review process] speciﬁed in § 1252(a)(1).”) (emphasis in
original); see also O.A., 404 F. Supp. 3d at 130-31 (explaining the “arising from” framework from
Justice Scalia’s dissent in St. Cyr and noting that it is consistent with St. Cyr majority’s opinion).
207 Aguilar v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf ’t, 510 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Motomura,
supra note 27, at 424).
208 Id. at 10
209 Id. at 9-10.
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initiation.210 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit later described the First Circuit’s
reading of “arising from” as one that eﬀectively “swallows up virtually all
claims that are tied to removal proceedings.”211
To be sure, the First Circuit recognized that the phrase “arising from”
imposes some limits on the scope of § 1252(b)(9). Because of that phrase, the
provision must be read to exclude those claims that are “independent of, or
wholly collateral to, the removal process.”212 Therefore, independent and
collateral claims are not subject to the jurisdictional restrictions that § 1252(b)(9)
imposes. As the First Circuit noted, however, what constitutes a “collateral
claim” is unclear and has been the subject of several Supreme Court decisions.213
According to the First Circuit’s interpretation in Aguilar, collateral claims
are primarily those that cannot be handled effectively by the administrative
process set forth in the INA.214 Because requiring exhaustion of those claims
would “foreclose them from any meaningful judicial review,” it would frustrate
Congress’s purpose to channel, rather than bar, such claims.215 Thus, under the
Aguilar interpretation, courts must seek to delineate between claims that the
administrative process could handle and those that it could not.216 Claims that
could be handled are considered “arising from” and thus precluded from
district court review, while those that could not be handled are considered
collateral to removal proceedings and thus outside the ambit of § 1252(b)(9).
210 See id. at 10 (“[N]othing in the statute limits its reach to claims arising from extant removal
proceedings.”) (emphasis added).
211 J.E. F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2016).
212 Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 11.
213 Id. at 12 (“Courts long have recognized an exception to the exhaustion requirement for
claims that are collateral to administrative proceedings.”). There are a number of Supreme Court
decisions on point. See, e.g., Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 212-13 (1994) (discussing
whether petitioner’s claims are collateral and reviewing previous cases); Bowen v. City of New York,
476 U.S. 467, 483 (1986) (“The claims in this lawsuit are collateral to the claims for beneﬁts that class
members had presented administratively.”) (emphasis added); Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 618
(1984) (“The latter exception to exhaustion is inapplicable here where respondents do not raise a
claim that is wholly ‘collateral’ to their claim for beneﬁts under the Act.”) (emphasis added).
214 Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 11 (“[C]laims that cannot eﬀectively be handled through the available
administrative process fall within [collateral] . . . purview.”).
215 Id. The First Circuit in Aguilar derives the phrase “meaningful judicial review” from the
Court’s decision in Thunder Basin. Id. at 12 (quoting Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 212-13). In that case,
the Supreme Court found that Congress intended for a certain statute, the Mine Act, to preclude
district court jurisdiction. Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 207. The Court stated that “[w]hether a statute
is intended to preclude initial judicial review is determined from the statute’s language, structure,
and purpose, its legislative history, and whether the claims can be aﬀorded meaningful review.” Id.
(citation omitted) (emphasis added).
216 The court in Aguilar noted two speciﬁc reﬁnements that would help guide its inquiry: ﬁrst,
whether the administrative process could provide “adequate relief ” for the claims. Aguilar, 510 F.3d
at 12 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 331 (1976)). Second, whether a party would be
“‘irreparably injured’” if they were required to adhere to the administrative process. Id. (citing
Bowen, 476 U.S. at 483).
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The inquiry, however, does not end there. The ﬁnal step into whether the
administrative process can “handle claims eﬀectively” depends on which part
of the administrative process is evaluated. If the inquiry turns on the
capabilities of immigration judges, whose authority is quite restricted,217 then
fewer claims could be “handled eﬀectively” in the administrative process and
thus there would be more collateral claims that fell outside the purview of
§ 1252(b)(9). But the Ninth Circuit, which appeared to deviate from earlier
precedent when it adopted the Aguilar interpretation in J.E. F.M.,218 did not
center its inquiry on the competencies of the immigration judge. Instead, it
focused its inquiry on whether claims were cognizable in a petition for review
before a court of appeals.219
In J.E. F.M., the court considered constitutional right-to-counsel claims
of indigent, noncitizen minors who had “tried and failed to obtain pro bono
counsel for removal proceedings.”220 Borrowing the dramatic language of
Aguilar that § 1252(b)(9) is “breathtaking” in scope and “vise-like” in grip, the
court held the provision barred the minors’ claims.221 Because right-tocounsel claims are “routinely raised in petitions for review ﬁled with a federal
court of appeals”222 and are “teed up for appellate review,”223 they were
“bound up in and an inextricable part of the administrative process.”224
This echoed the holding in Aguilar, where the First Circuit held that
§ 1252(b)(9) precluded the noncitizens’ right-to-counsel claims because such a
right “‘possesses a direct link to, and is inextricably intertwined with,” the
administrative system.225 To arrive at this conclusion, the First Circuit found that
right-to-counsel claims are “commonplace” and are “often featured in [petitions

217 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL § 1.5 (2020),
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/ﬁle/1258536/download
[https://perma.cc/C2A4-ZFJ5]
(describing the limited jurisdiction and authority of immigration judges).
218 J.E. F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2016). For a brief discussion of previous Ninth
Circuit precedent, see supra notes 196-200 and accompanying text. In the view of ﬁve Ninth Circuit
judges, J.E. F.M. v. Lynch marked a signiﬁcant break from prior circuit case law. See J. E. F.M. ex
rel. Ekblad v. Whitaker, 908 F.3d 1157, 1161-63 (9th Cir. 2018) (Berzon, J., dissenting) (asserting that
the court in J.E. F.M. wrote prior precedential cases “out of existence”).
219 J.E. F.M., 837 F.3d at 1033 (“[Right-to-counsel] claims are routinely raised in petitions for
review ﬁled with a federal court of appeals.”).
220 Id. at 1029.
221 Id. at 1031-33. The court speciﬁed that § 1252(a)(5) worked in tandem with § 1252(b)(9) to
channel the claims. See id. at 1031 (referring to § 1252(a)(5) and (b)(9) and noting that “the provisions
channel judicial review over ﬁnal orders of removal to the court of appeals”). For a discussion on
the relationship between the two provisions, see supra notes 133-139 and accompanying text.
222 J.E. F.M., 837 F.3d at 1033 (citing cases).
223 Id. at 1038.
224 Id. at 1032-33.
225 Id. at 1033 (quoting Aguilar v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf ’t, 510 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2007))
(emphasis added).
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for review] of removal orders” before courts of appeals.226 Thus, because they
could technically be brought through the petition for review process, barring
these claims from district court and requiring their administrative exhaustion
does not “foreclose all meaningful judicial review” of such claims.227
In sum, to determine whether claims could be “eﬀectively handled” by the
administrative process, the First and Ninth Circuits examined whether claims
could be brought in a petition for review with a court of appeals—not whether
immigration judges or the Board of Immigration Appeals could more
immediately provide the remedies noncitizens sought. And because the
courts concluded that right-to-counsel claims in both Aguilar and J.E. F.M.
were “routinely” raised in petitions for review, district court review was
unnecessary.228 But it bears mentioning that just because a claim is “routinely”
raised in a petition for review before a court of appeals, it is not tantamount
to that claim being “eﬀectively handled” in that forum. As will be discussed,
infra, several courts since Jennings have noted as much.229
Nevertheless, Aguilar’s influence was significant. The Sixth Circuit cited
Aguilar approvingly,230 and many district courts—both within and outside the
First Circuit—applied Aguilar,231 even if in some instances, courts considering
identical claims came out differently.232 The Ninth Circuit’s full-throated
226 Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 13. The First Circuit also rejected the noncitizens’ argument that
requiring exhaustion of their right-to-counsel claims will give rise to a substantive constitutional
question similar to that discussed in McNary v. Haitan Refugee Ctr., 498 U.S. 479 (1991). Aguilar, 510
F.3d at 13; see also supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text (describing the availability of review
over “pattern and practice” claims that McNary provided). The court found McNary distinguishable
on several grounds. Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 15. Most relevant for present purposes is that the unlike in
the special agricultural worker program, where the record was limited for any reviewing tribunal,
the initial record in Aguilar posed no issue because immigration judges “possess ample evidencegathering faculties” and thus the right-to-counsel claims will need “no supplemental factﬁnding in
order to create a solid platform for further administrative and judicial review.” Id.
227 Id. at 14. (citing Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 212-13 (1994)).
228 J.E. F.M., 837 F.3d at 1033; see also Aguliar, 510 F.3d at 18 (noting that right to counsel claims
are “commonplace” in petitions for review).
229 See, e.g., Torres v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 411 F. Supp. 3d 1036, 1049 (C.D. Cal. 2019)
(explaining that right-to-counsel issues do “sometimes appear in immigration proceedings and
related [petitions for review], [but] they are cognizable only in a narrow sense”) (emphasis added);
see also infra Part. III.B.1 (discussing the reviewability considerations).
230 See Hamdi ex rel. Hamdi v. Napolitano, 620 F.3d 615, 626 (6th Cir. 2010) (agreeing with
the First Circuit’s reasoning that § 1252(b)(9) is a “judicial channeling provision, not a claim-barring
one”) (quoting Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 11) (internal quotation marks omitted).
231 See, e.g., Robledo v. Chertoﬀ, 658 F. Supp. 2d 688, 693-94 (D. Md. 2009) (“Following the
Aguilar court’s logic” to determine that certain claims were “collateral” to the removal process and
therefore were reviewable in district court despite § 1252(b)(9)); Flores-Powell v. Chadbourne, 677
F. Supp. 2d 455, 467-68 (D. Mass. 2010) (holding that a noncitizen’s challenges to the applicability
of mandatory detention statute to his oﬀense and his removal order are “intertwined rather than
independent” of removal and thus § 1252(b)(9) foreclosed jurisdiction) (emphasis added).
232 Compare Argueta v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf ’t, No. 08-1652, 2009 WL 1307236, at *15
(D.N.J. May 7, 2009) (holding that § 1252(b)(9) did not bar noncitizens’ Fourth Amendment Bivens
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endorsement of Aguilar underscored its influence and the impact it might have
had if the Supreme Court had not intervened in Jennings just two years later.
D. The Third Attempt: Jennings v. Rodriguez
In 2018, the Supreme Court addressed § 1252(b)(9) in Jennings for the ﬁrst
time since St. Cyr.233 Jennings involved a class action challenging the prolonged
detention of noncitizens pending the completion of their removal
proceedings, including judicial review.234 Although neither party raised
§ 1252(b)(9),235 the Court addressed the provision head on, resulting in three
divergent opinions.236 Cobbled together, the Court concluded, 6-2, that
§ 1252(b)(9) did not divest the district court of jurisdiction over the challenge
to prolonged detention during removal proceedings.237
Justice Breyer, writing for three dissenting justices, took the narrowest
view of § 1252(b)(9) in a brief, two-sentence paragraph, stating:
Jurisdiction also is unaﬀected by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9), which by its terms
applies only ‘[w]ith respect to review of an order of removal under

claim because if denied review in the district court, there would be “no forum where he can seek
redress of his grievances against the government”), with Arias v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf ’t,
No. 07-1959, 2008 WL 1827604, at *6 (D. Minn. Apr. 23, 2008) (holding that § 1252(b)(9) bars
noncitizen’s Bivens claims because they are “common in removal proceedings” and could “directly
impact Plaintiﬀs’ immigration status”).
233 See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 839-40 (2018) (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion)
(discussing § 1252(b)(9) and the prior precedents of the Court interpreting its meaning).
234 Id. at 838. The certiﬁed class, of which Rodriguez was representative, included noncitizens
who “are or were detained . . . pending completion of removal proceedings.” Id.
235 Id. at 853 (Thomas, J., concurring in part) (“Although neither party raises § 1252(b)(9), this
Court has an independent obligation to assess whether it deprives us and the lower courts of
jurisdiction.”) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006)).
236 In his concurrence in part, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, concluded that §
1252(b)(9) apply to the claims at issue. Id. at 853-59 (Thomas, J., concurring in part). Writing for
the plurality, Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy, concluded that the
claims did not fall within the scope of § 1252(b)(9). Id. at 839-41 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion). In
dissent, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, agreed that the claims did not
fall within the provision's ambit but read it more narrowly than did the plurality. Id. at 876 (Breyer,
J., dissenting). Justice Kagan took no part in the decision. Id. at 852.
237 See supra note 236 (reviewing alignment of the justices of the Court on the jurisdiction
question). Although there was no controlling opinion on the jurisdictional issue, six justices agreed
that § 1252(b)(9) did not preclude district court jurisdiction over this challenge to prolonged
detention during removal proceedings. Id. Normally, the “Supreme Court creates precedent only
when [a majority of] Justices endorse a single rule of decision . . . .” Richard M. Re, Beyond the Marks
Rule, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1942, 1943 (2019). The main exception, however, was established in Marks
v. United States, which provides: “When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale
explaining the result enjoys the assent of ﬁve Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as
that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds . . . .’” 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)).
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[§ 1252(a)(1)].’ § 1252(b). Respondents challenge their detention without bail,
not an order of removal.238

Like the St. Cyr majority, Justice Breyer’s dissent appears to give
signiﬁcant weight to the prefatory clause of § 1252(b), which limits the reach
of § 1252(b)(9) solely to claims challenging “an order of removal.”239 Under
this interpretation, the inquiry of § 1252(b)(9)’s application turns on whether
a noncitizen’s claims challenge “an order of removal,” not whether they are
arising from some removal action.240 Claims challenging detention without
bail, the dissent suggested, are distinct from those challenging “an order of
removal” and thus fall outside the ambit of § 1252(b)(9).241
Justice Thomas, writing for the two justices concurring in part, took
perhaps the broadest possible view of § 1252(b)(9). For one, he discarded the
dissent’s narrow interpretation that § 1252(b)(9) is restricted to challenges to
removal orders.242 Justice Thomas ﬁrst noted that the text of § 1252(b)(9)
“refers to review of ‘all questions of law and fact’ arising from removal,’ not
just removal orders.”243 In addition, by interpreting § 1252(b)(9) as governing
only removal orders, the dissent would “render superﬂuous § 1252(a)(5),
which already speciﬁes that the review made available under § 1252(a)(1) ‘shall
be the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of an order of removal.’”244
Under Justice Thomas’s interpretation, claims that challenge detention
during removal proceedings, like the claim at issue in Jennings, “fall within
the heartland of § 1252(b)(9).”245 Justice Thomas reasoned that the phrase
“any action taken . . . to remove an alien from the United States” must at least
include any “congressionally authorized portions of the deportation process
that necessarily serve the purpose of ensuring an alien’s removal.”246 Since
detention is merely one step of the prescribed process to remove a noncitizen,
the challenge at issue must “arise from” removal proceedings.247 In other
words, as long as the events that gave rise to the noncitizen’s claims would
Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 876 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. This is the same reading that the Ninth Circuit adopted in Singh, before J.E. F.M., and
the one the Eleventh Circuit adopted in Madu. For a more detailed discussion of this interpretation,
see supra note 198.
241 Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 876 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
242 Id. at 855 (Thomas, J., concurring in part).
243 Id. (emphasis in original).
244 Id. (emphasis in original).
245 Id. at 854.
246 Id.
247 Id. In his analysis, Justice Thomas blurred the “arising from” inquiry with the “action taken
to remove” inquiry. As the plurality highlighted, “[t]he question is not whether detention is an action
taken to remove an alien but whether the legal questions in this case arise from such an action.” Id. at
841 n.3 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion) (emphasis in original).
238
239
240
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not have happened but for the removal action, those claims “arise from” that
action and are swallowed by § 1252(b)(9).
Even though Justice Thomas qualified his conclusion by suggesting that
§ 1252(b)(9) may not cover claims challenging actions which “go beyond the
government’s lawful pursuit of its removal objective,”248 he took an expansive
view of the provision. Indeed, his interpretation extended § 1252(b)(9) even
beyond the scope of the First Circuit’s interpretation in Aguilar. Aguilar was at
least clear that § 1252(b)(9) did not affect district courts’ jurisdiction over
challenges to the legality of immigration detention.249 Under Justice Thomas’s
approach, exceedingly few challenges would escape the strictures of § 1252(b)(9).
The three-justice plurality authored by Justice Alito took a middle-ground
approach. Although it voiced skepticism, the plurality assumed for the sake
of argument Justice Thomas’s contention that detention is an “action
taken . . . to remove an alien.”250 Justice Alito’s analysis, thus, turned on
whether the legal questions before the Court arose from those actions taken
to remove the aliens.251
In ﬁnding that the legal questions in Jennings did not “arise from” a
removal action and thus fell outside the ambit of § 1252(b)(9), the plurality
made several important observations about the scope of the provision.
First, the plurality ﬂatly rejected the broad, “but for” test suggested by
Justice Thomas. It noted that this “expansive interpretation” of § 1252(b)(9)
would have “staggering results”252 and provided three examples to illustrate
the kinds of claims that would be barred by such an interpretation: a Bivens
claims based on inhumane conditions of conﬁnement; a state-law assault
claim against a guard or fellow detainee; and a tort claim against a truck driver
or owner who hit the bus transporting noncitizens to a detention facility.253
Although these injuries would not have occurred but for the government’s
decision to place the noncitizens in detention, “cramming judicial review of
those questions into the review of ﬁnal removal orders would be absurd.”254
Put simply, these challenges do not arise from removal proceedings or an
action taken to remove a noncitizen.
Second, the plurality expressed concern about reviewability. Adopting an
extreme but for formulation of claims “arising from” removal orders would
Id. at 855 (Thomas, J., concurring in part).
Aguilar v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf ’t, 510 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2007) (explaining that
§ 1252(b)(9) does not preclude district court jurisdiction over claims challenging detention).
250 Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 841 n.3 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion) (questioning whether detention
actually is an “action taken . . . to remove an alien”).
251 Id.
252 Id. at 840 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion).
253 Id.
254 Id.
248
249
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make claims of prolonged detention, like the one at issue in Jennings,
“effectively unreviewable.”255 The justices in the plurality were concerned
about two distinct but related outcomes. In one, a final order of removal is
eventually entered but the injury has already taken place, so judicial review
would fail to remedy the harm.256 In the other, no order of removal is ever
issued and thus the petition for review process never becomes available, so the
noncitizen would be deprived of “any meaningful chance for judicial review.”257
Finally, the plurality cautioned against adopting “uncritical literalism” when
interpreting “capacious phrases” such as “arising from.”258 It recalled the Court’s
approach in Reno v. AADC, where it narrowly construed identical language
from a neighboring provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). The Jennings plurality
explained that the Court “did not interpret this language to sweep in any claim
that can technically be said to ‘arise from’ the three listed actions. . . . Instead,
we read the language to refer to just those three specific actions themselves.”259
With these warnings in mind, the plurality concluded that it was not
necessary to “attempt to provide a comprehensive interpretation” of
§ 1252(b)(9).260 Instead, “[f]or present purposes,” it was “enough” that the
noncitizen detainees here were “not asking for review of an order of removal;
they [were] not challenging the decision to detain them in the ﬁrst place or
to seek removal; and they [were] not even challenging any part of the process
by which their removability will be determined.”261 The plurality also noted
that even if detention were an “action taken to remove an alien,” as Justice
Thomas argued, the legal questions are “too remote” to be said to “arise from”
such an action.262 Therefore, the claims at issue did not fall within the scope
of § 1252(b)(9) and the district court rightfully retained jurisdiction.
Between the three justices in the plurality’s jurisdictional analysis and
three in the dissent, six of the eight justices involved in the decision held

Id.
Id.
Id. In the recent case that overturned the district court’s adverse decision in Efrain and
Mia’s case, the Third Circuit distilled a “now-or-never” principle from Jennings, Preap—which largely
repeated the positions of Jennings, see infra Section III.B—and the presumptions favoring judicial
review. See E.O.H.C. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 950 F.3d 177, 185-86 (3d Cir. 2020).
Although the principle will be more closely examined in Part III, it is worth noting here that Justice
Alito’s discussion of reviewability circles around the concept of “now-or-never.” See Jennings, 138 S.
Ct. at 840 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion) (“Interpreting ‘arising from’ in this extreme way would also
make claims of prolonged detention eﬀectively unreviewable.”).
258 Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 840 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion).
259 Id. at 841 (emphasis added).
260 Id.
261 Id.
262 Id. at 841 n.3 (quotation marks omitted).
255
256
257
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§ 1252(b)(9) did not bar claims challenging prolonged detention without a
bond hearing, even when detainees had ongoing removal proceedings.263
A year after Jennings, Justice Alito, joined now by Justice Kavanaugh and
again by Chief Justice Roberts, essentially reprised these positions in Nielsen
v. Preap, ﬁnding that § 1252(b)(9) did not preclude district court jurisdiction
over a challenge raising the question of whether noncitizens were subject to
mandatory detention when the government failed to detain them
immediately after their release from state court.264 It stated:
As in Jennings, respondents here ‘are not asking for review of an order of
removal; they are not challenging the decision to detain them in the ﬁrst place
or to seek removal . . . ; and they are not even challenging any part of the
process by which their removability will be determined. Under these
circumstances . . . § 1252(b)(9) does not present a jurisdictional bar.’265

After Jennings and Preap, lower courts were left to make sense of the
Supreme Court’s fractured jurisdictional holdings.266
III. POST-JENNINGS AND THE PRESENT STATE OF § 1252(b)(9)
Jennings failed to provide lower courts with clear guidance on how to
construe § 1252(b)(9). Perhaps as a result, litigation implicating § 1252(b)(9)
has proliferated since Jennings,267 underscoring the need for a comprehensive
Id. at 841, 876.
Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954, 960-62 (2019).
Id. at 962 (quoting Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 841 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion)).
As mentioned before, the Supreme Court has—to varying degrees—discussed § 1252(b)(9) in
three cases since Preap was decided. See supra note 29. Of the three cases to treat the provision,
Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California adds the most to the discussion.
140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020). In Regents, the Court determined that the Trump administration’s rescission of
DACA was unlawful. Id.; see also Meghan Downey & Adam Garnick, Explaining the Supreme Court’s
DACA Decision, REG. REV. (July 7, 2020), https://www.theregreview.org/2020/07/07/downey-garnickexplaining-supreme-court-daca-decision/ [https://perma.cc/93JJ-4PZX] (explaining the Court’s
analysis of the Administrative Procedure Act challenges to the DACA recission). In so holding, the
Court discussed § 1252(b)(9) and held the provision did not present a jurisdictional bar to petitioners’
challenge to the DACA recission. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1907. As in Preap, the Court articulated the same
rule from Jennings. Id. Importantly, however, it went further, holding that § 1252(b)(9) “is certainly not
a bar where, as here, the parties are not challenging any removal proceedings.” In addition, the Court
described the language of § 1252(b)(9) as “targeted” and “narrow.” Id. This language was almost
immediately seized upon by at least two circuit courts. See Canal A Media Holding, LLC v. U.S.
Citizenship and Immigr. Servs., 964 F.3d 1250, 1257 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Regents in overturning
district court’s expansive interpretation of § 1252(b)(9) because it “does not square with that provision’s
‘narrow’ scope”); Gonzalez v. U.S. Immigr. and Customs Enf ’t, 975 F.3d 788, 810 (9th Cir. 2020)
(finding that § 1252(b)(9) did not bar challenge to the use of immigration detainers in part because the
Supreme Court has “instructed that [the provision] is . . . ‘targeted’ and ‘narrow’”).
267 In the roughly three years since Jennings, at least 200 cases have cited the provision. See
infra Appendix (listing cases). To be sure, pure citation-count is an imperfect proxy to support the
263
264
265
266
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synthesis of the law in its current form. This Part aims to provide that in three
steps. First, this Part contends that Jennings, fractured as it was, undercut the
broad interpretation of “arising from” previously embraced by the First and
Ninth Circuits. Second, this Part lays out a roadmap of the law,268 based on
Jennings and other recent Supreme Court cases, that sets the stage for a
narrower reading of “arising from”. Finally, this Part analyzes the speciﬁc
factors and frameworks that courts have relied on when construing “arising
from” in light of the narrower reading that Jennings commands.
A. The Conflict Between Jennings and the Aguilar Interpretation
Although it did not do so explicitly, the Jennings Court rejected the Aguilar
interpretation of “arising from,” and counseled in favor of a quite narrow
reading of that phrase.269 On a purely semantic level, the language of the
Jennings plurality runs counter to the broad, dramatic language used in the
Aguilar interpretation, which described § 1252(b)(9) as “breathtaking in
scope” and “vice-like in grip.”270 The plurality cautioned against an
“expansive” reading of § 1252(b)(9) and expressed concern over the
“staggering results” that would result from “cramming judicial review” of
certain claims into a petition for review of ﬁnal removal orders.271 The three
justices in the plurality also recalled the Court’s narrow reading of § 1252(g)
in AADC, noting that any interpretation of “arising from” must avoid the
“uncritical literalism” that could lead to results that “no sensible person could
have intended.”272 Coupled with the three dissenters who embraced the even
narrower interpretation,273 six of eight justices involved in Jennings urged
lower courts not to adopt a broad reading of § 1252(b)(9).
But the interpretive conﬂict is not merely semantic. The Supreme Court’s
decision in Jennings substantively narrowed the scope of § 1252(b)(9) as
interpreted by Aguilar and its progeny. One district court in the Ninth Circuit
proposition that Jennings initiated a wave of litigation, but the stark diﬀerence in number of cases
pre- and post-Jennings is noteworthy. The Trump administration’s severe immigration policies may
have also contributed to the uptick in challenges implicating § 1252(b)(9). See, e.g., Casa De
Maryland v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 924 F.3d 684, 691 (4th Cir. 2019) (challenging DACA
rescission); O.A. v. Trump, 404 F. Supp. 3d 109, 117 (D.D.C. 2019) (challenging the policy popularly
refenced as the “asylum ban”).
268 See supra, note 29 (discussing the Supreme Court cases that addressed § 1252(b)(9) after Jennings).
269 As mentioned, this assertion is further supported by the Court’s discussion of the provision
in Regents in which it explicitly described it as “targeted” and “narrow.” 140 S. Ct. at 1907; see also
supra notes 29, 266, (discussing Regents in more detail).
270 Aguilar v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf ’t, 510 F.3d 1, 9-10 (1st Cir. 2007).
271 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 840 (2018) (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion).
272 Id. at 840-41 (quoting Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 943 (2016))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
273 Id. at 876 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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suggested that its circuit’s precedent, which most notably includes J.E. F.M.,
treats § 1252(b)(9) “too broadly in light of the Jennings plurality’s rejection of
an ‘expansive’ interpretation of ‘arising from’ that would sweep a claim into
Section 1252(b)(9) simply because an alien is in removal proceedings or a
removal action was taken.”274 Likewise, after reviewing prior case law that
interpreted § 1252(b)(9) as expansive in scope, a district court in the Second
Circuit noted, “as the Supreme Court’s plurality opinion in [Jennings]
explained, § 1252(b)(9) should not be construed broadly.”275
A district court case that reconsidered and partially reversed in light of
Jennings best illustrates the substantive narrowing. In that case, the district
court was confronted with noncitizens’ Fifth Amendment claims regarding
the government’s alleged failure to promptly present them to an immigration
judge for a probable cause determination.276 Prior to Jennings, the district
court found that the pre-hearing custody decisions were “inextricably linked”
with removal proceedings because the initial hearing is a “crucial stage of the
removal proceedings.”277
In reconsidering the case after Jennings, however, the district court
reversed.278 It found that the Fifth Amendment claims did not “arise from”
any of the challenges to removal listed in Jennings that § 1252(b)(9) might
circumscribe.279 Moreover, it held that if the noncitizens could not bring their
claims to district court, those claims might become “eﬀectively unreviewable,”
an outcome the Jennings plurality explicitly cautioned against.280

274 Cancino-Castellar v. Nielsen, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1107, 1114 (S.D. Cal. 2018); see also Las
Americas Immigrant Advoc. Ctr. v. Trump, No. 19-20051, 2020 WL 4431682, at *7 (D. Or. July 31,
2020) (“Defendants rely heavily on language in J.E. F.M. that characterizes § 1252(b)(9) as
‘breathtaking’ in its scope . . . . In determining the scope of § 1252(b)(9), however, this Court must
look not only to J.E. F.M. but also to Jennings . . . which appears to adopt a somewhat more limited
view of the scope of § 1252(b)(9).”); Roy v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, No. 12-09012, 2018 WL 914773, at
*18 (C.D. Cal. Feb 7, 2018) (holding that § 1252(b)(9) does not bar claims pertaining to ICE
detainers, as these actions occur before and oftentimes independently from “any decision to
commence removal proceedings”); Nava v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 435 F. Supp. 3d 880, 893 (N.D.
Ill. 2020) (citing Roy for the proposition that the language in Jennings counseled against an expansive
interpretation of “arising from”).
275 P.L. v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf ’t, No. 19-01336, 2019 WL 2568648, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
June 21, 2019)
276 Castellar v. Nielsen, No. 17-0491, 2018 WL 786742, at *6, *12-13 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2018). A
“probable cause determination” refers to DHS seeking prompt judicial review and approval of their
detention of noncitizens, consistent with the Fourth and Fifth Amendments’ requirement that
seizures by government agents are reasonable and noncitizens are aﬀorded due process. HILLEL R.
SMITH, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10375, IMMIGRATION DETAINERS: BACKGROUND AND
RECENT LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS 2 (2019).
277 Castellar, 2018 WL 786742 at *12.
278 Cancino-Castellar, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 1117.
279 Id.
280 Id.
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Claims outside the detention context that were likely to have been swept
into § 1252(b)(9) under the Aguilar approach have likewise fallen outside the
provision’s strictures in light of Jennings. Several courts, including one district
court in the Ninth Circuit, have found that right-to-counsel claims fall outside
the reach of § 1252(b)(9), despite the contrary holdings of J.E. F.M. and Aguilar,
which held that § 1252(b)(9) prohibited district court review of those claims.281
Likewise, multiple district courts have found that § 1252(b)(9) does not
foreclose their jurisdiction where a noncitizen challenged the legality of ICE’s
conduct during their initial stop and detention.282 This makes sense given that
the Jennings plurality warned courts not to “cram” such challenges into the
administrative process.283 Under the Aguilar interpretation, these claims would
likely have been swallowed by § 1252(b)(9) given their nexus to removal
proceedings, even though they arose prior to the initiation of removal
proceedings and thus were at risk of never receiving any judicial review.284
In sum, Jennings, despite lacking a majority opinion, undercut the broad
Aguilar interpretation of § 1252(b)(9). How exactly lower courts have applied
Jennings to eﬀectuate its narrower construction of “arising from” is a more
complicated question.
B. The State of the Law: Interpreting “Arising From”
To properly situate the factors and frameworks courts have employed
when construing “arising from,” it is worth providing a brief roadmap of the

281 See E.O.H.C. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 950 F.3d 177, 187 (3d Cir. 2020)
(concluding that constitutional right-to-counsel claims are not barred by § 1252(b)(9)); Arroyo v.
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 19-815, 2019 WL 2912848, at *13 (C.D. Cal. June 20, 2019)
(represented noncitizens’ claims not barred by § 1252(b)(9)); Torres v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Security, 411 F. Supp. 3d 1036, 1048-49 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (represented and unrepresented noncitizens’
claims not barred by § 1252(b)(9)).
282 See, e.g., Nak Kim Chhoeun v. Marin, No. 17-01898, 2018 WL 1941756, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar.
26, 2018) (ﬁnding district court jurisdiction over claims challenging the government’s failure to
notify petitioners of changed circumstances justifying detention and deportation); Tun-Cos v.
Perrotte, No. 17-943, 2018 WL 3616863, at *1, *6 (E.D. Va. Apr. 5, 2020) (ﬁnding district court
jurisdiction over an action for damages following an allegedly unlawful search by government
agents); Nava v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 435 F. Supp. 3d 880, 885 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (ﬁnding district
court jurisdiction over claims challenging “indiscriminate, large-scale immigration sweeps”).
283 See J.E. F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Aguilar v. U.S. Immigr.
& Customs Enf ’t, 510 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2007)) (noting that § 1252(b)(9) “swallows up virtually all
claims that are tied to removal proceedings”).
284 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 840 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion). See infra subsection
III.B.2 (discussing how claims arising prior to the initiation of removal proceedings do not fall into
the scope of § 1252(b)(9) in light of Jennings).
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current law as it stands after Jennings and other recent Supreme Court cases.285
At this point, courts understand § 1252(b)(9) to function as a “zipper
clause”286 meant to “consolidate judicial review of immigration proceedings
into one action in the court of appeals.”287 By its own terms, the provision
applies only to legal questions that “arise from” removal proceedings and does
not encompass claims that are “too remote from” such proceedings.288
Although the Supreme Court has not yet offered a comprehensive
interpretation of “arising from,”289 it has repeatedly urged that the phrase
should be construed narrowly.290 In addition, the Court has explained that
claims that do not challenge (1) an order of removal, (2) the government’s
decision to seek removal, or (3) the process by which removability will be
determined categorically do not “arise from” removal proceedings and thus do
not fall within § 1252(b)(9)’s reach.291 Likewise, claims that do not challenge
any removal proceedings “certainly” do not “arise from” such proceedings.292
Therefore, if claims do not challenge one of these enumerated categories,
§ 1252(b)(9) does not present a jurisdictional bar and the court’s analysis ends.
But when a claim does not fall cleanly outside one of those enumerated
categories—when it presents a closer call—lower courts since Jennings have applied
a range of factors to construe “arising from,” some of which are more useful than
others in how they effectuate the narrow reading that Jennings commands.
This subsection argues that reviewability—one of the leading factors
courts have employed—should turn on whether an immigration judge has the
ability to grant the relief sought. It further contends that a “timeframe
consideration” categorically excludes § 1252(b)(9) from swallowing any claims
that challenge actions arising prior to the commencement of removal
proceedings. After those discussions, it surveys other important factors and
occasionally oﬀers their beneﬁts and drawbacks.

285 To be clear, the case law of § 1252(b)(9) is rapidly changing within each circuit, but this
introduction draws upon several recent Supreme Court decisions to provide an overview of where
the law stands across all jurisdictions.
286 See Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062, 1070 (2020) (referring to § 1252(b)(9) as a
“zipper clause”).
287 Id.
288 Jennings, 138 S. Ct. 830, 841 n.3 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion).
289 Id. at 841 (noting that it was “not necessary for us to attempt to provide a comprehensive
interpretation” of § 1252(b)(9)).
290 See id. at 840 (cautioning against an expansive reading of “arising from”). See also Dep’t of
Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1907 (2020) (describing § 1252(g)
and § 1252(b)(9), which both contain the phrase “arising from,” as “similarly narrow”).
291 Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 840 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion); see also Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1907
(quoting Jennings, 138 S. Ct at 841 for this proposition).
292 Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1907.
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1. Reviewability
Reviewability—whether claims will receive adequate judicial review—has
been at the center of § 1252(b)(9) jurisprudence since the provision was
enacted. In fact, the Supreme Court in McNary provided an avenue around
the strictures of § 1252(b)(9)’s predecessor because if noncitizens were “not
allowed to pursue their claims in the District Court, [they] would not as a
practical matter be able to obtain meaningful judicial review . . . .”293
“Meaningful judicial review” has remained a baseline consideration in
determining whether claims are channeled by § 1252(b)(9).294 The Jennings
plurality highlighted as much when it warned that interpreting “arising from”
in an “extreme way” would make some claims “eﬀectively unreviewable.”295 Of
course, as one district court aptly noted, reviewability is not the sole factor
used to determine whether § 1252(b)(9) prohibits a district court from having
jurisdiction over certain claims.296 If it were, the Jennings plurality would have
ended its analysis once it discussed reviewability, which it did not.297 But at
minimum, “meaningful judicial review” remains a signiﬁcant—and perhaps
the leading—factor courts use when construing § 1252(b)(9).
Determining what exactly “meaningful review” requires is a fraught but
critical exercise. The Aguilar interpretation tended to look at whether claims
were cognizable in a petition for review before the court of appeals.298 Aguilar
itself stated that § 1252(b)(9) applies to claims that were “cognizable within
the review process” established by Congress.299 But the Aguilar court was less
clear on precisely what that inquiry entailed. Did this mean cognizable before
an immigration judge, or eventually cognizable in a petition for review before
the court of appeals?
Almost ten years later, J.E. F.M. helped answer that question. There, the
Ninth Circuit embraced the Aguilar interpretation and rejected the argument
that the unaccompanied minors’ right-to-counsel claims would be denied any
McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., 498 U.S. 479, 496 (1991).
Id.; see J.E. F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2016) (analyzing whether
foreclosing the noncitizen minors’ claims would deny them “meaningful judicial review”).
295 138 S. Ct. at 840 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). It bears emphasizing that
Congress meant § 1252(b)(9) to be a claims challenging provision, “not a claims-barring one.” Aguilar
v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf ’t, 510 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2007) (emphasis added).
296 Cancino-Castellar v. Nielsen, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1107, 1114 (S.D. Cal. 2018).
297 Id.
298 See Aguilar v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf ’t, 510 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2007) (“[T]he most
salient questions involve whether the underlying claims are cognizable within the review process
established by Congress, and if so, whether enforcement of the exhaustion requirement will allow
meaningful judicial review without inviting an irreparable injury.”); see, e.g., Arroyo v. U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., No. 19-815, 2019 WL 2912848, at *14 (C.D. Cal. June 20, 2019) (“Reviewability by
an [immigration judge] is not the standard as to whether an action is unreviewable.”).
299 Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 17.
293
294
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meaningful judicial review because “a right-to-counsel claim is teed up for
appellate review,” despite conceding that neither the immigration judge nor
the Board of Immigration Appeals has authority to provide the requested
relief.300 The “reviewability” inquiry, then, under the Aguilar interpretation
as clariﬁed in J.E. F.M. focused on whether claims were cognizable at the
petition for review level—it did not examine whether immigration judges or
the Board of Immigration Appeals had the ability to provide relief.
Lower courts since Jennings, however, have looked at another part of the
administrative process: whether the immigration judge could provide the
requested relief. In O.A. v. Trump, the District Court for the District of
Columbia considered in depth the scope of § 1252(b)(9), in light of Jennings.301
Holding that a challenge to the Trump administration’s “asylum ban” was not
barred by § 1252(b)(9), the court dedicated much of its opinion to concerns
of reviewability.302 In particular, it stated, “Plaintiﬀs’ challenges are also
outside the . . . competence and expertise of asylum oﬃcers, immigration
judges, and the [Board of Immigration Appeals].”303 Even if the claims could
eventually be “teed up” for appellate review through a petition for review,
that would be insuﬃcient to prohibit district court jurisdiction under
§ 1252(b)(9). Instead, courts must look at the abilities of the initial
decisionmakers—the immigration judges and the Board of Immigration
Appeals oﬃcials who are responsible for responding during removal
processes to noncitizens’ requests for relief.
Courts have employed this inquiry across several contexts. In conditions
of conﬁnement cases, for example, one court explained that “interpreting
section 1252(b)(9) to reach [such claims] would be problematic, especially
because Immigration Judges are ‘powerless to remedy the conditions
alleged.’”304 Likewise, in a case considering a challenge to the rescission of an
individual’s DACA status, the district court found determinative that because
“an immigration judge in a removal proceeding does not have the power to
grant or deny deferred action, or to review or reverse an agency’s decision to
revoke it,” § 1252(b)(9) posed no jurisdictional bar.305 In the Bivens context,
300 J.E. F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026, 1038 (9th Cir. 2016) (emphasis added). To be sure, the
Ninth Circuit noted that constitutional claims fell within a “narrow exception” whereby a court of
appeals could still consider those claims although they were not raised during administrative
proceedings. Id.
301 O.A. v. Trump, 404 F. Supp. 3d 109, 134-38 (D.D.C. 2019).
302 Id.
303 Id. at 137 (citing Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 491 (2010)).
304 S. Poverty L. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 18-760, 2020 WL 3265533, at *16
(D.D.C. June 17, 2020) (citing Torres v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 411 F. Supp. 3d 1036, 1049
(C.D. Cal. 2019)).
305 Inland Empire—Immigrant Youth Collective v. Nielsen, No. 17-2048, 2018 WL 4998230, at
*14 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2018) (emphasis in original).
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numerous cases have applied the same logic: because immigration judges
cannot award damages, these claims escape the reach of § 1252(b)(9).306
In Efrain and Mia’s case, the Third Circuit held that § 1252(b)(9) did not
bar most of Efrain and Mia’s claims, including their Fifth Amendment rightto-counsel due process claim.307 The court centered its decision—particularly
its “arising from” inquiry—on reviewability.308 The court distilled a principle
from Jennings, Preap, and “the presumptions favoring judicial review,” which
essentially compels courts to ask: If a noncitizen cannot obtain judicial review
now, then will meaningful review be available at all?309 Put diﬀerently, if it
will be too late to remedy the harm later, the district court must have
jurisdiction to review—and potentially remedy—the harm now.
In eﬀect, the Third Circuit’s “now-or-never principle” requires courts to
assess the competencies of immigration judges and the Board of Immigration
Appeals, because the principle is primarily concerned with the urgency of the
claims and the ability of the administrative process to remedy that harm.
In another right-to-counsel case, a district court found that the “limited
jurisdiction of Immigration Judges” weighed in favor of ﬁnding that
§ 1252(b)(9) did not bar right-to-counsel claims.310 The court explained that
even though right-to-counsel issues do sometimes appear in removal
proceedings and related petitions for review, “[t]hey are cognizable only in a
narrow sense.”311 In the petition for review context, the focus is “categorically
diﬀerent” than it would be in a full hearing on the merits because the only
question in a petition for review is “whether to overturn a decision below,”
rather than to conduct a thorough review of the removal proceeding.312 Such
reasoning strongly suggests that conﬁning judicial review of right-to-counsel
claims to the petition for review process would risk shortchanging the
noncitizens’ opportunity to obtain “meaningful judicial review.”
In sum, in light of Jennings, the proper inquiry into reviewability examines
the competencies of the immigration judge and whether she can provide
306 See, e.g., Tun-Cos v. Perrotte, No. 17-943, 2018 WL 3616863, at *6 (E.D. Va. Apr. 5, 2020)
(holding § 1252(b)(9) does not bar Bivens claims partly because the immigration judge cannot grant
Plaintiﬀs the relief they seek); Rueda Vidal v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 18-9276, 2019 WL
7899948, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2019), rev’d on other grounds, Rueda Vidal v. Bolton, 822 F. App’x
643 (9th Cir. 2020) (“Because claims for damages are not available in removal proceedings, they are
collateral to that process for purposes of Section 1252(b)(9).”); cf. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct.
830, 840 (2018) (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion) (suggesting that interpreting § 1252(b)(9) to encompass
Bivens claims would be “absurd”).
307 E.O.H.C. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 950 F.3d 177, 184-87 (3d Cir. 2020).
308 See id. (analyzing whether claims would be subject to meaningful review).
309 Id. at 185-86.
310 Torres v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 411 F. Supp. 3d 1036, 1049 (C.D. Cal. 2019)
(emphasis added).
311 Id.
312 Id.
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relief.313 It no longer focuses on what type of claims could eventually be “teed
up” for appellate review.314 As a result, an array of claims that may have been
(and indeed were) encompassed by § 1252(b)(9) under the Aguilar
interpretation now fall outside its reach.
2. Timeframe
A closely related factor is “timeframe,” which examines the point during
removal proceedings at which the claims were brought or the challenged actions
occurred. This factor can be distilled into the following bright-line rule: claims
challenging actions that occurred before the initiation of removal proceedings
categorically do not fall within the reach of § 1252(b)(9).
To some extent, similar concerns that underpin the reviewability
consideration support the timeframe consideration. If § 1252(b)(9) foreclosed
district court review for claims arising prior to the initiation of removal
proceedings, there is no guarantee that the government will ever issue a
removal order, much less commence removal proceedings in the first place. In
either instance, the noncitizen never has an opportunity to bring claims
through a petition for review and would be completely deprived of any judicial
review.315 This is precisely the “absurd” result Jennings sought to avoid.316
But reviewability on its own, as explained, cannot form the basis of the
categorical rule proposed here.317 What pushes the timeframe consideration
into the realm of a categorical rule is that any claims arising prior to removal
proceedings present legal questions that the Jennings plurality warned would
be “too remote” from such proceedings to be said to “arise from” them.318
Courts previously applying the Aguilar interpretation, however, did not
share the same concern. In Aguilar itself, removal proceedings had not been
initiated by the time that the noncitizens brought their claims to district
court.319 Even still, the court held that § 1252(b)(9) could still channel the
noncitizens’ claims into a petition for review because the provision’s scope
313 Cf. Urbina v. Barr, No. 20-325, 2020 WL 3002344, at *5 (E.D. Va. June 4, 2020) (focusing the
inquiry on whether claims are cognizable at the petition for review stage, noting that “Urbina can
challenge his removability in a petition for review filed with the Fourth Circuit, which has the clear
authority to adjudicate whether an alien’s prior convictions are crimes involving moral turpitude”).
314 J.E. F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026, 1038 (9th Cir. 2016).
315 See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 840 (2018) (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion)
(explaining that if § 1252(b)(9) applied to certain claims prior to the issuance of an order of removal,
it would make such claims “eﬀectively unreviewable”).
316 Id.
317 See supra notes 298-299 and accompanying text (noting that Jennings implies that
reviewability cannot be the only factor in the “arising from” analysis).
318 See Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 840 n.3 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion) (explaining that the legal
questions at issue were “too remote” from the actions taken to fall within § 1252(b)(9)).
319 Aguilar v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf ’t, 510 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2007).
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was not limited to claims arising from “extant removal proceedings.”320 That
is no longer the case after Jennings.
Since Jennings, several courts have held that § 1252(b)(9) cannot channel
claims brought prior to the initiation of removal proceedings. In Innovation
Law Lab v. Nielsen, a case that considered a challenge to the conditions of
pre-hearing detention, the district court found it could not have constituted
a challenge to removal proceedings for the obvious reason that such
proceedings had not yet commenced.321 It noted that the Jennings plurality
cautioned against reading § 1252(b)(9) in a way that makes certain claims
“eﬀectively unreviewable.”322 Because foreclosing jurisdiction may have
denied all avenues to judicial review, that consequence weighed heavily
against applying § 1252(b)(9).323 But that alone would not suﬃce. The
lynchpin, according to the court, was that the legal questions at issue—raised
before removal proceedings even commenced—were simply “too remote”
from removal proceedings to be said to “arise from” them, leading the court
to hold that § 1252(b)(9) did not apply to the claims.324
The same was true in Al Otro Lado, Inc v. McAleenan, a case in which
noncitizens challenged restrictive policies that prohibited certain individuals
from applying for asylum in the ﬁrst place.325 The court held that since the
entire goal of the suit was to commence removal proceedings so that plaintiﬀs
could apply for asylum, they could not possibly be challenging such
proceedings.326 As a result, the court held § 1252(b)(9) posed no obstacle to
the noncitizens’ claims.327
Under this categorical timeframe rule, even if removal proceedings have
commenced by the time the claims are brought to district court, § 1252(b)(9)
does not present a jurisdictional bar as long as the actions occurred prior. In
one case, which considered noncitizens’ challenge to ICE’s use of detainers to
apprehend them in the ﬁrst place, the court held that “[b]ecause Plaintiﬀs’
. . . claims relate to the ICE oﬃcers’ actions before removal proceedings were
ﬁled . . . the Court ﬁnds that they are independent of the removal process.”328

Id. at 6-9, 10.
Innovation L. Lab v. Nielsen, 342 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1071-77 (D. Or. 2018).
Id. at 1077 (quoting Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 840) (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion)).
Id.
Id. at 1078.
Al Otro Lado, Inc v. McAleenan, 432 F. Supp. 3d 848, 859-61 (S.D. Cal. 2019)
See id. at 863 (“The Government does not allege that any Plaintiﬀ is in removal proceedings
or that a ﬁnal order of removal has been issued as to any Plaintiﬀ. . . . In fact, the very relief
Plaintiﬀs seek is to commence such proceedings and have their asylum claims adjudicated.”).
327 Id.
328 Roy v. Los Angeles Cnty., No. 12-09012, 2018 WL 914773, at *18 (quoting Medina v. U.S.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. C17-218, 2017 WL 2954719, at *11 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 14, 2017)).
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
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The district court in Nava v. Department of Homeland Security reached a
similar conclusion in a class action challenge to ICE’s allegedly race-based
traﬃc stops, which led to the arrest and detention of several individuals.329
There, the court observed that “the risk that certain Plaintiﬀs could be
precluded from presenting their claims in any forum weighs in favor of a
ﬁnding that Section 1252(b)(9) does not deprive the court of jurisdiction.”330
In addition to the reviewability concerns, what ultimately pushed the claims
outside the provision’s scope was that the plaintiﬀs’ challenges to “[a]n illegal
stop conducted before the government has any legitimate reason to believe the
subject is removable” were “too remote from removal actions to fall within the
scope of § 1252(b)(9), and therefore did not ‘arise from’ them.”331
When claims “arise from” actions that occur before the initiation of removal
proceedings, they cannot be barred by § 1252(b)(9). For one, reviewability
concerns are particularly heightened because there is a risk that an individual is
deprived of any and all judicial review, which is an unacceptable outcome. If
removal proceedings are never initiated or if the noncitizen obtains relief, an
opportunity to bring claims through a petition for review will never manifest.
It is tautological that events occurring prior to the commencement of removal
proceedings present legal questions that are “too remote from” such
proceedings.332 Indeed, two years after Jennings, the Supreme Court explained that
claims “not challenging any removal proceedings” “certainly” do not arise from
such proceedings.333 Therefore, this timeframe consideration provides a simple
rule that any claims that challenge action occurring prior to the initiation of
removal proceedings must not “arise from” such proceedings and thus fall outside
the sweep of § 1252(b)(9). The bright-line rule this creates is a helpful tool for
district courts confronted with these types of claims, as it would allow them to
quickly dispose of challenges to their jurisdiction on § 1252(b)(9) grounds.
3. Nature of the Right
Courts have recently paid more attention to the nature of the right that
was allegedly violated. Generally, if claims assert rights that aﬀord
Nava v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 435 F. Supp. 3d 880, 890 (N.D. Ill. 2020).
Id. at 894 (emphasis added). This language mirrors that of the Supreme Court’s in St. Cyr:
“If it were clear that the question of law could be answered in another judicial forum, it might be
permissible to accept the INS’ reading of § 1252. But the absence of such a forum, coupled with the
lack of [an express statement to repeal habeas], strongly counsels against adopting a construction
that would raise serious constitutional questions.” Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533
U.S. 289, 314 (2001).
331 Nava, 435 F. Supp. 3d at 890-91 (emphasis added) (citing Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct.
830, 841 n.3 (2018) (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion)).
332 Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 841 n.3 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion)
333 Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1907 (2020).
329
330
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protections beyond those aﬀorded in removal proceedings, they fall outside
the reach of § 1252(b)(9). This has been particularly pronounced in cases
where right-to-counsel claims fall outside the reach of § 1252(b)(9).334
In Arroyo v. Department of Homeland Security, for example, a district court
held that § 1252(b)(9) posed no jurisdictional barrier to claims of noncitizens
who had an existing attorney-client relationship.335 Guided by Jennings, the
court explained, “the nature of right violated guides the jurisdictional inquiry
rather than the source of the right.”336 Under both the INA and Constitution,
a noncitizen enjoys the “right not to have that relationship unduly burdened
or interfered with.”337 The attorney–client relationship “carries with it certain
rights separate from and additional to their rights in removal proceedings.”338
Therefore, the alleged harm accrues at the moment that the relationship is
burdened, without reference to the removal proceedings.339 In other words,
the right asserted offers protections that extend beyond the bounds of removal
proceedings, and thus, such claims could not “arise from” those proceedings.
Torres v. Department of Homeland Security employed the same logic and
extended it to cover unrepresented noncitizens in addition to already
represented noncitizens.340 The court said that because the asserted rights
extend beyond removal proceedings, an alleged violation of those rights are
equally “apart from the removal process.”341
The decision in Efrain and Mia’s case, E.O.H.C.—which otherwise
centered on reviewability—also discussed the “nature of the right,”
speciﬁcally with regard to the right-to-counsel claim.342 The Third Circuit
found that § 1252(b)(9) did not bar the father and daughter’s constitutional
right-to-counsel claims because there are certain rights separate from and
334 Right-to-counsel claims present perhaps the most complicated—or, at least, divisive—
questions about the scope of § 1252(b)(9). One district court summarized the state of the law as
such: “The question of whether the Court would have jurisdiction over Plaintiﬀ ’s access to counsel
claim is a complicated one and the authorities are equipoise.” S. Poverty L. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., No. 18-760, 2020 WL 3265533, at *35 n.4 (D.D.C. June 17, 2020). This area of the
law is ripe for further scholarship, given that the Supreme Court has yet to confront a right-tocounsel claim, but these claims have been the subject of some of the most important § 1252(b)(9)
circuit cases since the provision’s enactment. See, e.g., Aguilar v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf ’t, 510
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007); J.E. F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2016); E.O.H.C. v. Sec’y U.S.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 950 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 2020).
335 Arroyo v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 19-815, 2019 WL 2912848, at *13 (C.D. Cal.
June 20, 2019).
336 Id.
337 Id.
338 Id.
339 Id.
340 Torres v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 411 F. Supp. 3d 1036, 1049 (C.D. Cal. 2019).
341 Id.
342 E.O.H.C. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 950 F.3d 177, 186 (3d Cir. 2020); Arroyo
v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 19-815, 2019 WL 2912848, at *13 (C.D. Cal. June 20, 2019).
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additional to those implicated in removal proceedings.343 Conversely, the
court held that § 1252(b)(9) did bar the statutory claims because “the right is
limited to [removal proceedings].”344
While Torres and Arroyo differed from E.O.H.C. in holding that both the
constitutional and statutory right to counsel extend beyond removal proceedings,
the key takeaway is that a growing number of courts view the “nature of the right”
as integral to their § 1252(b)(9) analysis.345 Since the bounds of a noncitizen’s
right to counsel are unclear,346 noncitizens can and should construe them as
expansively as possible to circumvent the strictures of § 1252(b)(9). Under the
logic adopted in Torres and Arroyo, if any part of the asserted right falls outside
the confines of removal proceedings, those claims do not “arise from” such
proceedings and thus § 1252(b)(9) poses no jurisdictional bar.
4. Three Challenges Approach
A widely used inquiry that comes directly from the Jennings plurality can
be described as the “three challenges approach.” It is taken from the plurality’s
suggestion that it was “enough” for “present purposes” that the noncitizens
in the case were “not asking for review of an order of removal; they [were]
not challenging the decision to detain them in the ﬁrst place or to seek
removal; and they [were] not even challenging any part of the process by
which their removability will be determined.”347
As noted in the introduction to this Section, if claims are not directed toward
one of these three categories, the analysis ends and § 1252(b)(9) must not apply.
In Regents, for example, the Court found that a challenge to the rescission of a
deferred action policy did not fall within § 1252(b)(9) because those bringing
suit were “not asking for review of an order of removal, the decision . . . to seek
removal, or the process by which . . . removability will be determined.”348
Likewise, the district court in Vasquez Cruz v. Barr found that because the
noncitizen’s objection to continued detention was not directed at any of the
three challenges enumerated in Jennings, § 1252(b)(9) posed no jurisdictional
barrier.349 The same was true in Al Otro Lado, where the court allowed
challenges to asylum policies to proceed in district court, partially because

E.O.H.C., 950 F.3d at 188.
Id. at 187.
See, e.g., id. at 186; Arroyo, 2019 WL 2912848, at *13.
See MANUEL supra note 100 (discussing noncitizens’ right to counsel in removal proceedings).
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 841 (2018) (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion)
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1907 (2020). The
Court added that § 1252(b)(9) was “certainly not a bar where, as here, the parties are not challenging
any removal proceedings.” Id. (emphasis added).
349 Vasquez Cruz v. Barr, No. 19-05251, 2019 WL 6327576, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2019).
343
344
345
346
347
348
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they did not implicate any of Jennings’ three challenges.350 Courts have
similarly found that claims challenging the denial of bond petitions,351 ICE
conduct,352 and an ICE ﬁeld oﬃce detention policy353 do not fall within one
of the three categories and thus fall outside § 1252(b)(9)’s reach.
In contrast, several courts have analogized the claims before them to one
of the “three challenges” to ﬁnd that § 1252(b)(9) bars jurisdiction. This is
problematic for several reasons. For one, the Supreme Court has only held
that claims that do not challenge any of the three categories fall outside the
ambit of § 1252(b)(9).354 It has not held that the reverse is true—that where
claims do challenge one of the three categories that they automatically fall
within the reach of § 1252(b)(9). In any event, the second and third of the
enumerated categories are imprecisely deﬁned.355 Courts using those two
categories as the basis for sweeping claims into § 1252(b)(9) risk painting the
provision’s scope with too broad a brush. It is worthwhile to address each of
the “three challenges” in turn, although the ﬁrst can be disposed of quickly.
a. “Review of an Order of Removal”
The Jennings plurality ﬁrst listed “review of an order of removal” as a
challenge swept into § 1252(b)(9).356 This type of challenge is essentially
restating the crux of § 1252(b)(9), so it oﬀers nothing new. In fact, such
challenges would even be barred under the Jennings dissent’s interpretation,
which reads § 1252(b)(9) quite narrowly.

Al Otro Lado, Inc v. McAleenan, 432 F. Supp. 3d 848, 863 (S.D. Cal. 2019)
See Torosyan v. Nielsen, No. 18-5873, 2018 WL 5784708, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2018)
(distinguishing a challenge to decision to detain petitioner without bail from a challenge arising
from action taken to remove the petitioner); Monterosa v. Decker, No. 20-02653, 2020 WL 1847771
at *2, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2020) (ﬁnding district court jurisdiction where petitioner challenged his
detention without bond).
352 See Tun-Cos, v. Perrotte, No. 17-943, 2018 WL 3616863, at *6 (E.D. Va. Apr. 5, 2020)
(ﬁnding district court jurisdiction in an action seeking damages after law enforcement agents
allegedly violated plaintiﬀ ’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights).
353 See Aguilar v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf ’t, 346 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1184 (N.D. Ill. 2018)
(concluding that § 1252(b)(9) did not bar district court jurisdiction over class action challenges to
the conditions of detention).
354 See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 841 (2018) (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion) (“[I]t is enough
to note that respondents are not asking for review [of one of the three categories].” (emphasis added)).
355 The second category includes claims challenging the decision to detain or to seek removal
in the ﬁrst place. Id. The third category includes claims challenging “any part of the process by which
removability will be determined.” Id.
356 Id.
350
351
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b. “Decision to Detain [Noncitizens] in the First Place or to Seek Removal”
The second of the three categories of claims are those directed at the
“decision to detain [noncitizens] in the ﬁrst place or to seek removal.”357
Notably, this mirrors the language of § 1252(b)(9)’s neighboring provision,
§ 1252(g), which bars challenges “arising from the decision or action by the
Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute
removal orders against any alien.”358
Nonetheless, the district court in Cancino-Castellar partially relied on this
language from Jennings to hold that § 1252(b)(9) channeled claims contesting
detention without a prompt probable cause determination.359 The court reasoned
that the prompt presentment claim “plainly ‘challenges the decision to detain
them in the first place’ . . . [because it] expressly challenged ‘decisions to keep
persons in custody beyond 48 hours and before their initial Master Calendar
Hearing . . . without prompt judicial review.’”360 Even though the claim seems to
challenge how they were detained—the circumstances of detention—the court
folded this claim into the government’s decision to “detain them in the first place”
and thus the claim fell within the restrictions of § 1252(b)(9).361
Another similar case came out the other way. In Aguilar v. U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement Chicago Field Office—a case unrelated to the First
Circuit’s Aguilar decision—plaintiffs brought claims to district court challenging
ICE’s policy of failing to promptly initiate removal proceedings, thus forcing
people to wait days or weeks in custody before seeing an immigration judge.362
During that period, ICE did not provide detainees a particularized statement of
probable cause nor a probable cause determination.363 These claims were almost
identical to those in Cancino-Castellar. Despite acknowledging the same “detain
in the first place” language from Jennings, the court found that § 1252(b)(9) did
not apply because the plaintiffs, “like the Jennings plaintiffs,” were only
challenging the circumstances of their detention.364
Reconciling these two cases presents a challenge. One plausible explanation
for Cancino-Castellar’s reading of § 1252(b)(9) is that unlike those in Aguilar, the
claims in Cancino-Castellar, which fell into § 1252(b)(9), did not involve a “policy

Id.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (emphasis added); see also Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Comm. (AADC), 525 U.S. 471, 483 (1999) (interpreting § 1252(g) narrowly as applying only to the
statute’s enumerated actions).
359 Cancino-Castellar v. Nielsen, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1107, 1115 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (emphasis added).
360 Id.
361 Id. (citing Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 841 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion)).
362 Aguilar v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf ’t, 346 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1178-81 (N.D. Ill. 2018).
363 Id. at 1179.
364 Id. at 1183-84 (citing Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 841 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion)).
357
358
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in which individuals are detained without probable cause.”365 Rather, the court
in Cancino-Castellar characterized the claims as concerning “the mere fact than
an immigration officer has taken any action at all against the Plaintiffs and the
putative class.”366 But that characterization is divorced from the language of the
complaint, which alleged the government had a “policy and practice of detaining
individuals for extended periods without promptly presenting them for an
initial hearing before an immigration judge.”367
In addition, like those in Aguilar, the plaintiﬀs in Cancino-Castellar alleged
that individuals “‘routinely languish in detention for two months or longer
before they see a judge’ because of [the] alleged policy.”368 Therefore, the
claims in Cancino-Castellar and Aguilar are almost indistinguishable. Whereas
one court found them to be challenging circumstances of detention and
therefore not barred by § 1252(b)(9), another found them to be challenging
the government’s decision to detain or remove noncitizens in the ﬁrst place
and thus swallowed by the provision.369
The foregoing discussion reveals the risk involved in using the second
category of the three challenges approach as a reason to sweep claims into
§ 1252(b)(9). The initial decision to detain a noncitizen could be read broadly,
like it was in Cancino-Castellar, to encompass claims that are really too remote
from removal proceedings.370 Willing courts could read this language so
broadly that § 1252(b)(9) would apply to claims challenging ICE’s conduct in
its initial stop and detention simply because it could be analogized to a
decision to detain individuals “in the ﬁrst place.”371
But it must not be so. Courts should resolve such close calls resulting from
this ambiguous language in favor of the noncitizen for two reasons. First, the
Supreme Court has consistently recognized a strong presumption in favor of
judicial review, especially in the immigration context.372 Second, the Court
Cancino-Castellar v. Nielsen, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1107, 1115 n.6 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (emphasis added).
Id. at 1116.
Id. at 1109 (emphasis added).
Id. (citing Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 841 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion)).
Id. (citing Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 841 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion)); Aguilar v. U.S. Immigr.
& Customs Enf ’t, 346 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1184 (N.D. Ill. 2018).
370 Cancino-Castellar, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 1114 (quoting Justice Alito’s analysis in Jennings, 138 S.
Ct. at 841 n.3). Separately, noncitizens with prompt presentment claims may also invoke the
timeframe consideration because their claims occur before the initiation of removal proceedings.
Moreover, they may also use the illegal conduct consideration from Justice Thomas’s concurrence.
Arguably, these claims challenge illegal ICE conduct during pre-hearing detention. See infra
subsection III.B.5.
371 Cancino-Castellar, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 1115 (citing Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 841 (Alito, J.)
(plurality opinion)).
372 See Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062, 1069 (2020) (explaining that the Court has
“consistently applied” the “strong” and “well-settled” presumption in favor of judicial review to
immigration statutes). See also McNary v. Haitan Refugee Ctr., 498 U.S. 479, 496 (1991)
365
366
367
368
369
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has now repeatedly urged a narrow reading of “arising from,” and accordingly,
when courts employ the second of the “three challenges approach,” they must
do so with caution and err on the side of preserving judicial review.373
c. “Any Part of the Process by Which [] Removability [Would] Be Determined”
The third of the “three challenges approach” implicates a small subset of claims
that object to the processes “by which . . . removability will be determined.”374
Since Jennings, the “third challenge” has been used primarily to channel
claims contesting the use of videoconference technology in removal
proceedings. P.L. v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement is the leading
case and has been cited in two subsequent videoconference technology cases
that came out the same way.375 At issue was a new policy adopted by the ICE
New York Field Oﬃce whereby it would no longer bring detained noncitizens
to immigration court but would instead conduct removal proceedings
remotely through videoconference technology.376
In addition to technological issues that caused delays, which resulted in
longer periods of detention, organizational plaintiffs alleged that the policy
prevented them from meaningfully participating in removal proceedings.377
The court determined that, “[h]ow immigrants appear for removal proceedings
constitutes part of the process of these proceedings.”378 Thus, § 1252(b)(9)
precludes jurisdiction because “Plaintiffs are challenging, by seeking to enjoin,
a ‘part of the process by which . . . removability will be determined . . . .’”379

(recognizing a “well-settled presumption . . . that allow[s] judicial review of administrative
action . . . .”) (citing Bowen v. Michigan Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 671 (1986)); see
also Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 379-80 (1962) (refusing to deny judicial review in the absence of
“clear and convincing evidence that Congress so intended”); Benson, supra note 25, at 1458
(“Litigants [trying to evade the strictures of § 1252(b)(9)] will also rely on the long line of cases
which hold that courts should narrowly construe statutes which seek to limit judicial review and,
absent the express intent of Congress, should preserve review of constitutional challenges.”). Benson
cites several cases that “reﬂect the presumption of preserving judicial review, especially for
constitutional questions.” Id. at 1458-59 n.215.
373 Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 840-41 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion) (explaining that the Court must read
“capacious phrases” like “arising from” narrowly, as it did in AADC); Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents
of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1907 (2020) (describing the provision as “targeted” and “narrow”).
374 Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 841 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
375 See Flores Valle v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf ’t, No. 19-2254, 2019 WL 7756069, at *1, *5
(N.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 2019) (challenging the use of videoconference technology in ICE’s Dallas Field
Oﬃce); Rivas Rosales v. Barr, No. 20-00888, 2020 WL 1505682, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2020)
(challenging the use of videoconference technology in individual removal proceedings).
376 P.L. v. U.S. Immigr. Customs Enf ’t, No. 19-01336, 2019 WL 2568648, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y.
June 21, 2019).
377 Id.
378 Id. at *3.
379 Id.
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Although only a few courts outside the videoconference technology context
have explored it,380 this language from Jennings must be construed narrowly.
Under a broad reading, it could sweep a wide swath of claims into § 1252(b)(9).
For example, Efrain and Mia challenged the Trump administration’s MPP
policy.381 In the context of the three challenges approach, the government might
have argued that the policy is part and parcel of the process by which
removability will be determined—in this instance, at the U.S.-Mexican border.
But because this is the type of “cramming judicial review” that would be
“absurd,” courts must avoid reading this third category of claims too broadly
and overlook that explicit warning from Jennings.382
Claims such as those in the videoconference technology cases may struggle
to find their way into federal district court given this language from Jennings.
Noncitizens could frame videoconference technology or similar claims as
challenges to the circumstances of detention, or assert that their right to
counsel has been violated, although such arguments failed in P.L.383 Without
alternative strategies, though, the third category of the “three challenges
approach” seems to sweep these types of claims into the ambit of § 1252(b)(9).
5. Eﬀect on Removal Proceedings
Another factor that courts use when analyzing “arising from” is whether
granting relief would have bearing on the underlying merits of removal
proceedings. This factor is most frequently used in challenges where a removal
order has already become final, but after Jennings, a similar consideration has
made its way into a small subset of pre-removal order challenges as well.384
For example, a noncitizen challenged his continued detention during
removal proceedings on the grounds that he was not subject to mandatory
detention.385 The court held that because the resolution of the continued

380 See e.g., Ali v. Barr, 464 F. Supp. 3d 549, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (holding claims that sought
to enjoin ﬁling deadlines until after the government lifted the stay-at-home orders related to the
pandemic were part of the process by which removability will be determined and thus fell into the
scope of § 1252(b)(9)).
381 See Brief for Plaintiﬀs, supra note 1.
382 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 840 (2018) (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion).
383 See supra notes 376-379 and accompanying text.
384 See supra note 132 (describing cases where courts have deployed § 1252(a)(5) without
§ 1252(b)(9)).
385 See Torosyan v. Nielsen, No. 18-5873, 2018 WL 5784708, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2018)
(summarizing petitioner’s argument that it was unlawful to subject him to mandatory detention, as
doing so contravened the text of 8 U.S.C § 1226 and created a “new category of oﬀenses eligible for
mandatory detention that Congress did not authorize”).
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detention claims “will neither invalidate nor imply the invalidity of any
removal order he might face,” they cannot be channeled by § 1252(b)(9).386
Likewise, in a challenge to various government asylum policies brought
by a number of organizational plaintiﬀs, the court held § 1252(b)(9) did not
foreclose jurisdiction, partially because “Plaintiﬀs are not challenging any
removal order, nor would granting a remedy require any removal order to be
overturned.”387 In other words, because the court’s decision would have no
eﬀect on any singular removal proceeding, it skirted the reach of § 1252(b)(9).
When this consideration functions to bar claims, it only operates in a small
subset of pre-removal order challenges: where no removal order has been
issued but some other agency decision has already been made such that
granting relief sought would effectively negate that agency decision. Such was
the case in Gomez, where the district court was confronted with a challenge to
the policy of placing applicants for cancellation of removal in a “queue,” rather
than immediately issuing a visa.388 The court held § 1252(b)(9) precluded
jurisdiction because if the district court were to grant relief, it would “have the
effect of negating an order of removal, should one be issued.”389
This consideration must be conﬁned to this narrow group of pre-removalorder cases for two reasons. First, it cannot apply conceptually in most other
situations. For this consideration to operate, there must have been some
ancillary administrative decision made, overturning which would
substantially aﬀect a future removal order. Second, to the extent that it could
be applied in other contexts, it might be construed too broadly. Anything
could have some eﬀect on the validity of a future removal order, even if the
eﬀect were attenuated. But in the words of the Jennings plurality, such claims
are “too remote” to be “arising from” removal proceedings.390 Therefore, this
consideration has little relevance in pre-removal order challenges.

386 Id. at *3 (emphasis added). See also Tun-Cos, v. Perrotte, No. 17-943, 2018 WL 3616863, at *6
(E.D. Va. Apr. 5, 2020) (holding that noncitizens’ Bivens claims are not channeled by § 1252(b)(9)
because their “success or lack of success . . . will have absolutely no effect on the removal proceedings”).
387 Las Americas Immigrant Advocacy Ctr. v. Trump, No. 19-20051, 2020 WL 4431682, at *8
(D. Or. July 31, 2020).
388 Gomez v. McAleenan, No. 19-04199, 2019 WL 5722619, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2019).
389 Id. at *4; see also Nikolic v. Decker, No. 19-6047-LTS, 2019 WL 5887500, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 12, 2019) (holding that § 1252(b)(9) channels claims that allege failure to accommodate
noncitizen’s disabilities because they “cannot be remedied without ﬁrst invalidating the ﬁnal order
of removal that has been entered against him,” though it was pending appeal to the Board of
Immigration Appeals); Calmo v. Sessions, No. C 17-07124, 2018 WL 2938628, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June
12, 2018) (holding that § 1252(b)(9) channels claims that challenge continued detention because “we
cannot review one without reviewing the other,” referring to the removal order).
390 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 841 n.3 (2018) (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion).
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6. An Action Taken or Proceeding Brought
The ﬁnal consideration pertains not to “arising from” but rather to the
language that follows. Section 1252(b)(9) states that the provision only
applies to legal questions “arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to
remove an alien from the United States . . . .” 391 If a noncitizen’s claims do
not challenge an “action taken or proceeding brought to remove” her, those
claims would necessarily fall outside the ambit of § 1252(b)(9).
The only Supreme Court guidance on this part of the provision comes from
Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Jennings, which interpreted § 1252(b)(9)
extremely broadly. There, Justice Thomas delineated between actions that are
“congressionally authorized” or “meant to ensure that an alien can be
removed” and those that “go beyond the Government’s lawful pursuit of its
removal objective.”392 According to Justice Thomas, claims challenging the
former—like those in Jennings—are swept into § 1252(b)(9), whereas those
challenging the latter likely fall outside the provision’s scope.393
For example, courts have agreed that § 1252(b)(9) does not bar Bivens
claims brought by noncitizens that challenge ICE’s allegedly illegal conduct
when initially stopping and detaining the noncitizens.394 Drawing from
language in Justice Thomas’s concurrence, two courts found it signiﬁcant that
the noncitizens were not challenging conduct that was “congressionally
authorized” nor “meant to ensure that an alien can be removed.”395 Instead,
the noncitizens were challenging “actions that go beyond the Government’s
lawful pursuit of its removal objective[s]” and challenges to such actions
cannot be swept into the reach of § 1252(b)(9).
This consideration could be broadened and applied in contexts outside of
Bivens claims. For example, in the videoconference technology cases
discussed above, a noncitizen could argue that indiscriminate deployment of
videoconference technology in lieu of in-person hearings is a
noncongressionally-authorized action taken to remove a noncitizen.396
Relying on Justice Thomas’s concurrence, a court might reasonably conclude
that such a challenge falls outside of the reach of § 1252(b)(9).
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) (emphasis added).
Id. at 855 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id.
See Tun-Cos, v. Perrotte, No. 17-943, 2018 WL 3616863, at *6 (E.D. Va. Apr. 5, 2020) (concluding
that the plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims were outside the scope of § 1252(b)(9)); Nava v.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 435 F. Supp. 3d 880, 904 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss
plaintiff’s complaint alleging Fourth Amendment violations for lack of jurisdiction).
395 Tun-Cos, 2018 WL 3616863 at *6 (citing Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 855 (Thomas, J., concurring);
see also Nava, 435 F. Supp. 3d at 891 (“[I]n Jennings, the Court’s discussion of detention as an action
taken to remove a non-citizen appears to have contemplated lawful detention.”) (emphasis in original).
396 See supra note 375 and accompanying text (discussing videoconference technology cases).
391
392
393
394
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CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court took an important step in Jennings to narrow the
scope of § 1252(b)(9). But because it failed to provide a comprehensive
interpretation of the provision, lower courts have been tasked with
eﬀectuating the narrow reading Jennings counsels. This Comment seeks to
provide those courts with the tools necessary to eﬀectuate that reading.
Whether lower courts interpret § 1252(b)(9) narrowly is not merely a
matter of adhering to Supreme Court precedent. Their reading of the
provision has signiﬁcant practical consequences for noncitizens, who must
frequently seek urgent relief in federal district court. Whether it is a group
of hundreds of noncitizen workers rounded up in an ICE raid and fast-tracked
for deportation, or a father and daughter facing imminent expulsion to
Mexico, the federal district court is often the best and potentially only forum
where noncitizens can meaningfully seek relief. But when an executive can
take harsh action against noncitizens and then wield § 1252(b)(9) to preclude
any judicial review of its alleged abuses, immigrants are mired in a catch-22.
For that reason, it is essential that § 1252(b)(9)—and provisions like it—
are read narrowly. Jennings was an important step, but more must be done.
Federal courts now must clearly and consistently apply a narrow
interpretation of § 1252(b)(9) to ensure noncitizens have fundamental access
to justice. The diﬀerence, after all, can be one of life and death.
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APPENDIX: CHART OF MAJOR § 1252(b)(9) CASES SINCE JENNINGS
This chart, recent as of November 17, 2020, compiles all the non-Supreme
Court cases since Jennings that cite and discuss § 1252(b)(9) with some level
of detail. Those that merely cite the provision or mention it only in passing
are not included in this chart. The chart is organized ﬁrst by the type of claim,
with the intent that similar claims appear in consecutive order, and then by
jurisdiction, which is organized by circuit.

Yes

No

No

No (except
claim re:
asylum-free
zones)

Challenging asylum
decision, right to
reopen, and detention

Challenging asylum
policy

Challenging asylum
policy

Challenging asylum
policy

1st

9th

9th

9th.

Hussein v. Brackett,
No. 18-273, 2018 WL
2248513, at *3-4
(D.N.H. May 16,
2018)

E. Bay Sanctuary v.
Trump, 950 F.3d
1242, 1269-71 (9th
Cir. 2020)

Al Otro Lado, Inc. v.
McAleenan, 423 F.
Supp. 3d 848, 862-63
(S.D. Cal. 2019)

Las Americas
Immigrant Advoc.
Ctr. v. Trump, No.
19-02051, 2020 WL
4431682, at *6-8 (D.
Or. July 31, 2020)

(B)(9) BARS
CLAIMS?

CLAIMS

CIR.

CASE

• Claims do not plainly challenge any decision to detain an
alien
• Plaintiffs not challenging any removal order, nor would
granting a remedy require any removal order to be overturned
• Plaintiffs challenge immigration process
• Plaintiﬀs do not have access to PFR process for their
asserted claims

• Not challenging removal order, decision to seek removal,
or any step that has been taken to determine removability
• Plaintiﬀs seek to commence such proceedings

• The provision applies “only to removal orders” and
because a bar to asylum eligibility is not linked with removal
orders and thus (b)(9) is irrelevant

• Asylum claim “arises from” because INA violated only if
removal order executed
• Right to reopen “arises from” because right exists because
of removal order
• Detention “arises from” because he would not be detained
without order

REASONING

Yes

Yes

No

No

CITING
Jennings OR
Regents?
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CLAIMS

Challenging asylum
policy

Challenging asylum
policy

Challenging BIA’s
removability decision

CIR.

D.C.

D.C.

4th.

CASE

Cap. Area
Immigrants’ Rts.
Coal. v. Trump, No. 192117, 2020 WL
3542481, at *8 (D.D.C.
June 30, 2020)

O.A. v. Trump, 404
F. Supp. 3d 109, 12838 (D.D.C. 2019)

Urbina v. Barr, No. 20235, 2020 WL 3002344,
at *4-5 (E.D. Va. June
4, 2020)
Yes

No

No

(B)(9) BARS
CLAIMS?

• BIA’s removability decision “arises from” his removal
proceedings
• Plaintiﬀ can challenge removability in petition for review

• The challenged Rule is not an “ action taken . . . to
remove an alien” and was not promulgated as part of a
removal proceeding
• Not “ arising from” removal proceedings but from the
challenged rulemaking
• Congress did not intend for (b)(9) to swallow APA
challenges to rulemaking
• Collateral challenge
• Reviewability concerns
• Challenges outside competence/expertise of asylum
officers, immigration judges, and BIA

• No support for proposition that organizations may not
facially challenge under the APA immigration-related
regulations that harm their own interests
• No removal proceedings at issue here so provision is not
implicated

REASONING

Yes

Yes

Yes

CITING
Jennings OR
Regents?
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CLAIMS

Challenging BIA’s sua
sponte decision to
reopen and remand
removal proceedings
Challenging conditions
of conﬁnement and
claiming right to
counsel

Challenging conditions
of pre-hearing
detention

Challenging continued
detention (after denial
of bond petitions)
Challenging continued
detention (alleging due
process concerns in
bond hearings)

CIR.

3d

9th

9th.

9th

6th

CASE

Ndaula v. Hoover, No.
19-1152, 2020 WL
996761, at *3-4 (M.D.
Pa. Mar. 2, 2020)

Torres v. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., 411
F. Supp. 3d 1036,
1046-49 (C.D. Cal.
2019)

Innovation L. Lab v.
Nielsen, 342 F. Supp.
3d 1067 (D. Or. 2018)

Ramos v. Sessions, 293
F. Supp. 3d 1021, 107678 (N.D. Cal. 2018)

Malam v. Adducci,
452 F. Supp. 3d 643,
653 (E.D. Mich.
2020)

• Jennings is on point because here claims challenge continued
detention

• Jennings aﬃrmed that (b)(9) is not a jurisdictional bar to
habeas cases challenging denial of bond
• Jennings conﬁrmed that bond petitions are not challenging
decision to detain in ﬁrst place or to seek removal

• No challenge to removal proceedings because they have
not yet commenced
• The mere fact that a noncitizen has been detained does
not mean that (b)(9) presents a bar to all claims arising from
circumstances of that detention

• Primarily conditions-of-confinement claims and Aguilar,
upon which J.E. F.M. relies, assumed claims regarding
detention conditions are independent of removal proceedings
• Extending Arroyo to both represented and unrepresented
plaintiffs because relationships burdened with regard to nonremoval immigration proceedings
• Immigration judges have limited power over claims

• Petitioner is not seeking to challenge a ﬁnal order of
removal
• Chehazeh did not preclude review in district court of BIA’s
sua sponte decision to reopen removal proceedings

REASONING

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

CITING
Jennings OR
Regents?
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No

No

No

No

(B)(9) BARS
CLAIMS?

848
[Vol. 169: 783

CLAIMS

Challenging continued
detention (alleging due
process concerns in
bond hearings)
Challenging continued
detention (because
alleges not subject to
mandatory detention)
Challenging continued
detention (because
alleges not subject to
mandatory detention)
Challenging continued
detention (because
alleges not subject to
mandatory detention)
Challenging continued
detention (because
alleges not subject to
mandatory detention)

CIR.

9th.

1st

2d

9th.

9th

CASE

Calmo v. Sessions, No.
C 17-07124, 2018 WL
2938628, at *2 (N.D.
Cal. June 12, 2018)

Aguayo v. Martinez,
No. 20-00825, 2020
WL 2395638, at *4 (D.
Colo. May 12, 2020)

Sophia v. Decker, No.
19-9599, 2020 WL
764279, at *1-2
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14,
2020)

Vasquez Cruz v. Barr,
No. 19-05251, 2019 WL
6327576, at *3-4 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 26, 2019)

Torosyan v. Nielsen,
No. 18-5873, 2018 WL
5784708, at *3-6 (C.D.
Cal. Sept. 27, 2018)
No

No

Yes

No

Yes

(B)(9) BARS
CLAIMS?

• Merely challenging detention decision on statutory
grounds that, whether upheld or rejected, will neither
invalidate nor imply the invalidity of any removal order he
might face

• Claims are not directed at any of those listed in Jennings
plurality
• Holding otherwise would insulate agency from review of
decision to detain

• Alleged legal error is a question of law, and provision is not
limited to questions of law that would in fact determine
removability

• Plaintiﬀ challenges interpretation and application of
statute that was made during pending removal proceedings
• Plaintiﬀ challenges decision to detain him in the ﬁrst
place

• Though claims only seek relief from immigration
detention without reaching merits of the order of removal,
they are “wholly intertwined” with merits of removal order

REASONING

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

CITING
Jennings OR
Regents?
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CLAIMS

Challenging continued
detention (while
challenge to removal
pends because claims
US citizenship)
Challenging continued
detention (while
challenge to removal
pends because claims
US citizenship)
Challenging continued
detention (without
probable cause
determination)
Challenging continued
detention during
COVID-19 pandemic

CIR.

11th

4th

2d

2d

CASE

Msezane v. Gartland,
No. 19-51, 2020 WL
1042293, at *5-6 (S.D.
Ga. Jan. 29, 2020)

Duncan v. Kavanagh,
439 F. Supp. 3d 576,
582-87 (D. Md. 2020)

Michalski v. Decker,
279 F.Supp.3d 487,
492-94 (S.D.N.Y.
2018)

Monterosa v. Decker,
No. 20-02653, 2020
WL 1847771, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11,
2020)
No

No

Yes

No

(B)(9) BARS
CLAIMS?

• Plaintiﬀ’s challenge does not fall into any of the three
categories barred in Jennings

• Plaintiff cannot be challenging an order of removal for the
“ common-sense reason” that he is not yet subject to one

• Citizenship claim is not one of those “ unusual
circumstances” in the Ninth Circuit that justified departure
from statutory scheme

• Allowing alien to avoid detention while removal
proceedings are ongoing based only on a claim of citizenship
would render entire statutory framework invalid

REASONING

Yes

No

No

Yes

CITING
Jennings OR
Regents?
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CLAIMS

Challenging conditions
of conﬁnement during
COVID-19 (court does
not consider access to
counsel claims)

Challenging continued
detention during
COVID-19 pandemic

Challenging DACA
rescission

Challenging DACA
rescission

CIR.

D.C.

9th

4th

9th

CASE

S. Poverty L. Ctr. v.
U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., No.
18-760, 2020 WL
3265533, at *14-17
(D.D.C. June 17,
2020)

Moran v. U.S. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec.,
No. 20-00696, 2020
WL 6083445, at *6-7
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 21,
2020)

Casa De Md. v. Dep’ t
of Homeland Sec., 924
F.3d 684, 697 (4th Cir.
2019)

Regents of the Univ.
of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec.,
908 F.3d 476, 504
n.19 (9th Cir. 2018),
aﬀ’d in part 140 S. Ct.
1891, 1907 (2020)
No

No

No

No

(B)(9) BARS
CLAIMS?

• Not challenging a final order of removal

• Section (b)(9) does not help government because it
“applies only with respect to review of an order of removal
under (a)(1)”

• Claims are independent of removal process

• Plaintiff does not challenge a final removal order; these
claims are analogous to the conditions of confinement claims
that plurality opinion in Jennings highlighted as collateral
• Interpreting (b)(9) to reach these claims would be
problematic because IJs are “ powerless to remedy the
conditions alleged”

REASONING

No

No

Yes

Yes

CITING
Jennings OR
Regents?
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CLAIMS

Challenging DACA
rescission

Challenging denial of
intracompany executive
transferee visa request

Challenging failure to
accommodate disability
while detained

Challenging ICE’s
conduct in initial stop
and detention
(“rounded up” 100
Cambodian nationals)

CIR.

9th

11th

2d

9th

CASE

Inland Empire—
Immigrant Youth
Collective v. Nielsen,
No. 17-2048, 2018
WL 4998230, *12-16
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 19,
2018)

Canal A Media
Holding, LLC v. U.S.
Citizenship and
Immigr. Servs., 964
F.3d 1250, 1257-58
(11th Cir. 2020)

Nikolic v. Decker,
No. 19-6047, 2019
WL 5887500, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12,
2019)

Nak Kim Chhoeun v.
Marin, No. 17-01898,
2018 WL 1941756, at
*4-5 (C.D. Cal. Mar.
26, 2018)
No

Yes

No

No

(B)(9) BARS
CLAIMS?

• Claims do not challenge any ﬁnal order of removal, but
rather challenge ICE’s conduct before they could challenge
removal orders

• Claims are “ arising from” because petitioner explicitly
challenges removal process
• Claims cannot be remedied without first invalidating final
order of removal (though appeal to BIA pending)

• No challenge to removal proceedings
• “ District Court’ s expansive interpretation of the zipper
clause does not square with that provision’ s ‘ narrow’
scope”

• Immigration judge does not have power to handle deferred
action
• Claims not “ arising from” because challenging a decision
completely separate from removal proceedings

REASONING

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

CITING
Jennings OR
Regents?
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CLAIMS

Challenging ICE’s
conduct in initial stop
and detention
(“unlawful seizure”)
Challenging ICE’s
conduct in initial stop
and detention (home
invasion)

Challenging ICE’s
conduct in initial stop
and detention (illegal
stop and search)

Challenging ICE’s
policy of delaying
issuance of NTA

CIR.

D.C.

9th

4th

7th

CASE

Neufville v. Barr, No.
19-292, 2019 WL
5537947, at *1 (D.R.I.
Oct. 25, 2019)

Ton-Cos v. Perrotte,
No. 17-943, 2018 WL
3616863, at *3-7
(E.D. Va Apr. 5,
2018) rev’d on other
grounds, 922 F.3d 514
(4th Cir. 2019)

Nava v. Dep’ t of
Homeland Sec., 435 F.
Supp. 3d 880, 888-95
(N.D. Ill. 2020)

Aguilar v. U.S.
Immigr. & Customs
Enf’t , 346 F. Supp.
3d 1174, 1183-84
(N.D. Ill. 2018)
No

No

No

Yes

(B)(9) BARS
CLAIMS?

• Because plaintiffs, like those in Jennings, only challenge
circumstances of their detention, (b)(9) is inapplicable

• “An illegal stop conducted before government has any
legitimate reason to believe subject is removable cannot be
an ‘action taken . . . to remove an alien’”
• Accords with Jennings concurrence because challenging
unlawful conduct
• Claims “collateral,” PFR would be “absurd” result
• Reviewability not suﬃcient here

• Seeking damages, not challenging the three listed in
Jennings plurality
• Accords with Jennings concurrence because challenging
unlawful conduct
• Success in this action will have “absolutely no eﬀect” on
removal proceedings
• Removal proceedings cannot provide relief they seek

• Review of removal orders “ includes all matters on which
the validity of the final order is contingent” and here claims
must be sought through PFR

REASONING

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

CITING
Jennings OR
Regents?
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CLAIMS

Challenging ICE’s
practice of arresting
noncitizens in federal
courthouse

Challenging ICE’s
procedure to revoke
order of supervision
Challenging ICE’s
selective enforcement
policy as
unconstitutional and in
violation of APA

Challenging ICE’s use
of immigration
detainers

CIR.

9th

5th

9th

9th

CASE

Velazquez-Hernandez
v. U.S. Immigr. &
Customs Enf’t, No.
20-2060, 2020 WL
6712223, at *3 (S.D.
Cal. Nov. 16, 2020)

Alam v. Nielsen, 312
F. Supp. 3d 574, 580
(S.D. Tex. 2018)

NWDC Resistance v.
Immigr. & Customs
Enf’t, No. 18-5860
2020 WL 5981998, at
*5-8 (W.D. Wash.
Oct. 8, 2020)

Gonzalez v. United
States Immigr. and
Customs Enf’ t, 975
F.3d 788, 810-11 (9th
Cir. 2020)
No

No

No

No

(B)(9) BARS
CLAIMS?

• Class of plaintiﬀs is not challenging “any removal
proceedings” and they are challenging the legality of
detention, which is outside the provision’s scope

• Noting that Jennings narrowed Ninth Circuit precedent and
holding that (b)(9) is inapplicable to claims that do not
challenge any removal order or part of the process by which
removability would be determined

• Claims do not challenge order of removal, but rather the
process that ICE followed in cancelling Order of Supervision
and returning plaintiff to detention

• The provision is “ targeted” and “ narrow” and is not a
bar where, as here, parties are not challenging any removal
proceedings

REASONING

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

CITING
Jennings OR
Regents?
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CLAIMS

Challenging ICE’s use
of immigration
detainers

Challenging policy of
putting applicants in
“queue” for
cancellation

Challenging practice of
detaining noncitizens
who come to USCIS
for waiver interview
(see I-130 cases)
Challenging probable
cause determination
and prompt
presentment

CIR.

9th

9th

4th

9th

CASE

Roy v. Los Angeles
Cnty., No. 12-09012,
2018 WL 914773, at
*17-19 (C.D. Cal. Feb
7, 2018)

Gomez v.
McAleenan, No. 1904199, 2019 WL
5722619, at *3-4
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 5,
2019)

Sanchez v. McAleenan,
No. 19-1728, 2020 WL
607032, at *5 (D. Md.
Feb 7. 2020)

Cancino-Castellar v.
Nielsen, 338 F. Supp.
3d 1107, 1110-18 (S.D.
Cal. 2018)
Yes/No

No

Yes

No

(B)(9) BARS
CLAIMS?

• Fourth Amendment probable cause claims “ arising from”
because challenge decision to detain them in the first place and to
seek removal. Reviewability not the inquiry and any remedy
would impede removal proceedings
• Fifth Amendment prompt presentment claims do not “ arise
from” because challenging conduct of immigration authorities
delaying removal process, thus, essentially prolonged detention

• Claims “arise from” not an “action taken” but from
allegation that DHS has adopted new policy that nulliﬁes its
own rules

• Since claims ask for relief that will have effect of negating an
order of removal, should one be issued, they must be brought
through PFR

• Claims relate to ICE officers’ actions before removal
proceedings were filed, do not seek to disrupt outcome of
removal proceedings, thus independent of removal process
• Reviewability concern for those who never will be in
removal proceedings

REASONING

Yes

No

No

No

CITING
Jennings OR
Regents?
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CLAIMS

Challenging process of
removal proceedings

Challenging process of
removal proceedings

Challenging process of
removal proceedings,
ineﬀective assistance of
counsel

Challenging revocation
of Green Card

CIR.

3d

5th

9th

9th

CASE

Hesketh R. v.
Warden, No. 1815172, 2019 WL
1466904, at *2
(D.N.J. Apr. 2, 2019)

Benitez-Garay v.
Dep’ t of Homeland
Sec., No. 18-422, 2019
WL 542035, at *5-6
(W.D. Tex. Feb. 8,
2019)

Cheema v. Curran,
No. 17-3692, 2018
WL 2090719, at *2-5
(D. Ariz. Apr. 11,
2018)

Huiwu Lai v. United
States, No. 17-1704,
2018 WL 1610189, at
*2-4 (W.D. Wash.
Apr. 3, 2018)
No

Yes

Yes

Yes

(B)(9) BARS
CLAIMS?

• “ Absent relief from this Court, Plaintiff may not have an
opportunity for relief for some of his claims”

• Both claims concern effectiveness of counsel in removal
proceedings, thus they challenge procedure of agency
determination and are “ inextricably linked” to removal
order

• Claims all relate to validity of IJ decision to deny
withholding from removal; all issues upon which validity of
order of removal is contingent and relief would be
inconsistent with removal order

• Claims are directed “ not at his detention, but instead at his
removal proceedings”
• Verde-Rodriguez is on point and dispositive

REASONING

No

No

No

No

CITING
Jennings OR
Regents?
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Challenging suﬃciency
of NTA

Challenging suﬃciency
of NTA

Challenging suﬃciency
of NTA

Challenging USCIS
decision to dismiss
adjustment of status
application for lack of
SMJ

10th

2d

3d

1st

Diaz-Ceja v.
McAleeenan, No. 1900824, 2019 WL
2774211, at *13 (D.
Col. July 2, 2019)

Asylum Seeker
Advocacy Project v.
Barr, 409 F.Supp.3d
221, 224-228
(S.D.N.Y. 2019)

Rikey R. v. Sessions,
No. 18-15613, 2018 WL
5962479, at *1-2 (D.N.J.
Nov. 13, 2018)

Patel v. Wolf, 427 F.
Supp. 3d 161, 165-66
(D. Mass. 2019)

CLAIMS

CIR.

CASE

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

(B)(9) BARS
CLAIMS?

• Claims inextricably linked to removal order because if
relief granted, would invalidate removal order

• Once an alien is subject to ﬁnal order of removal, district
court is without jurisdiction, so because petitioner is subject
to such an order, must go through PFR process

• Relief that plaintiffs seek is a “ necessary prerequisite” to
challenge removal order and such indirect challenges are barred
• Challenging two of the three problematic claims set out in
Jennings plurality

• NTA itself is not a final order of removal nor is it an
antecedent finding of “ fact or law” to such an order under
the provision

REASONING

No

No

Yes

No

CITING
Jennings OR
Regents?
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CLAIMS

Challenging USCIS
decision to dismiss
adjustment of status
application for lack of
SMJ

Challenging USCIS
decision to dismiss
adjustment of status
application for lack of
SMJ
Challenging USCIS
decision to dismiss
adjustment of status
application for lack of
SMJ

Challenging use of
video conference
(VTC) (challenge to
Dallas oﬃce policy)

CIR.

5th

5th

8th

5th

CASE

Santa Maria v.
McAleenan, No. 183996, 2019 WL
2120725, at *2-3 (S.D.
Tex. May 15, 2019)

Isaula v. Nielson, No.
18-2992, 2019 WL
93307, at *2-3 (S.D.
Tex. Jan. 3, 2019)

Herbert L.R. v.
Tritten, 421 F. Supp.
3d 688, 692-94 (D.
Minn. 2019)

Flores Valle v. U.S.
Immigr. & Customs
Enf’t , No. 19-2254,
2019 WL 7756069, at
*1-6 (N.D. Tex. Oct.
8, 2019)
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

(B)(9) BARS
CLAIMS?

• Claims challenge a “ part of the process by which . . .
removability will be determined” per Jennings
• Review will remain available to them through PFR process

• Claims challenge the procedure and substance of USCIS’ s
decision to close application, which was based on his removal
order and related removal proceedings
• Though favorable resolution of APA claim would not per se
prevent removal, claim is necessary prerequisite to adjusting his
status

• Because USCIS decision to close application is based on
removal order, challenge to that decision is “inextricably
linked” to determination relating to order

• Because USCIS closed application based on the removal
order, challenge is inextricably linked to removal order’ s
continuing validity
• Claims inextricably linked to removal order because if
relief granted, would invalidate removal order

REASONING

Yes

No

No

No

CITING
Jennings OR
Regents?
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CLAIMS

Challenging use of
video conference
(VTC) (challenge to
NY oﬃce policy)

Challenging use of
video conference
(VTC) (individual
challenge)
Claiming familial
association

Claiming familial
association

Claiming familial
association and
selective enforcement

CIR.

2d

9th

1st

6th

5th

CASE

P.L. v. U.S. Imingr. &
Customs Enf’ t, No.
19-01336, 2019 WL
2568648, at *2-4
(S.D.N.Y. June 21,
2019)

Rivas Rosales v. Barr,
No. 20-00888, 2020
WL 1505682, at *4-9
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 30,
2020)

Candra v. Cronen,
361 F. Supp. 3d 148,
155-58 (D. Mass.
2019)

Cooper Butt ex rel.
Q.T.R. v. Barr, 954
F.3d 901, 905-07 (6th
Cir. 2020)

Duron v. Johnson,
898 F.3d 644, 646-47
(5th Cir. 2018)

Yes/No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

(B)(9) BARS
CLAIMS?

• Familial association barred because relief sought is stop
removal and courts “ routinely consider” constitutional
claims via PFR
• Selective enforcement not barred because could not be raised
in initial removal proceedings

• Relief sought cannot be granted by federal court because
it would interfere with removal order

• Claims fall outside administrative process because unclear
how children could assert their separate rights under
Constitution or APA in their father’ s removal proceedings

• Joining P.L. and Flores Valle
• Claims challenge procedure utilized within immigration
proceedings; they are “ inextricably intertwined” with
process

• Claims challenge a “part of the process by which . . .
removability will be determined” per Jennings

REASONING

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

CITING
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CLAIMS

Claiming family
integrity after
detention transfer
Claiming right to be
present at proceedings
after removal

Claiming right to
counsel after detention
transfer
Claiming right to
counsel after detention
transfer

CIR.

4th

1st

9th

9th

CASE

Reyna v. Hott, No.
17-01192, 2018 WL
3551558, at *3 (E.D.
Va. Mar. 20, 2018)

Conteh v. Wolf, No.
20-10736, 2020 WL
6363910, at *4-8 (D.
Mass. Oct. 29, 2020)

Avilez v. Barr, No.
19-08296, 2020 WL
570987, at *2-4 (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 5, 2020)

Alvarez v. Sessions,
338 F. Supp. 3d.
1042, 1046-50 (N.D.
Cal. 2018)
Yes

Yes

Yes

No

(B)(9) BARS
CLAIMS?

• J.E. F.M. on point
• Jennings offers no assistance because still “ arising from,”
creates no absurdity, and no preclusion of meaningful judicial
review
• Analysis does not change depending civil or habeas claims

•FJ.E. F.M. and Alvarez are on point
• Arroyo is unpersuasive and contrary to broad language of J.E.
F.M.

• Challenging the “process by which his removability will
be determined” because he is seeking to ﬁght removal in
person as opposed to via videoconference, since he was
already removed
• Indistinguishable from Anaya Murcia, where section
1252(b)(9) precluded claims

• Jennings plurality and dissent construed (b)(9) narrowly
• Accords with Jennings concurrence because challenging
unlawful conduct

REASONING

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

CITING
Jennings OR
Regents?
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CLAIMS

Claiming right to
counsel after detention
transfer

Claiming right to
counsel and challenging
MPP and nonrefoulement

Claiming right to
counsel and right to be
present at proceedings
after removal
Claiming right to
counsel during
COVID-19 pandemic

CIR.

9th

3d

9th

D.C.

CASE

Arroyo v. DHS, No.
19-815, 2019 WL
2912848, at *12-17
(C.D. Cal. June 20,
2019)

E.O.H.C. v. Sec’y of
United States Dep’t
of Homeland Sec.,
950 F.3d 177, 184-88
(3d Cir. 2020)

Anaya Murcia v.
Godfrey, No. 19-587,
2019 WL 5597883, at
*3-8 (W.D. Wash. Oct.
10, 2019)

Nat’l Immigr. Project
of Nat’l Laws. Guild
v. Exec. Oﬀ. of
Immigr. Rev., 456 F.
Supp. 3d 16, 29-30
(D.D.C. 2020)
Yes

Yes

Yes/No

Yes/No

(B)(9) BARS
CLAIMS?

• Claims arise from the course of removal hearings
• Whether there has been a violation of right to counsel will
depend on specific facts that arise from removal proceedings

• Following the Jennings plurality, must ﬁrst identify legal
questions, which are all challenging the removal proceeding
• Declining to follow Arroyo

• MPP and non-refoulement claims not barred because by time
of final order, too late to remedy return to Mexico
• Constitutional counsel claim does not “ arise from”
removal proceedings and cannot await later review
• Statutory counsel claim barred because the right is tied to
removal proceedings themselves

• Represented not barred because counsel relationship carries
additional rights separate from removal proceedings, thus harm
accrues immediately upon transfer, without effect on removal
proceedings
• Unrepresented barred because rights cannot be violated
without reference to underlying fairness of removal proceeding
and not unreviewable because can be brought via PFR

REASONING

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

CITING
Jennings OR
Regents?
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CLAIMS

Claims unclear:
challenging legality of
detention
Seeking order
compelling BIA to
decide pending
motions and stay of
removal
Seeking stay of
removal

Seeking stay of
removal or challenging
detention while trying
to reopen case/adjust
status (I-130)
Seeking stay of
removal, grant of
credible fear interview,
and issuance of NTA

CIR.

9th

3d

D.C.

3d

9th

CASE

Paz v. California, No.
16-0003, 2019 WL
1581418, at *4 (C.D.
Cal. Feb. 11, 2019)

Patel v. Barr, No. 203856, 2020 WL
4700636, at *3-4 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 13, 2020)

A.M.P.V. v. Barr,
No. 20-913, 2020 WL
2079433, at *4-6
(D.D.C. Apr. 30,
2020)

Tazu v. Att’y Gen.
U.S., 975 F.3d 292,
299 (3d Cir. 2020)

Villanueva-Bustillos
v. Marin, 370 F.
Supp. 3d 1083, 1089
(C.D. Cal. 2018)

• Concern that petitioner will not have an opportunity for a
full and fair hearing and lack of meaningful review

• Plaintiff’ s brief re-detention was part of the process of
removing him back to his home country and the legal questions
he raises “ arise from” that “ action taken”

• Claims squarely challenging a final order of removal

• Claims do not plainly challenge any decision to detain an alien
• Plaintiffs not challenging any removal order, nor would
granting a remedy require any removal order to be overturned
• Plaintiffs challenge immigration process
• Plaintiffs do not have access to PFR process for their asserted
claims (i.e., reviewability concerns)

• PFR is the exclusive means to directly challenge a final
removal order

REASONING

No

No

No

Yes

No

CITING
Jennings OR
Regents?
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No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes
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CLAIMS

Seeking stay of
removal or challenging
detention while trying
to reopen case/adjust
status (I-130)
Seeking stay of
removal or challenging
detention while trying
to reopen case/adjust
status (changed
circumstances)
Seeking stay of
removal or challenging
detention while trying
to reopen case/adjust
status (I-130)
Seeking stay of
removal or challenging
detention while trying
to reopen case/adjust
status (I-130)

CIR.

1st

1st

2d

2d

CASE

Jimenez v. Nielsen,
334 F.Supp.3d 370,
381-82 (D. Mass.
2018)

Compere v. Nielsen,
358 F. Supp. 3d 170,
177 (D.N.H. 2019)

Calderon v. Sessions,
330 F. Supp.3d 944,
955-56 (S.D.N.Y.
2018)

You, Xiu Qing v.
Nielsen, 321 F.
Supp.3d 451, 456-60
(S.D.N.Y. 2018)
No

No

Yes

No

(B)(9) BARS
CLAIMS?

• “ Cramming” claims here into a PFR would render them
“ effectively unreviewable”
• This is independent from a challenge to removal order

• Claims are neither direct nor indirect challenges to his
removal order because merely seeks access to immigration
process

• Claims arise directly from removal proceedings

• No other means to have claims decided by court of appeal
• Immigration court cannot grant relief and court of appeals
cannot hear claim

REASONING

Yes

No

Yes

No

CITING
Jennings OR
Regents?
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CLAIMS

Seeking stay of
removal or challenging
detention while trying
to reopen case/adjust
status (I-130)
Seeking stay of
removal or challenging
detention while trying
to reopen case/adjust
status (I-130)
Seeking stay of
removal or challenging
detention while trying
to reopen case/adjust
status (I-130)
Seeking stay of
removal or challenging
detention while trying
to reopen case/adjust
status (I-130)

CIR.

2d

3d

3d

4th

CASE

Mamadjonova v. Barr,
No. 19-01317 2019
WL 6174678, at *3-7
(D. Conn. Nov. 20,
2019)

M’Bagoyi v. Barr, 423
F. Supp. 3d 99, 10407 (M.D. Pa. 2019)

De Jesus Martinez v.
Nielsen, 341 F. Supp.
3d 400, 406-08
(D.N.J. 2018)

Wanrong Lin v.
Nielsen, 377 F. Supp.
3d 556, 561-62 (D.
Md. 2019)
No

No

No

Yes

(B)(9) BARS
CLAIMS?

• Claims could not be raised in immigration court or the BIA,
as the relief sought can only be secured after such a court has
issued a removal order
• Claims do not “ arise from” an “ action taken” but from
allegation that DHS has adopted new policy that nullifies its
own rules

• Plaintiff challenges merits of a separate proceeding,
specifically that he has right to engage in provisional waiver
process before removal

• Claims not directly or indirectly challenging validity of the
order of removal because even if relief is granted, order of
removal remains untouched

• Indirect challenge to removal order because seeking to have
court stay removal so he can more easily pursue unlawful
presence waiver, with ultimate goal of staying in US (i.e., not
being removed)

REASONING

Yes

Yes

No

No

CITING
Jennings OR
Regents?
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CLAIMS

Seeking stay of
removal or challenging
detention while trying
to reopen case/adjust
status (I-130)
Seeking stay of
removal or challenging
detention while trying
to reopen case/adjust
status (changed
circumstances)
Seeking stay of
removal or challenging
detention while trying
to reopen case/adjust
status (changed
circumstances)
Seeking stay of
removal or challenging
detention while trying
to reopen case/adjust
status (I-130)

CIR.

9th

9th

9th

9th

CASE

Chhoeun v. Marin,
306 F. Supp. 3d 1147,
1157-58 (C.D. Cal.
2018)

Chaudhry v. Barr,
No. 19-0682, 2019
WL 3713762, at *7
(E.D. Cal. Aug. 7,
2019)

Sied v. Nielsen, No.
17-06785, 2018 WL
1142202, at *11-19
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 2,
2018)

Ketsoyan v. DOJ, No.
19-01198, 2019 WL
4261881 at *3-4 (C.D.
Cal. July 2, 2019)
No

No

No

No

(B)(9) BARS
CLAIMS?

• Claims seek interference with execution of final order of
removal
• Claims are challenging potential detention pursuant to
removal, which is one of the Jennings challenges

• Grounds for petition arose only after removal order was
entered
• Indirect challenge to removal order because petitioner
merely seeks a “ day in court”

• Petitioner is not raising a direct challenge to an order of
removal
• If granted, removal order would not be vacated, but rather a
“ day in court”

• Claims do not seek review of viability of removal orders
• Indirect challenge to removal order because petitioner
merely seeks a “ day in court”

REASONING

Yes

Yes

No

No

CITING
Jennings OR
Regents?
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CLAIMS

Seeking stay of
removal while T Visa is
decided on the merits

Seeking to enjoin ﬁling
deadlines until after
stay-at-home orders are
lifted (re: COVID-19)

CIR.

3d

2d

CASE

Sergio S.E. v.
Rodriguez, No. 206751, 2020 WL
5494682, at *3-5
(D.N.J. Sept. 11,
2020)

Ali v. Barr, No. 203337, 2020 WL
2986692, at *4-5
(S.D.N.Y. June 3,
2020)
Yes

No

(B)(9) BARS
CLAIMS?

• Claims here are part of the process by which removability
will be determined

• If plaintiff is removed, he will become ineligible for T Visa
and thus his claims are “ now or never”

REASONING

Yes

Yes

CITING
Jennings OR
Regents?
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